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ABSTRACT 
 
This study analyses how media initiatives have sought to improve the coverage on private 
pan-Arab television channels, of poverty, illiteracy, and violence against disadvantaged Arab 
women.  This was achieved by studying how women‘s status has been critiqued on MBC1, an 
entertainment channel, and on Al Arabiya, a news channel.  Programmes on MBC1 that 
related to poverty, illiteracy and violence were examined through the eyes of young 
disadvantaged women in a Saudi Arabian village.  How Al Arabiya and MBC1 applied media 
initiatives in their programming to improve women‘s status  was also examined through 
interviews with key players in Queen Rania‘s Media Office and in the Middle East 
Broadcasting Corporation (MBC) Group.  A textual analysis of programmes on MBC1 and Al 
Arabiya was also undertaken.   
 
The study not only contributed to knowledge by covering areas not generally explored in 
existing research, such as development related programmes about women‘s status on 
privately-owned pan-Arab satellite television, but it also explores the tug of war between two 
opposing powers in Saudi society: the reformists and the conservatives.  The study used 
different methods, including ethnographic research, focus groups, and interviews with 
disadvantaged Saudi women, interviews with key players and decision makers involved in 
media output  and, finally, a textual analysis of programmes dealing with the issues of 
poverty, illiteracy and violence.  It discovers that the contradictory forces in Saudi society are 
reflected in the way women‘s status and female empowerment are handled in television 
programmes.  This study underlines the dominant ideology that forms the essence of 
initiatives aimed at developing women‘s status through media, especially those launched by 
‗first ladies‘, and the policies made by MBC Group officials in broadcasting development 
programmes for women.  This dominant ideology was also examined in the light of the 
preconceptions and responses of disadvantaged women.  
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This study started from the premise that poverty, illiteracy and violence against women are 
the three main obstacles to development in Saudi Arabia, and it investigates how these 
obstacles are covered on private, Saudi-owned, pan-Arab satellite channels.  The private 
channels selected in this study are owned by the Middle East Broadcasting Corporation 
(MBC) Group. The first channel is MBC1, an entertainment channel, and the second is Al 
Arabiya, which is a news channel.  The study aims to discover the impact of the policies and 
codes of practice that guide television coverage of development issues, specifically with 
regard to disadvantaged Arab women.   
 
For this study, MBC1 and Al Arabiya were selected from the MBC Group for several reasons. 
Firstly, MBC1 is an entertainment channel watched by an audience of millions including 
disadvantaged women. In contrast, Al Arabiya is a news channel that is viewed by the elite 
and the decision-makers, who may be inspired by these programmes to help those in need.  
Secondly, they both broadcast in Arabic, which means they reach the entire population, 
irrespective of education or knowledge of foreign languages. Lastly, these two channels are 
managed by sophisticated media specialists whose expertise merits analysis. 
  
By watching the two channels, I found that there are programmes about disadvantaged 
women that address the points on which I am focusing in this study; namely poverty, 
illiteracy and violence against disadvantaged women
1
.  These programmes were useful for 
the focus groups I conducted with disadvantaged women in the village of Goz Al Jaafarh in 
Sabya Province, Jazan (in the south of Saudi Arabia).; the DVD that I showed participants 
                                                 
1
 Violence against women in other classes also exists but here I focus on the incidence of violence against 
disadvantaged women. 
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was composed of clips from different MBC1 programmes, illustrating the study‘s three 
development focal points. 
 
Moreover, when I read that Sheikh Waleed Al Ibrahim, the MBC Group‘s Chairman and 
Chief Executive Officer (CEO), wants to ―make a difference in the Arab world‖ and has 
ambitions to achieve greater progress with regard to modernity and the development of 
women‘s status in that world, I realised that the MBC Group is not simply a private satellite 
television channel concerned only with profit margins, but that it also has much wider 
development objectives. It became apparent that my expectations were true when I 
interviewed Sheikh Waleed Al Ibrahim and Abdul Rahman Al Rashed, Director of Al 
Arabiya.  It was clear that both are committed to achieving progress towards modernity and 
development in the Arab world, particularly with regard to women.    
 
This study covers new ground because it explores voluntary media codes of practice in the 
coverage of poverty, illiteracy, and violence against disadvantaged Arab women in village 
communities by private pan-Arab television channels.  Previous studies of Arab television 
that have targeted disadvantaged groups have mostly focused on state-run channels, despite 
the fact that private channels have more viewers and can, as a result, have a greater impact on 
public opinion.      
  
1.1 Saudi Arabia and the Development of Women’s Status     
There is a dearth of statistics in Saudi Arabia on women‘s status, especially on poverty, 
illiteracy and violence against disadvantaged village women.  In this study, poverty in Saudi 
Arabia is defined as relating to those who are dependent on the government‘s social security.  
According to data from the Human Development Report, 2008, unemployment among Saudi 
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women is up to 79.9%.  Globally, Saudi Arabia has the highest proportion of women who 
were economically dependent on men (quoted in Metcalfe et al, 2011, pp.151-152).          
          
One of the main ways to assist those in need in Saudi Arabia is through social security 
benefits.  Any Saudi individual is eligible for social security if their income is SR1,291 
(Saudi Riyals) a month (the equivalent of approximately £219 GBP), or less.  Where the head 
of the household (usually the father) has eight or more members in his nuclear family, he is 
eligible for social security if the family‘s monthly income is SR4,275 or less.  Social security 
in Saudi Arabia has seen several transformations.  When first introduced in 1961, it consisted 
of SR360 a year, and for a family of seven, SR1,540.  In 1992, the security benefits were 
raised by 138%.  In 2005, King Abdullah bin Abulaziz increased the upper limit to SR28,000 
per year.  In 2006, further changes were made to the social security system by adding the 
eighth individual to the family, bringing the maximum to SR 31,100 annually (The Annual 
Statistical Book, 2005/2006, pp.198, 199).  Since the head of the household, is usually the 
father or husband, which means they are usually in charge of social security benefits, women 
depend on men for access to them.   
 
The General Administration of Girls' Education was established independently from the 
Ministry of Education in 1960 and was put under the administration of the Ministry in 2002.  
Girls‘ education became the responsibility of the Ministry of Education, after a fire at a girls' 
school in Mecca, killed fifteen young girls in 2002.  The religious police (Promotion of 
Virtue and the Prevention of Vice) prevented girls from leaving the burning building and 
hindered rescue workers from rescuing them, because the girls were not wearing the correct 
Islamic dress (Hamdan, 2004, p.44).  The number of women receiving education in Saudi 
Arabia has steadily increased since the 1960s (World Bank, 2009) and the amount spent on 
 12 
education for both girls and boys in Saudi Arabia in the period 1995-2012 was in the region 
of SR1.7 trillion (Human Resource Development, 2012).  However, this spending is out of 
synch with the high unemployment rate among Saudi women.  This may be explained by the 
fact that the degrees that women are permitted to undertake do not always match market 
needs and women are still prohibited from studying certain subjects, such as engineering, 
politics and architecture.  In Saudi Arabia, women in the labour force are mainly within the 
education sector.  The shortage of public and private universities for women has caused a 
large number of young, single women to stay at home, particularly as work opportunities 
remain limited (World Bank, 2009).  The requirement for a male guardian‘s approval for a 
woman to receive education has deprived women of the right to education in numerous cases, 
and this has led to a high illiteracy rate among women compared with men.  According to 
statistics from the Ministry of Education, in 2007 the number of illiterate women reached 
62,441, while the number of illiterate men stood at only 22,623, so the ratio of illiterate 
women to men was just under three to one (Al Abdeen, 2008, p.9).  It is important to 
highlight here that primary education in Saudi Arabia is not compulsory.      
 
Women in Saudi Arabia experience both physical and psychological violence.  Physical 
violence involves the use of physical force by one person (usually a male) over another 
(usually a female) in order to exert power and often to enforce their will.  In Saudi Arabia 
there are two human rights associations; the National Society for Human Rights, a non-
governmental body set up in 2004, and the Human Rights Commission, a government 
association established in 2005.  According to the National Society for Human Rights, 
psychological violence includes emotional deprivation, verbal abuse and depriving women of 
their right to choose a spouse, and to be free to hold their own opinions (National Society for 
Human Rights, 2006, p.93).  Sexual violence includes being forced into prostitution or sexual 
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harassment or rape by a family member.  The number of cases involving sexual violence 
reported to the National Society for Human Rights between its inception in 2004 and the end 
of 2006, was 80 (Ibid, p.94).  Financial violence includes the imposition of guardianship and 
custody by men over women, depriving them of their inheritance, their salaries and any 
household income.  The number of cases of financial abuse reported to the National Society 
for Human Rights in the same period was 156 (Ibid, p.94).  Social abuse includes reinforcing 
the perceptions that women are inferior and preventing women from demanding their rights; 
depriving them of their right to education, denying their rights to marriage, custody of their 
children after divorce, or preventing them from seeing their children, and rejecting divorce 
even where cohabitation is impossible.  The number of cases of such abuse reported to the 
National Society for Human Rights between 2004 and 2006 was 644 (Ibid, p.94).  The 
number of instances is likely to be much higher, as violence goes unreported by women for 
several reasons, including fear of recrimination from their partner, fear of being without a 
husband‘s financial support, fear of losing their children and the risk of defamation.  
 
The seventh report from the National Society for Human Rights stated that 20% of the cases 
reported to the association in 2010 related to domestic violence, the highest since the 
association‘s establishment in 2004.  Among these cases, husbands make up the majority of 
perpetrators, followed by fathers.  Physical and sexual violence is the most common form of 
violence in these reports, followed by denying women the right to marry.  Husbands were the 
primary cause of personal status
2
 cases, followed by ex-husbands.  The most common 
problems in these cases were mothers being deprived of their rights to see their children and 
of their right to alimony (Saudi Women's Rights Forums, 2011). 
 
                                                 
2
 Personal status: Laws related to family relationship such as divorce, children‘s custody, and legal guardian.   
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1.1.1 Disadvantaged Saudi women in the village of Goz Al Jaafarh 
 
I chose Jazan for my fieldwork because the specific issues that I am addressing in my 
research, namely poverty, illiteracy and violence against Arab women in village 
communities, are prevalent in Jazan.  To narrow the focus area down, I chose a village I 
consider representative of the area, called Goz Al Jaafarh.  Jazan is in the south-west of Saudi 
Arabia near the Yemeni border, and has the highest rate of illiteracy among women in Saudi 
Arabia at 31.6%.  Illiteracy is much higher among Saudi women than among Saudi men in all 
regions within the Kingdom (Ministry of Economy & Planning, Central Department of 
Statistics and Information, 2007, p.31).  Poverty, in this study, is defined as relating to those 
who are on government subsidies, including social security and a pension, as well as those 
reliant on charity handouts.  There are 30,000 people receiving social security in Sabya 
Province alone.  There are six social security offices in the Jazan region, which are located in 
the following provinces: Sabya, Al Dayer, Farasan, Samta, Markaz Eban (Ibid, p.203).  
Training subsidies distributed by charities to women in Jazan total SR 100,000, and the total 
amount of emergency relief subsidies was SR 150, 000 for the fiscal year 2005-2006 (Ibid, 
2006, p. 166).  Jazan does not have the highest recorded incidence of domestic violence in 
Saudi Arabia; in 2009 there were a total of 30 reported cases, compared with 91 in Riyadh 
and 77 in Jeddah (Statistics Issues of the Society, 2009).  However, the number of cases 
recorded may be far fewer than the actual number, as only 31% of reports made to the 
National Society for Human Rights were by women, compared with 69% by men (Ibid, 
2009).  Women are constrained by traditions and by fear, which I observed first hand in the 
village, preventing them from reporting to the National Society for Human Rights.      
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1.2 The Study’s Contribution to Knowledge 
The study aims to contribute to knowledge by covering three areas that are not generally 
explored in existing research.  The first is the study of media initiatives in the coverage of 
poverty, illiteracy, and violence against rural/village Arab women on private pan-Arab 
television channels, which has not been covered by the existing literature.  The second area is 
the study of the development of women‘s status programmes on pan-Arab television, such as 
the MBC Group, which is a private, commercial media conglomerate.  The third area is the 
study of young disadvantaged Saudi Arabian village women‘s media consumption of MBC1 
programmes relating to poverty, illiteracy and violence.  Most studies that deal with Saudi 
women focus on the privileged and the educated; disadvantaged Saudi women are not only 
voiceless, but are treated as if they simply do not exist.   
  
The Arab media tend to centre on either politics or entertainment programmes specifically 
directed at the elites, rather than on the immediate local development concerns of each Arab 
country, and they completely ignore rural or village areas.  Both rural/village women and 
poor/urban Arab women are almost totally absent from the media, which are arguably more 
preoccupied with educated and privileged women.  Sahar Khamis commented during her 
research that the media focus on images of rural women and the effects of media on women 
in general, rather than on women‘s responses to media messages that are specifically targeted 
at them (Khamis, 2007, p.107).  Such responses were investigated in my ethnographic study 
of young, disadvantaged Saudi Arabian women.  There is a lack of research on Saudi 
women‘s media consumption and nothing on the underprivileged, as there is a widely-held 
belief worldwide that disadvantaged Saudis do not exist and everybody in Saudi Arabia is 
well-off. 
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Most studies on women‘s reception of Arab television focus on state television channels 
rather than private ones, although the latter have more viewers and so may have a greater 
impact on public opinion, e.g., Abu-Lughod analysed Egyptian state television through the 
eyes of marginalized women.  My main reason for choosing this commercial private media 
group is, as Ayish discussed in his study (Ayish, 1997, p.480) that private commercial 
television channels, such as MBC, allow greater freedom of expression in news provision and 
information programming, in contrast to government-controlled satellite channels.  MBC1 
was chosen for my ethnographic study as it is considered the channel of Arab family issues 
and is the most watched channel in Saudi Arabia, reaching as many as 70% of all viewers 
(Arab Media Outlook, 2009-2013, p.45).  Even though the MBC Group, mainly MBC1 and 
Al Arabiya, is widely watched in the Arab region, especially among Saudis, there are hardly 
any academic studies on it.  MBC1 is always studied as a commercial channel, as in Ayish‘s 
article, ‗Arab Television Goes Commercial: A Case Study of the Middle East Broadcasting 
Centre‘, but no academic studies have examined it as socio-educational entertainment, by 
analysing the programmes that cover the development of women‘s status issues.  
  
In my study of MBC1 and Al Arabiya I will look at the development of women‘s status in 
relation to poverty, illiteracy and violence on these two channels, with special reference to 
drama, situation comedy, and talk shows.  I aim the extent to which voluntary media codes of 
practice, such as Queen Rania‘s Media Initiative, are being applied on MBC1 and Al Arabiya 
and, where they are under-applied, to discover the reasons for this.  More generally, I aim to 
find out how pan-Arab television or private television programming, can affect the 
development of women‘s status in the region.   
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1.2.1 Research Questions 
 
Main Research Question: To what extent have MBC1 and Al Arabiya applied pan-Arab 
media initiatives in their programming on the development of Arab women‘s status?  How 
and why have they been implemented? How do disadvantaged Saudi village women perceive 
television programmes that cover development issues?  
Sub-Research Questions: 
 How do the commercial objectives of MBC1 and Al Arabiya influence their 
scheduling of programmes about development in general, and those for disadvantaged 
women in particular?    
 What kind of cooperation exists between these channels, development organizations 
and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that tackle poverty, illiteracy, and 
violence against Arab women?  Are these examples of cooperation reflected in the 
programmes?    
 What has been the impact of the elite‘s media initiatives on the development of 
women‘s status? 
 What kind of barriers or obstacles might make managers and decision-makers in 
MBC1 and Al Arabiya opt out of producing development programmes? 
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Chapter 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW & THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
   
This chapter explores some key theories in development and media and is divided into four 
parts.  The first discusses development theories related to the international arena: the Arab 
world‘s struggle with development; women‘s struggle with development, particularly 
poverty, illiteracy and violence; and attitudes towards development in Saudi Arabia. The 
second part discusses private pan-Arab satellite television, employing theories about media 
policies and the political economy of media.  The third part focuses on communication for 
development theories and the fourth on women and television genres, including women‘s 
views of entertainment channels and theories about women and news.  This theoretical 
overview creates a framework for investigating, among other things, whether a dominant 
ideology pertaining to women and development underlies the development policies and 
media strategies adopted by private pan-Arab satellite television channels and, if so, what this 
dominant ideology is.   
 
2.1 Dominant Ideologies of Development    
Since this study focuses on disadvantaged Saudi Arabian women as a development issue and, 
in relation to private pan-Arab television, the first term that must be critically examined is the 
definition of development.  Historically, there has been a general consensus among 
development experts that the word‘s current is economic development.  As Rist has shown 
(2008), there have been several development theories and studies supporting this definition, 
but what will be revealed in this study is the dominant ideology of this economic 
development, for example, the Point Four Programme, a development assistance programme 
announced by the United States President Harry S. Truman in his inaugural address on 20
th
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January, 1949, marked the beginning of the ‗age of development‘.  Below is an extract from 
Truman‘s speech, illustrating the emphasis on development and ‗underdevelopment‘ as 
economic phenomena.   
 
“Fourth, we must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our 
scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth 
of underdeveloped areas” (quoted in Rist, 2008, p.71) 
 
Here, underdeveloped means economically backward and also initiates the dichotomy 
between the developed North and the underdeveloped South.  As Rist has shown, this 
hegemonic view gave rise to the dependency school of thought, by stressing the responsibility 
that the North industrial countries have with regard to the poor countries of the South (Ibid, 
p.71).  Underdeveloped countries, here, are the poor that ―lack‖ what the rich possess in 
terms of financial wealth, and thus economic development is seen as the solution to poverty 
eradication. This assumption is made without taking into account the historical backgrounds 
of the poor, and also disregards any non-economic or cultural issues as priorities (Ibid, p.79).  
 
Rostow, an American economist and political theorist and author of The Stages of Economic 
Growth: A non-communist manifesto-1960, developed an economic theory that supports 
Truman‘s views.  Rostow was known for his evolutionist theory that played a role in 
development theory and was based on five categories of economic growth: traditional 
society, preconditions for take-off, the take-off, the drive for maturity, and the age of mass-
consumption.  For Rostow, development meant economic growth and so, everything should 
be employed to fulfil this goal.  According to such thinking, societies should be transformed 
from those of the traditional South to those of the modern North.  This is, a market society, 
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and such a change in the South would not be achieved without a shake up by the North.  Such 
aid from the North was not to assist other nations, but to further economic growth (Ibid, p.94-
99).  In The Passing of Traditional Society, Daniel Lerner shares Rostow‘s conception of 
modernity, writing ―the people of the Middle East wanted social change, development, and a 
better standard of living.  These desirable goals were embedded in the living example of the 
USA: What America is … the modernizing Middle East seeks to become‖ (quoted in Sparks, 
2007, pp.21-22).         
 
François Perroux, French economist and Professor at the Collège de France, who founded the 
Institut de Sciences Economiques Appliquées in 1944, was critical of these dominant 
Western economic policies toward the Third World: 
 
“Since the beginning of the modern industry, Western societies have been structures 
based upon domination…. As much as they could, they have denied workers and 
colonial peoples the right to speak, seeing them respectively as the „the dangerous 
classes‟ and „infant peoples‟.  When the right to speak was conceded, it was so that 
everything could be discussed except the essentials….  Political rights and colonial 
parliaments were not originally meant to challenge colonialist domination.  The 
granting of the right to speak is itself a means of struggle: it maintains the forms of 
inequality and domination bound up with the social order” (quoted in Rist, 2008, 
p.105).  
 
Dudley Seers, Director of the Institute for Development Studies, Sussex University, 1967- 
1972, shared Perroux‘s analysis.  Seers critiqued the dominant economic paradigm taught in 
universities, as it is based on developed countries‘ hegemony and is therefore inapplicable to 
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underdeveloped countries.  For that reason, he implied that ‗development economics‘ were 
more applicable to dominant countries.  In this case, economics would become a ‗local‘ 
discipline, not a ‗science‘ one with global relevance.  Gilbert Rist, Professor at the Graduate 
Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva, argued that Seers did not 
recognise that the prevalence of the dominant economic paradigm limits the independence of 
‗development economics‘ as it obliges them to work within the dominant paradigm (Ibid, 
p.107).    
 
Some experts in international development organisations have opposed the dominant 
economic paradigm but none could realise their visions of participatory development since 
the dominant economic development in international organisations limits the autonomy of 
such development (Esteva, 2010, p. 2, 3).            
 
Although experts in rich developed countries think that economic development is the only 
means for development, they provide no justification for the number of poor citizens within 
their borders, e.g., the United States, the richest country in the world, has 30 million citizens 
living below the poverty line (Rahnema, 2010, p.184).  In addition, no international 
development organisation can provide an explanation for the pessimistic forecasts given for 
the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).  Rist‘s research suggests 
that conditions in countries of the South, except those in Southeast Asia, were worse than 
they were fifty years ago – particularly in Africa.  If goals could not be achieved for decades, 
there should logically be other strategies put forward to fulfil them (Rist, 2008, p.235-239).  
The problems of the poor need to be investigated much more analytically to establish whether 
the problem lies with poverty itself, or with the excesses of the rich; whether the problem 
comes from values like solidarity, generosity, and brotherhood in traditionally 
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underdeveloped societies, or from the characteristics of economically obsessed individuals 
concerned with greed and exploitation.  The ultimate end should be clarified: is it to create 
societies obsessed with having more or being more? (Rahnema, 2010, p.190).     
 
Muhammad Yunus, winner of the Nobel Peace Prize, 2006, explains how development 
should be defined as a human rights issue, not as a question of simply increasing a country‘s 
gross national product (GNP).  When the national economy improves, the situation of the 
poor does not necessarily correspondingly improve.  As a result, Yunus argues that 
development should be redefined.  It should only refer to a positive measurable change in the 
per capita income of the bottom 50% of the population (Yunus, 2007, p.146).       
 
Amartya Sen, winner of the Nobel Prize in Economic Science in 1998, explained in 
Development as Freedom that development cannot be achieved without the individual‘s 
economic, social and political freedom.  Sen‘s work highlights the role of social factors, such 
as gender equity, the availability of quality, affordable child-care, family size and fertility 
rates.  He acknowledges the existence of prevailing values and social values that require an 
absence of corruption and the role of trust in economic social or political relationships.  
Freedom can be exercised where a society‘s values support such freedom, but values can only 
be proliferated by public discussions and social interaction, both considered participatory 
freedoms (Sen, 1999, p.9).   
 
Even though, according to Sen, freedom is a crucial component of development, it is hard to 
apply it to entire nations, where traditions are forced upon citizens by religious leaders, 
political rulers or cultural experts.  In such nations, there is an absence of participatory 
conflict-resolution and there is a unilateral rejection of modernity in favour of tradition by 
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religious authorities and political rulers, who both cling to what they claim to be the legacy of 
the past (Ibid, p.32).  Most likely, in countries where democracy for development prevails, 
there is a ‗political conception‘ of justice that requires tolerance and pluralism.  This 
tolerance is composed of diverse beliefs applicable to everybody; all of these conditions are 
lacking in unilateral societies controlled by religious authorities (Ibid, p.233).     
 
Against the background of struggles over the dominant ideology of development between 
North and South, there is also struggle in the South itself, particularly due to challenges posed 
by the participatory development paradigm in societies where only a few people possess the 
capital and reserve the right to make important decisions themselves (Sparks, 2007, p.67).   
 
2.1.1 Dominant Ideologies of Development and Arab Identity  
We cannot discuss the development of women‘s status without considering the core problems 
of development in the Arab world.  If one were to ask an Arab individual the best ways to 
contribute to progress and development, the answer would probably be that this could be 
achieved through reviving Arab history and stimulating a combination of identities, namely 
Arab nationalism and Islamism.  According to Coury, ‗romantic nostalgia‘ has dominated 
much of Arab thinking and has blindly led many subscribers to these identities without any 
historical criticism of the past (Coury, 2005, p.2).   
 
After the decline of the Ottoman Empire and the early years following independence, Arab 
countries struggled to assert new identities.  Arab leaders not only dismissed the economic 
and social inheritance of their colonial predecessors, but they also wanted to be independent 
of any dominant Western theories of development.  Their legitimacy depended on their 
ability to interpret political independence, both in national terms and in a manner compatible 
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with Islamic ideals (Findlay, 1994, p.19).  Although Arab nationalist governments were 
secular, Islam was an integral part of Arab nationalism.  The main argument was that Islam 
could not be set apart from Arab nationalist identity, but the state must be absolutely 
separated from religion.  The Egyptian and Syrian pioneers of pan-Arab nationalism believed 
in an authoritarian state that would transform the heterogeneous populations in to one united 
nation and creed (Coury, 2005, p.4).  Egypt, under General Nasser, in 1952 was the spiritual 
home of Arab nationalism.  Other Arab nationalist countries were socialist dictatorships.  
Even though these countries experienced failures, they also achieved progressions in 
development, such as the minimising – of unemployment, the provision of health and 
education services, and the introduction of agriculture and industrial projects (Ibid, p.84).  
Advances in women‘s status in some Arab countries, such as Egypt, were reflected in the 
expansion of women's education and participation in social and vocational work.   
Nevertheless, nationalist and socialist ideologies declined due to internal and external factors.   
 
Ironically, nationalist and socialist ideologies were regarded as being dominant in some Arab 
countries, making them similar to the Western dominant ideologies against which these 
leaders were fighting.  The dominant Arab ideologies mainly emerged in opposition to 
Western capitalist hegemony, rather than being based on the needs to improve social 
development (Ibid, p.193).  The core problem was that these ideologies did not appear 
because they were supporters of development, but because they were opponents of Western 
capitalism (Sparks, 2007, p.67).  As Mohammed Abdel Al-Jabri, a contemporary Moroccan 
critic, Professor of Philosophy and Islamic Thought at Mohammed V University, Rabat, 
points out:  
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“In one word, we say that, in the Arab world, the socialist problematic was treated, 
not based on the circumstances of Arab society as a whole, and not based on the 
specificities of each of the Arab states....Thus, the modern Arab elite would prescribe 
for their society, not by analyzing its reality, but based on the results of the analysis of 
another reality, the reality of one Western state or another.  That is why there was a 
gap, a huge gap, between thought and reality, between the elite and the masses in the 
Arab world” (quoted in Aksikas, 2009, p.89).   
 
The same applies to the development of women‘s status.  Women have been subjected to 
patriarchal authoritarian regimes based on domination through contradictory laws.  One law 
does not differentiate between citizens on the basis of law, while another is based on gender 
discrimination, e.g., women are encouraged to participate in the job market so as to further 
economic development, yet, there are simultaneously no laws to protect them from honour 
crimes (Al Haidaree, 2003, p.356).      
 
The external factor that caused the decline of these socialist nationalist ideologies was the 
1967 Arab defeat in the war between several Arab states, led by Egypt, and Israel.  This 
defeat was a serious setback to these ideologies as it fostered a sense of inferiority amongst 
Arab men.  Jihad El-Khazen, a daily columnist at the Saudi-owned, Beirut based, Al Hayat 
newspaper, argues that these inferiority complexes led to Arab women‘s oppression.  He said 
men:   
 
“… see their lands being usurped and looted, their sacred places being attacked, and 
they cannot do anything about it. As a result, men turn to oppressing women, proving 
that they are no more sophisticated than porters on the street, or donkey herders, and 
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there is a saying that goes, “A man who can‟t flog a donkey, flogs the saddle‖‖ (El 
Khazen, 2011).       
 
After the failures and disappointments of the socialist nationalist ideologies, Islamist 
movements and ideologies emerged to overcome these breakdowns and to strive towards 
development.  Arab intellectuals put forward various explanations for the rise of these 
movements and ideologies.  There are both political and social factors that have contributed 
to the rise of Islamist ideologies in the Arab world.  One of the main factors that spread 
Islamist ideologies was the struggle between the oppressed and the ruling classes.  The 
oppressed classes are the poor peasants and some intellectuals, and the ruling classes are the 
foreign and political elites.  Scholars, such as Jaafar Aksikas, argue (2009) that the oppressed 
Arab masses, who were mostly disorganised and uneducated, supported these ideologies 
because they found hope in religious principles; the Arab elites supported these ideologies in 
order to confront the leftist liberal ideologies.  The Iranian Revolution in 1979, even though it 
was in a non-Arab country, fueled the rise of Islamist ideologies in the whole Middle East 
and North Africa (Aksikas, 2009, p.100).    
 
Alongside these political and social factors, Al-Jabri adds that the rise of Islamist ideologies 
was due to the dominant thoughts inside the Arab mind.  In his view, the lack of independent 
thinking by Islamists and the lack of critical analysis of the past caused a failure to achieve 
development.  Dominant ideologies emerged because of a way of thinking that always tried 
to borrow pre-existing models rather than to stir the people‘s reason (Ibid, p.93).  Al-Jabri put 
forward a reason for the block on development in the Arab world: 
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“As a whole, modern and contemporary Arab thought is ahistorical, and lacks 
minimum objectivity.  That is why its reading of tradition is fundamentalist.  It treats 
the past as if it were sacred, seeking to find in it ready-made solutions to all the 
problems of the present and the future…Thus, all Arabs model their renaissance 
project on some kind of past…It is the mechanical mental practice that seeks ready-
made solutions to all emergent problems in some origin or another” (quoted in 
Aksikas, 2009, p.69).         
             
For Al-Jabri, the modernity that will lead to development can be achieved through a 
reconstructed, enlightened, rational and critical analysis of the past.  This will set the Arab 
mind free of the dominant understanding of Islam by the development of a rational and 
critical interrogation of it.  To achieve true development and modernity, the reading of 
Islamic texts must be based on critical rational thinking.  A critical reading enables Islam to 
align itself with the present so that its positive aspects are put to use for the purpose of 
developmental needs (Ibid, p.70).  Ironically, the fundamentalist Islamists resemble the 
unbelievers mentioned in the Qur‘an, since they too did not use reason to obtain reality and 
guidance (Al-Jabri, 2011, p.27).  However, Al-Jabri was critiqued for giving an interpretation 
of the Islamists‘ minds, which ―tells us nothing about where and how cultural infiltration 
occurs.‖  The phenomenon of ―cultural infiltration‖ is not only reflected as an exterior action 
of the ―cultural imperialist hegemony‖, but it also has a negative impact on identity.  Al-Jabri, 
like other Arab scholars, failed to unpack the processes he described and moved to 
resolutions immediately.  His processes were not explained empirically and accordingly the 
effect or action of ―cultural infiltration‖ is unknown (Sabry, 2007, p.160).  What the Arab 
world actually needs is not only reason in abstract theory, but also reason in society, in order 
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to develop.  Essentially, this is the problem most Arab intellectuals share, whereas Islamist 
fundamentalists were successful in getting closer to the people (Aksikas, 2009, p.71).  
 
While most Arab intellectuals, like Al-Jabri, try to modernise Islam for development 
purposes, Islamist fundamentalists try to Islamicise modernity.  Islamist fundamentalists 
always try, through their interpretation of development, to emphasise the dichotomy between 
East and West in ways that are reminiscent of the dichotomy used by the Western 
development experts between the developed and the underdeveloped.  Some analysts point to 
an Islamist tendency to always describe the West by shining a light on the West‘s aggressive 
self-interest, whilst turning a blind eye to its principles of liberal enlightenment (Saleh, 2007, 
p.242).  There is a big difference between ideologies of identity (Arab nationalism and 
Islamism)
3
 that strive towards enlightenment and development, and identities that lead to 
fundamentalism.  The first focuses on what is common to all human beings, regardless of 
gender, language, religion or sect, whilst the latter focuses on the particularities of ethnic, 
religion and gender in order to differentiate between individuals.  This is what Amin 
Maalouf, a Lebanese author, called the deadly identities (Ibid, p.176).  This type of identity 
and the dichotomy between the West and the Muslim world are illustrated in most Islamist 
fundamentalists‘ speeches and comments.  Abdesslam Yassine, leader of a Moroccan Islamist 
organisation, describes the West as ‗the other‘, set apart from Islam and, although he 
concedes the West‘s development, he ultimately dismisses it because of its secular ideologies 
that he regards as being ignorant of Islam‘s true path.  He said:  
 
“In this perspective, they are jahiliya [ignorance] and we are Muslims.  That is an 
essential difference, because someone who believes in God and Last Day is not like 
                                                 
3
 The literal translation of the Arabic word ‗Al Haweya‘ is identity, but in English, since these identities (Arab 
nationalism and Islamism) become ‗ism‘s‘ and are therefore ideologies, the translation here is ideologies of 
identity.   
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someone who does not.  The unbelievers and the jahiliya civilization are superior in 
the means of strength and the adornment of worldly life, but they remain on the scale 
of eternity in loss and bankruptcy” (quoted in Aksikas, 2009, p.103).    
 
The rejection by Yassine and other Islamist fundamentalists of Western modernity is 
therefore not because of its capitalist hegemony, but because of its lack of God and religion.  
That is why Yassine writes, ―Islam thus provides a direct target for modernism: it rests upon 
a sacred revelation and its authority is that of the Messenger of God—exalted by His name‖ 
(quoted in Aksikas, 2009, p.103).  Such an Islamist view of modernity and the world 
produces dominant understandings that contradict the Islamists‘ own preaching about 
equality and justice regardless of religion, gender and ethnicity.  Nobody suffers from these 
contradictions and interpretations more than women.  Even though Islamists criticise the 
Western feminist movement because it is allegedly devoid of religion, and so recommends 
that women‘s liberation must be based on Islamic law and justice, all of these promises 
collapse under Yassine‘s claim that:   
 
“The struggle of those who defend women‟s rights from the Westernized and immoral 
perspective is centered on a central demand, the demand for equality of men and 
women, and thus, erasing all the specific Islamic laws about the woman, starting by 
the denial of the superiority of men over women” (quoted in Aksikas, 2009,  p.124).     
 
Yassine, here, destroys any hope of women‘s liberation and the development of their status 
under Islamic law.  Yassine and most Islamists always focus on and protest for gender 
segregation, but rarely discuss social issues such as poverty, unemployment and the role of 
women in a country‘s development (Ibid, p.108). 
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One of the most important accomplishments of Malaysian intellectuals that Arab intellectuals 
have not achieved, is the establishment of The International Institute of Islamic Thought and 
Civilization (ISTAC), a postgraduate institute of the International Islamic University 
Malaysia (IIUM) in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, founded in 1987 by Syed Muhammad Naquib 
al-Attas, a Muslim philosopher.  His studies are a mixture of Islamic sciences, philosophy, 
metaphysics, history, and literature.  His ideas are reflected in this institute.  They, distinguish 
between faith and thought in Islam.  Faith is a blind unquestioning obedience while thinking 
requires reason and logic.  The Institute stresses that Islamic civilisation is not about 
following rituals without thinking.  On the contrary; it is about rationalising rituals and the 
interpretation of the Qur‘an, Hadith and Sunnah.  Through reason and logic, Islam can be a 
source of development, not an obstacle to progress, because it brings secular science together 
with Islam, which cannot be accomplished by a non-thinking society.  One of the followers of 
this school is Mahathir Mohamad, the fourth Prime Minister of Malaysia and author of Islam 
and the Muslim Ummah, which discusses ways to make Islam a stimulus for development, 
not a hindrance.  He argues that one of the main reasons that Muslims countries are less 
developed is because they are pre-occupied with defending rituals and trivialities, forgetting 
their bigger problems and serious developmental issues like industry and information 
technology, focusing blindly on submission to faith (Mohamad, 2001, pp.255-256).  
Mohamad‘s ideas on Islam and development can be applied to Arab states.    
 
Scholars argue that Arab people admire development models, but not for carefully considered 
reasons.  For example, Arabs have been stunned by the success of the Justice and 
Development Party (AKP) in Turkey, which represents Islam in a secular state.  However, 
Nafi (2009, p.78) shows how Arab admiration of the Turkish model is based on a nostalgia 
for the past, rather than because it may be a potentially successful development model for the 
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Arab world in the future (Ibid, p.78).  Ready-made development models, whether Malaysian 
or Turkish, will not work without a self-critique of Arab ideologies of identity (Arab 
nationalism and Islamism) to enable Arabs to understand the deep philosophy behind such 
models, so they do not simply blindly copy them.  A new home cannot be built without 
dismantling or renovating the walls of the old house.  Analysts have suggested that Arabs 
were mistaken if they thought self critique could be avoided by simply importing ready-made 
models (Saleh, 2007, p.159).   
 
In the following sections, there will be further discussion of how such Arab ideologies of 
identity (Arab nationalism and Islamism) have been seen to affect both the development of 
women‘s status and media policies.  Since this study discusses disadvantaged women as a 
development issue and media with a focus on Saudi Arabia, it is relevant to consider 
ideologies of identity in Saudi Arabia and then to investigate how these have been said to 
influence attitudes to gender equality and the development of media policies.       
 
2.1.1.1 Saudi Arabia:   
Saudi Arabia is an exceptional Arab state as it has never been colonised by a foreign power 
and its system has thus emerged as a result of internal religious, social, and cultural factors 
not imposed by Western powers (Findlay, 1994, p.41).  The previous section discussed how 
Arab ideologies of identity (Arab nationalism and Islamism) were a reaction to external 
factors.  How, then should we interpret dominant ideologies of identity in the case of Saudi 
Arabia?  The Saudi constitution is based on a specific form of Islam, which is Wahhabism, 
founded by Sheikh Muhmmad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (Al-Rasheed, 2007, p.46).  Sheikh Abd al-
Wahhab and his followers did not accept the ―Wahhabi‖ label and instead referred to 
themselves as “ahl al-sunna wa al-jama‟a (people of tradition and community), or ahl al-
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tawhid (the people of monotheism)” (Ibid, p.22).  However, the Saudi regime is not a 
theocratic regime but a hybrid structure, neither wholly secular nor wholly religious.  As 
such, the religious class functions under the authority of the ruling class.  Oil wealth has 
enabled Wahhabism, the ruling group and Saudi society generally, to flourish economically, 
within the limits allegedly prescribed in the Qur‘an and al-sunna4 (Ibid, 2007, p.58).  In sum, 
religion and oil revenues are the two main factors that have impacted on development in 
Saudi Arabia.   
 
Wahhabi scholars or ahl al-sunna wa al-jama‟a are from Najdi religious families who share 
the same regional religious traditions.  The fact that for over two hundred years almost all 
religious scholars have originated from Najd (the central region of Saudi Arabia), has resulted 
in a unilateral interpretation of the Qur‘an and al-sunna, particularly with regard to those 
verses relating to women (Ibid, p.28).  Women are always the victims of the principle of sad 
al-thara‟i‟ (blocking the means), the prohibition of certain practices that are permitted under 
the pretext of preventing possible sins, such as the ban on women driving (Ibid, p.28).  
Wahhabi scholars have exerted strict control over men and women.  There are numerous 
fatwas relating to social conduct, such as gender segregation, women‘s dress, false eyelashes, 
hair removal, sports centres, etc.  These fatwas show that clerics are desperate to control 
every aspect of the social sphere, especially where women are involved (Ibid, p.55).  
Wahhabi scholars thus accept aspects of modernity only if they are in control of them, e.g., 
after opposing women‘s education in the 1960s, they gave it their approval after taking 
responsibility for the female curriculum and schools.  In the 1960s, these scholars objected to 
television, but later agreed to it when they realised that they could dominate the broadcasting 
schedule.  In the 1990s, they initially condemned satellite television channels, but later 
                                                 
4
 The Sunnah is the living example of the Islamic prophet Muhammad. 
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allowed them when they were assured of repeated appearances on religious programmes, 
sometimes offering their own satellite channels (Ibid, p.56).  Socially, Wahhabism creates a 
struggle between the dominant religious powers and the people, mainly women, which 
ultimately has implications for Saudi Arabia‘s development.   
  
Louis Pierre Althusser, a French Marxist philosopher, argued that societies differ in the kinds 
and relationships of Ideological State Apparatus (ISA). The ISAs are the religious and 
educational institutions, trade unions, radio, television, press and family structures.  In pre-
capitalist societies, religion dominates all of these elements, whilst in capitalist societies the 
educational system is dominant (Abercrombie et al, 1980, p.23).  Accordingly, religion can 
be manipulated to the political advantage of the dominant class, and religious parties are used 
as agents to transmit the dominant ideologies to society (Ibid., p.159).  Antonio Gramsci, an 
Italian Marxist philosopher, accepted Marx‘s analysis from the 19th century and believed that 
the struggle between the ruling class and the subordinate working class was the driving force 
that moved society forward.  At the same time, however, he rejected the economic 
reductionism of such an analysis.  Instead, Gramsci stated that hegemony presents a constant 
contradiction between the dominant ideology and the social experience of subordination, 
engendering ideological struggle.  To reduce this struggle, most authoritarian regimes sustain 
popular support and legitimacy by using different tools, such as religion to maintain stability.  
However, the struggle emerges after the working-class develop an awareness of this 
dominant ideology as a result of intellectual encouragement (Abercrombie et al, 1980, p.15).  
This transformation of social consciousness should not be imposed on people but must 
emerge from their working lives and experiences.  Intellectuals are not to be seen as being 
confined to an elite class, but are to be grounded in everyday life.  Gramsci wrote that "the 
mode of being of the new intellectual can no longer consist in eloquence … but in active 
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participation in practical life, as constructor, organiser, "permanent  persuader" and not just a 
simple orator" (Gramsci, 1971).  It could thus be said that Saudi society is still under a pre-
capitalist system, since all the ISA elements to which Althusser referred to are dominated by 
the religious group.   
         
The second factor that has played a significant role in the development of Saudi Arabia is oil.  
The emergence of oil in Saudi Arabia in the 1930s, and the rapid rise in oil wealth in the 
1970s and 1980s produced an era of infrastructural development and increased the wealth.  
This wealth and these oil revenues helped to build large numbers of schools, colleges, 
hospitals, clinics and other social services (Findlay, 1994, p.90).  The relationship between 
the United States and Saudi Arabia is based on oil companies, in order to control oil prices, 
costs and returns.  This relationship stands in contrast to all the other Arab countries that were 
colonised by Western countries.  Accordingly, Saudi Arabia did not oppose capitalist 
production, and there was a willingness to accept direct foreign involvement in development 
projects (Ibid, p.93).   
 
While oil revenues have brought economic development and material progress, human 
development, and particularly that of women, has not progressed in the same way.  For 
example, at the end of the 1970s, private investors began to take a serious interest in 
agricultural development.  The capital from oil revenues artificially stimulated the 
commercialisation of agriculture and increased productivity.  Such development was not 
brought about by the Saudi people, and women are absent from the labour markets, such as 
agriculture, for several religious and social reasons.  Evidence suggests that this path of 
development eventually leads to a constant dependence on the government‘s support and on 
Western technical managerial skills (Ibid, p.155).     
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Here, the definition of development falls in-to the same category as that which became 
accepted in the West – economic  growth – but this time it is not only the fault of Western 
capitalist hegemony, but is also due to internal social, religious and political factors.  Saudi 
Arabia, when it was celebrating the sixtieth anniversary of its National Day, boasted in an 
advertising supplement in a UK national newspaper that it had accomplished ‗60 years of 
progress without change‘5.  Even though oil revenues have brought remarkable economic 
progress, change in human development, and mainly the advancement of women‘s status, has 
been limited (Ibid, p.195).  Capitalist growth has been reflected in Saudi Arabia‘s economic 
progress, but, as argued above, its society is still run under a pre-capitalist system dominated 
by the religious group.  The status of women has thus not developed in parallel with the rapid 
economic progress, so the richest state in the Arab world has remained socially undeveloped.  
Women are controlled by a dominant patriarchal institution and are constrained by Islamic 
laws that hinder their advancement (Al Haidaree, 2003, p.349).      
 
Abdullah Al Gethame, a Saudi academic and literary critic, called the development that 
occurred in Saudi Arabia “Tafra”, which means ―economic boom‖.  ―Boom‖ is the negative 
face of development, because building the place was achieved much faster than building the 
person.  One of the main reasons for this was the absence of social experts in the first 
development plan. As a result, the place has become more modern than the person.  
Modernity has therefore only arrived in a physical sense, while, according to Al Gethame, 
backwardness of the mind remained (Al Gethame, 2005, p.169-173).  Therefore, Saudi 
society is considered pre-capitalist owing to an absence of freedom and society being 
controlled by religious leaders who unilaterally reject modernity (Sen, 1999, p.32).  
                                                 
5
 The Times, September 23, 1992. 
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Development requires pluralism and tolerance, which are lacking in unilateral societies 
controlled by religious authorities (Ibid, p.233).        
     
2.1.2 Women’s status in development 
This section is divided into three parts:  the first discusses feminism and gender issues in 
development organizations; the second highlights issues around class and gender; and the 
final part elaborates on the development of women‘s status and Islam.           
 
2.1.2.1 Feminism and development  
Rathgeber outlines the general frameworks that have guided most development researchers 
and practitioners to date.   She identifies three distinct theoretical paths in the field: Women 
in Development (WID), Women and Development (WAD) and Gender and Development 
(GAD) (Visvanathan, 1997, pp.18-19).    
 
The notion of Women in Development emerged in the early 1970s and was articulated by 
American liberal feminists.  WID is grounded in traditional modernisation theory, which 
wrongly assumed that women were not integrated in the process of development.  It accepted 
existing social structures and did not question the sources of women‘s subordination and 
oppression or why women had not benefited from development strategies.  Instead it focused 
exclusively on the productive aspects of women‘s work, as a result ignoring or minimising 
the reproductive side of women‘s lives (Beneria & Sen, 1997, p.49). 
 
WAD emerged from a critique of modernisation theory and the WID approach in the second 
half of the 1970s.  It draws on dependency theory, and focuses on the relationship between 
women and developmental processes.  For some critics, it fails to analyse the relationship 
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between patriarchy, differing modes of production and women‘s subordination and 
oppression.  Like WID, it is preoccupied with the reproductive side of women‘s work and 
lives.  WAD does not question the relationship between gender roles.   
 
In the 1980s, GAD emerged as an alternative to the two previous approaches.  It is influenced 
by socialist feminist thinking.  It offers a holistic perspective that considers all aspects of 
women‘s lives.  It questions the basis of assigning specific gender roles to different sexes and 
rejects the public/private dichotomy.  It gives special attention to women‘s oppression in the 
family by entering in-to the private sphere.  Women are seen as agents of change, rather than 
as passive recipients of development assistance.  It focuses on strengthening women‘s legal 
rights, including the reform of inheritance and property laws.  It talks in terms of challenging 
existing power structures in society between men and women (O‘Brien et al, 2000, p. 125).   
 
The key themes of the above, are power and self-empowerment.  The World Bank, the 
world‘s most influential international development agency, has been criticised for not taking 
power into account.  Critics argue that it is preoccupied with macro-economic restructuring in 
developing countries, whereas feminist economics and self-empowerment begin in micro-
economics and the politics of decision-making between women and men in the household. 
The World Bank has ignored all of these things.  In working papers, World Bank economists 
have discussed the visible (predominantly male) and invisible (predominantly female) 
economies.  Here, the visible economy is productive work in the labour market, and the 
invisible the economic value attributed to women‘s unpaid domestic labour, or ‗reproductive‘ 
work (Ibid, p.37).  Exploitation arises when women‘s inevitable involvement in both paid 
productive and unpaid reproductive work is taken for granted, resulting in a weakening of 
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their position in the labour market and their dependency on a male‘s wage (Beneria & Sen, 
1997, p.49).  
 
This economic system has led to a feminisation of poverty worldwide, and particularly in the 
Arab world, where traditions underlie a huge gap between women‘s and men‘s participation 
in economic activity, based on the premise that men should be responsible for supporting the 
family.  Arab women perform domestic work that is praised by traditional Arab society.  
However, this work is not calculated economically and does not factor in the calculation of 
gross national product; thus, working women bear the responsibility for both domestic and 
professional tasks because there has been little change in Arab family structure or 
redistribution of roles that will assist women to enter the job market.  The economic 
participation of Arab women is consequently the lowest in the world.  It does not exceed 
33.3%, while the global average is 55.6% (Arab Women‘s Organisation, 2010, p.198-199).  
 
It should be noted that where there are banks for the poor and the family, which give women 
specific loans with low interest rates such as the Muhammad Yunus Grameen Bank for the 
Poor, they are more successful in reducing poverty than where there are banks that do not 
give advantages to women (Ibid, p.253).  This is an indication that using the participatory 
model in female poverty reduction has higher returns in terms of reducing poverty rates 
generally.  Yunus explains that this banking system empowers the poor by giving them 
control over capital, while other banks do not give them access to capital, because they do not 
consider them credit-worthy.  Yunus is critical of the World Bank.  He said, ―We at the 
Grameen Bank have never wanted to, or accepted World Bank funding because we do not 
like the way that the bank conducts business.  Their experts and consultants often take over 
the projects they finance.‖  He calculates that the World Bank‘s projects usually spend 75% 
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of the financial assistance on equipment and experts from the donor country itself.  The 
remaining 25% goes to the elites of the local suppliers and to the politicians who have helped 
them in these contracts.  The rich thus get richer, and the poor get poorer.  Yunus believes 
that if foreign aid donors were truly serious about poverty alleviation, aid should reach poor 
households directly (Yunus, 2007, p.137-146).       
        
There are several differences between the World Bank and feminists in the definition of 
empowerment.  Feminists stress the multi-dimensional nature of power: ‗power-from-within‘, 
‗power to‘, ‗power-with‘ and ‗power over‘ (Wong, 2003, p.308).  ‗Power-from-within‘ 
examines the psychological power in people‘s minds and focuses on self-confidence, self-
esteem and self-respect.  ‗Power-to‘ refers to the capacity to take action and highlights the 
individual‘s productive capacity.  ‗Power-with‘ emphasises collective forces, where people 
cooperate to solve problems to attain goals.  It is mainly concerned with a sense of solidarity, 
capacity-building, social networks and organizational strength.  ‗Power-over‘ can be negative 
because it forces someone, or some groups, to do things against their will, but it can also be 
positive if it overrules dominance and unequal access to power.  According to experts, the 
World Bank focuses only on the ‗power-to‘ and ‗power with‘, while feminists focus on all 
four aspects.  The World Bank‘s rationale is economic efficiency and equality, whereas the 
feminist‘s rationale is overruling women‘s internal and external oppression by men.  Wong 
states that the World Bank‘s approach is through projects and empowerment as means to 
achieve economic goals, whilst the feminist‘s approach is process and empowerment as 
means through which to achieve equality and empowerment as ends in themselves (Ibid, 
p.312).  The Bank‘s focus on economic efficiency has imposed on the poor, particularly on 
poor women, an emphasis on the poor‘s contribution to development rather than the 
contribution of development to the poor‘s empowerment. Blind faith in the positive sides of 
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‗power-to‘ and ‗power with‘ has limited the scope of most empowerment-related 
programmes.  Neglect of the ‗power-over‘ aspect has prevented the Bank from adopting a 
more complete and drastic transformation of existing unequal power relations (Ibid, pp.308-
318).    
 
Some feminist activists have suggested that what is actually taking place in international 
development organisations and other economic and social institutions should not be called 
gender subordination, but male bias.  This male bias is embedded in organisations such as the 
World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) and has three typical forms: sexual 
division of labour, unpaid domestic work and household work.  This bias is allocated subtly 
in human resources and in the conceptual framework.  To overcome male bias women must 
be more visible in policy-making.  As argued by feminists, they must also make sure that they 
are available as producers and agents of development, rather than simply as recipients of 
welfare, in order to design development projects that encapsulate gender awareness.  In 
addition, there must be alternative forms of development through ―women‘s collective 
action‖ that underpins an ―empowerment approach to gender and development‖, as well as 
through gender aware re-conceptualisation.  Women must consider that they will continue to 
face challenges from economic and political powers that will hardly allow equal gender 
relations in social or economic structures.  So, women must work concurrently and 
cooperatively with and against the society until their aims are achieved (Elson, 1991, p.24-
26).               
 
Abu-Lughod contended that the elites prefer a superficially feminist interpretation of gender 
equity rather than being concerned with practical needs, especially with regard to the 
employment and education of disadvantaged women, as outlined in the Arab Human 
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Development Report 2005: Towards the Rise of Women in the Arab World.  She says that in 
this report, Arab women are treated as a homogenous group, irrespective of differences.  She 
adds that Arab intellectuals and activists, who were involved in writing this report, think the 
only way to overcome backwardness is through education, and they confuse literacy with 
creativity and knowledge, depicting illiterate women as less human.  They also state that 
illiteracy is caused by a lack of access to education, but it is more likely that poor quality 
public education for girls is to blame (Abu-Lughod, 2009, p.87).  There is also far too great 
an emphasis on the importance of women‘s employment without questioning whether poorly-
remunerated jobs are worth the cost of transportation, childcare, and exposure to harassment.  
For these reasons, it makes economic sense for women to be housewives, because the 
household may lose less money than it would were the women to go out to badly-paid jobs, 
and they can even earn money working from home, engaging in small-scale trade, sewing, 
etc.  As a result, women‘s unemployment is here due to economic factors, not to Islam or 
culture (Ibid, p.88).       
 
Moreover, the report discussed the main causes of violence against women in the Arab world 
as being gender inequality and the ‗impairment of personal liberty‘, and only briefly 
mentioned the link between violence against women and poverty and so with women‘s 
political, economic and social disempowerment.  In addition, the absence of any comparative 
perspectives from other parts of the world gives the impression that women elsewhere do not 
face violence.  The absence of discussion about ways in which women in other societies deal 
with violence, fails to teach Arab women how they can react if they face similar violence.  
Women in other parts of the world suffer violence in the form of trafficking, exploitative 
labour, HIV/AIDS contraction, substance abuse, starvation, the feminization of poverty, 
domestic violence and murder (Ibid, p.86).        
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The problems listed above are captured by Sen‘s explanation that inequality between women 
and men in the family is accepted as ‗natural‘ and ‗appropriate‘ and that providing better 
health-care to, or nutritional support for boys rather than girls is deemed acceptable.  The 
dilemma is when such inequalities are accepted by women themselves (Sen, 2007, pp.260, 
270).  Gender equality requires freedom, which is an individual‘s ability to make both simple 
and complex choices, from avoiding disease by consuming nutritious food to playing 
important roles in society and being completely free to try and achieve one‘s goals (Ibid, 
pp.267, 269).                            
  
2.1.2.2 Class and Feminism   
Disadvantaged women are seen as poor women who ―have nothing and know nothing‖.  
These common meanings of deprivation, and the ignorance about this class, make the 
disadvantaged – especially women – claim ―refusal of recognition‖ rather than ―right to be 
recognised‖.  Feminist theories show how class is a form of subjectivity because it 
emphasises ―inequality‖ and ―exploitation‖ (Skeggs, 2002, p.74-75).  According to these 
negative meanings, disadvantaged women aim for ―disidentification‖ with this class and want 
to improve their economic status and overcome poverty through education or through 
marriage.  The media tend to perpetuate the image of disadvantaged women as being inferior, 
ignorant or passive, which further emphasises these feelings of inferiority.  This makes 
working class women want to be in the position of respected, sophisticated, middle class 
women.  If disadvantaged women are thus devalued in the labour market because of a lack of 
proper education, they may start to invest in their femininity in order to get married.  
Moreover, in conservative cultures, single women are not socially valued until they are 
married.  This is why disadvantaged women invest in their femininity in order to marry, not 
just for economic reasons, but also for social, cultural and emotional support (Ibid, p.76-115).   
 43 
 This can be seen in disadvantaged Arab women‘s situations, particularly in rural and village 
communities, which are usually dominated by tribal, patriarchal systems and where the social 
and material conditions of life for women are extremely difficult.  In addition, girls‘ 
enrolment in schools is weak, which will reduce their employment opportunities and 
contribute to their ignorance of women‘s legitimate rights, inducing a lot of girls to marry at 
an early age (Arab Women Organisation, 2010, pp.203-204).  The problem is that middle 
class feminists cannot readily identify with the sufferings of disadvantaged women, nor can 
they understand the reasons behind their investment in femininity.  Feminism has to take into 
account economic, social, and cultural explanations, so as to be transformed from individual 
reactions towards injustice and, instead, to provide frameworks that incorporate everybody‘s 
experiences of injustice to embrace feminist principles.  It has to be sensitive to serious 
differences and inequalities that exist between women in different classes (Skeggs, 2002, 
pp.157-158).   
 
Disadvantaged women face two kinds of domination: class and gender.  Even though 
disadvantaged women marry to have more economic, social, cultural and emotional support, 
they later discover that they are under masculine domination.  Christine Delphy, a French 
sociologist and feminist theorist, argued:  
 
“Even though a marriage with a man from the capitalist class can raise a women‟s 
standard of living, it does not make her a member of that class.  She herself does not 
own the means of production.  Therefore her standard of living does not depend on 
her class relationship to the proletariat; but on her serf relations of production with 
her husband” (quoted in Adkins & Skeggs, 2006, p.44)                 
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Based on this male domination, women try to resist domestic patriarchal power through 
―weapons‖ of slyness and stratagem.  Bourdieu realised that these ―weapons‖ are used to 
fight and manipulate in order to ―manoeuvre‖, but concluded that ―the weapons of the weak 
are weak weapons‖ (quoted in Adkins & Skeggs, 2006, p.52).  Confronting gender and class 
domination can result in resistance among disadvantaged women and sometimes they are 
powerful enough to make changes.  For Gramsci, the motor for resistance and change is with 
intellectuals who recognise these inequalities and injustices, and believe development will not 
happen without intervention.  However, it must be remembered that resistance to achieve 
change is not an easy task, as it faces powerful domination (Adkins & Skeggs, 2006, p.121-
125).                             
 
2.1.2.3 Islam and disadvantaged women in Saudi Arabia 
Saudi Arabia applies Sharia law in its constitution and has never been colonised or received 
foreign financial aid for developmental projects due to its oil-based prosperity.  This section 
explores how certain interpretations of the Qur‘an and al-Sunna lead to the unfair treatment 
of women, contributing to poverty, illiteracy and violence against women in Saudi Arabia.  It 
also compares two approaches that have emerged from female critics of Islamism: one based 
on ―liberal Islam‖, and the other on ―secular Islam‖ (Cliteur, 2011, p.154).    
 
The advocates of ―liberal Islam‖ state that Islam has been hijacked by radical interpretations 
of the texts and that sometimes the ambiguity of certain verses of the Qur‘an are open to 
exploitation by clerics who are in charge of interpretations (Mernissi, 1991, p.129).  On the 
other hand, the advocates of ―secular Islam‖ believe that there are actual verses that do justify 
violence and discrimination against women, and these verses violate women‘s rights and 
should not be applied.  Advocates of this approach, such as Chahdortt Djavann, a French 
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novelist and public intellectual of Iranian origin, oppose the veil and consider it a form of 
women‘s submission to men, suggesting that it reduces women to sexual objects (Cliteur, 
2011, p. 155).  Irshad Manji, a Canadian born to parents of Egyptian and Gujarati descent, is 
an advocate of the ―liberal Islam‖ approach.  She argues that the problem is with the textual 
interpretation, so ijtihad (independent reasoning) must be encouraged.  She argues that this 
approach is closer to Muslim women than is the secular one, because if you ask any simple 
woman in the Muslim world about human rights she may not be responsive, but if you ask 
her about whether she believes in God, she will be affirmative (Ibid, p.157).  Mina Ahadi, a 
German intellectual of Iranian descent, advocates the ―secular Islam‖ approach.  Ahadi is 
against the stoning of women, as derived from the Qur‘an. She criticises penalties, such as 
stoning or honour crimes, arguing that they must not be tolerated simply due to tradition and 
culture (Ibid, p.158).  Taslima Nasreen, a Bangladeshi ex-physician, advocates the ―secular 
Islam‖ approach on the grounds that society and religion have always been owned and 
directed by men (Ibid., p.158).  Both approaches have their own rationale based on arguments 
around texts relating to women in the Qur‘an, but I will focus here on Suhaila Zain Al 
Abdeen, as she is a Saudi scholar with a doctoral degree in Sharia law from Cairo‘s Al Azhar 
University
6, and leans towards a ―liberal Islam‖ approach.  As she is from Al Madinah Al 
Munawwarah (the second holiest city in Islam after Mecca, located in the Hejaz region of 
western Saudi Arabia), her interpretations of the Qur‘an will highlight issues of gender 
equality in Saudi Arabia different from the unilateral interpretation of the Wahhabi scholars 
from Najd (the central region of Saudi Arabia).  Al Abdeen is a member of Saudi Arabia‘s 
National Human Rights Society and, has written more than forty books and articles relating 
to Islam and women.  She argues that the patriarchal and tribal interpretation by Saudi 
                                                 
6
 This University is a centre of Islamic learning.  Its students study the Qur‘an and Islamic law in detail, along 
with logic, grammar and rhetoric. It brings together secular subjects in its Islamic law curriculum. 
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Arabian clerics of Qur‘anic verses relating to women, has led to poverty, illiteracy and 
violence against women.   
 
Al Abdeen believes that one of the most important topics to be addressed is Islamic 
discourse, and there should be a re-reading of this discourse, because most of the 
interpretations of Qur‘anic verses relating to women are derived from tradition and cultural 
heritage.  Accordingly, the provisions of jurisprudence (fiqh) are based on these traditions 
and tribal heritage, which are inconsistent with God's justice.  As a result of these 
interpretations, men practice various forms of violence against women in the name of Islam, 
and women are deprived of their social, financial and educational rights (Al Abdeen, 2011, 
p.3).      
 
In Al Abdeen‘s view, Islamic discourse has been able to reduce the status of women and to 
extend the dominant power of men through the interpretation of this verse:  
 
“Men are the maintainers of women because Allah has made some of them to excel 
others and because they spend out of their property; the good women are therefore 
obedient, guarding the unseen as Allah has guarded; and (as to) those whose part you 
fear desertion, admonish them, and leave them alone in the sleeping-places and beat 
them; then if they obey you, do not seek a way against them; surely Allah is High, 
Great”. 7    
 
                                                 
7
 An-Nisa: 34-35-translated by I-Qur‘an and produced by ―Guided Ways of Technologies‖   
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According to its interpretation by Ismail ibn Kathir
8
, a faqih commentator, ―maintainers‖ 
(which in Arabic are “Kawamoon”), means “AlKayem” and in this context means the 
guardian who can punish if not obeyed.   Here, as Al Abdeen shows, the actual meaning was 
transferred from the original meaning, which is “Kawam”, to “Kayem”, and there is a big 
difference in meaning.  “Kawam” means those who are in charge of serving women and this 
is linked to the degree of qualifications rather than the preference for men over women.  Al 
Abdeen argues that ―beat‖ in the verse does not mean physical abuse, but means desertion, 
and this meaning is actually consistent with al-sunna because the prophet never beat his 
wives.  If ―beat‖ meant physical abuse and had been a divine order, the Prophet would have 
been the initiator (Ibid, pp.13-16).    
 
Based on what Al Abdeen describes as misconceptions, men practice physical abuse against 
women, and judges give unfair provisions to women who are abused and murdered by their 
men.  She gives examples: of a trial, in which a man, who physically abused his wife until 
she died, was sentenced to three years in prison and two hundred lashes; while, a man who 
stole two sheep was sentenced to three years in prison and two thousand lashes.  If the 
woman‘s death had been recognised as murder, Sharia law would have demanded the 
murderer‘s life as a penalty.  Al Abdeen finds judges base their verdicts on unsubstantiated 
hadiths (the Prophet‘s sayings) such as, ―A man will never be killed because of his murder of 
his wife since he owns her through the marriage contract‖ (Ibid, p.20).      
    
What Al Abdeen explains may be true, but she did not clarify how the fact that Qur‘anic 
texts, especially texts relating to women, are subject to different interpretations, some of 
which may oppress women, because it is not known whether such interpretations are a matter 
                                                 
8
 Ismail ibn Kathir (1301–1373) is a leading Faqīh of the ulema. He is influenced by ibn Taymiyyah (1263–
1328) who was a member of the school founded by Ahmad ibn Hanbal (780–855), a school dominated by 
orthodox Sunni scholars.   
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on which governments should legislate, or that come down to an individual man‘s 
conscience.  Take polygamy; even though the Qur‘an permits men to take up to four wives, 
he is obligated to treat all of his wives fairly and equally and must not marry more than one 
woman if he cannot treat all wives fairly.  It is unclear whether this condition is a matter for 
the government to legislate on, or whether it can be judged by each man himself, leaving 
women at the mercy of their husbands (Ahmed, 1992, p.88).     
 
That a women‘s fate and Qur‘anic texts relating to women are subject to different 
interpretations, mostly carried out by men, caused women in various parts of Arabia to rebel 
against Islam after the Prophet Muhammad‘s death.  For example, Salma bint Malik, who 
claimed she was a prophetess and revolted against the Islamic state, dying in battle against 
the apostates of Islam.  Another revolt was staged by Sajah bint Aws, who also declared she 
was a prophetess and opposed Islam; numerous women joined her because of the limitations 
that Islam had brought to them.  Abu Bakr, the first Muslim Caliph after the Prophet 
Muhammad's death, fought these women and other apostates of Islam (Ibid, p.59).    
 
Al Abdeen‘s argument comes down to issues of power and property.  The power given to 
male relatives of women under Saudi law underpins a sense of the male ownership of 
women‘s money, bodies and lives.  Families give absolute power to brothers over their 
sisters; therefore, some of these men think that they can do anything, e.g., adultery or sexual 
harassment.  In addition, there is no deterrent punishment to those who commit such crimes.  
Penalties do not exceed imprisonment for a limited period of time, and they may commit the 
same crime again after they are released.  Al Abdeen notes that there must be strict judicial 
punishment, which is the stoning to death penalty, as has been stated in the Qur‘an.  This is 
not about being in favour of stoning, but about using the ‗power-over‘ approach, which could 
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be positive if it overrules dominance and unequal access to power.  For Al Abdeen, applying 
such a penalty and publicly defaming the criminal will contain the irresponsible actions of 
male relatives.  Al Abdeen‘s research shows that there are numerous hidden cases of incest 
and other undisclosed crimes (Al Abdeen, 2011). 
 
The requirement for the male guardian‘s approval for a woman's education has deprived 
women of the right to education in numerous cases.  This has led to a high rate of illiteracy 
among women if compared to men.  This should not happen, because education is obligatory 
in Islam for both sexes and does not require a guardian‘s consent (Al Abdeen, 2008, p.9).   
The same thing is true of women‘s labour.  That there are restricted employment 
opportunities for women in certain areas due to fatwas from clerics has increased women's 
unemployment (Al Abdeen, 2011).   
 
The Arab elites, like Al Abdeen, claim that the problem is with the interpretation of Islam, 
rather than with ‗true‘ Islam.  This may not convince other nations, because misinterpretation 
of the Qur‘an and using it for political objectives occurs not only in Saudi Arabia, but also in 
the Islamic Republic of Iran, which also applies Sharia law in its constitution and is a Shiite 
theocracy.  The Islamic Republic‘s constitution denies women equal rights and the 
constitution itself was part of an overarching policy of excluding women from public life.  
The Islamic Republic withdrew many rights that women had gained under Mohammad Reza 
Shah Pahlavi-Shah of Iran.  Measures to bring back the glorious tradition of what was 
perceived of as ‗true‘ Islam included segregation of the sexes in public spaces, compulsory 
wearing of the hijab (veil), and excluding women from certain professions (Khiabany & 
Sreberny, 2001, p.21).  However, it seems that such strict Islamic rules for women can be 
loosened for a political agenda.  This was evident when the Iranian Revolutionary Leader, 
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Ayatollah Khomeini, opposed Mohammad Reza Pahlavi on granting women their political 
rights in 1963, accusing him of not abiding by the rules of Islam.  Nonetheless, after his 
triumph in the Iranian Revolution in 1979 with the successful women‘s participation in the 
revolutionary demonstrations, he declared that ‗women have the right to intervene in politics‘ 
(Ibid, p.22).     
 
Al Abdeen has fought for the right for women to issue fatwas.  A fatwa is a religious opinion 
on Islamic law issued by an Islamic scholar.  Al Abdeen says there are qualified Saudi, 
female, Islamic, scholars but they are not recognised because the ruling class in the religion 
in Saudi Arabia is all male.  According to Maha Akeel, a Saudi journalist and the Managing 
Editor of the Organization at the Islamic Conference (OIC), even the notion of ‗Islamic 
feminism‘ would be problematic in Saudi Arabia, due to the negative connotations of 
feminism in Saudi society.  Akeel has suggested using the term ―Islamic Development 
Movement for Saudi Women‖, since this indicates the link between Islam and the 
development of women‘s status (Akeel, 2010, p. 96, 98, 120).    
 
One of the central debates, and also one of the most continuous, is whether Islam is 
compatible with feminism and whether the gender consciousness movement and campaigns 
for changes in the law can be regarded as feminist.  Ziba Mir-Hosseini, an Iranian 
anthropologist, specializing in Islamic law, gender and development, thinks it can, whereas 
Shahrzad Mojab, Iranian Professor at the University of Toronto, and Haideh Moghissi, 
Professor of the Department of Equity Studies at York University, find the term ‗Islamic 
feminism‘ misleading and inaccurate, and criticize those who use it for falling into the trap of 
cultural relativism and for backing away from feminist ideals (Khiabany & Sreberny, 2001, 
p.29).    
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Valentine Moghadam, an Iranian feminist scholar and Professor of Sociology, Director of 
International Affairs at North-Eastern University, criticizes Islamic reformists who insist that 
change will only arrive through the ‗modernization‘ of Islam and who thus seek a different 
interpretation.  She argued that: ―Women, and not religion, should be the centre of that theory 
(feminism).  It is not possible to defend as feminist the view that women can attain equal 
status only in the context of Islam‖ (quoted in Khiabany & Sreberny, 2001, p.29).   
 
Although Al Abdeen‘s interpretation is considered ―liberal‖ in terms of Saudi Arabian 
standards, her interpretation and justification are considered conservative by other Islamic 
feminist scholars.  Both approaches have their own rationale based on arguments around texts 
relating to women in the Qur‘an, but Al Abdeen‘s approach might be expected to find 
sympathy in an in ultra-conservative country, like Saudi Arabia.  The following chapters will 
examine whether Al Abdeen‘s ―liberal approach‖, which is considered more conservative 
than some Islamic feminist scholars who take a ―secular approach‖, will find sympathy 
among clerics in Saudi Arabia on account of her sometimes controversial interpretation of 
verses in the Qur‘an relating to women and the ambivalence with which the media has treated 
her views.      
 
The main purpose of discussing how ‗Islamic discourse‘ on women in Saudi Arabia has 
contributed to poverty, illiteracy and violence among the disadvantaged is to consider the 
ways in which interpretations of the Qur‘an have influenced programmes about development 
and women‘s status on privately owned television channels, mainly on MBC1 and Al 
Arabiya. 
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2.2 Privately-owned Arab Satellite Channels 
Before discussing the privately-owned Saudi satellite channels, I will shed some light on the 
history of Saudi broadcasting.  Saudi citizens started listening to radio after World War II, 
first tuning in to Arabic programmes on foreign stations to hear the news and other 
programming.  Jeddah Station was launched in 1949.  Service was restricted to 5 hours per 
day, and neither women‘s voices nor music were allowed on the air.  Most broadcasting time 
was devoted to religious programming, including some broadcasts originating from Mecca.  
No other major development in broadcasting took place in Saudi Arabia in the 1950s, and 
listeners interested in news events turned to the BBC.  Those more interested in 
entertainment, especially popular Arabic music, tuned into Egyptian radio services.  Saudi 
Arabian radio started to expand to challenge the attacks on the Saudi royal family in the late 
1950s by the Egyptian Government that was calling for a revolution (Boyd, 1999, p.146).    
 
Construction began in Riyadh in the mid 1960s to broadcast a Voice of Islam programme to 
compete with the anti-Saudi Egyptian radio services.  At the end of the 1960s, the fact that 
the Kingdom was no longer under constant attack from other countries on the airwaves gave 
planners an opportunity to review the future of radio broadcasting in Saudi Arabia.  A new 
central radio studio and its administration building was completed in 1972.  It became 
operational in 1974 (Ibid, p.147).   
 
The Saudi Government had several reasons for announcing, in late 1963, that a national 
television system was to be built.  Firstly, it needed to provide the population with national 
television to give the government control over the kind of news, developmental and 
entertainment programming they were consuming, even though these were Wahhabi 
interpretations of television entrainment programming.  Secondly, television would provide 
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an attractive alternative to Radio Cairo and the Voice of the Arabs, and would therefore be 
able to challenge the hostile broadcasts from Egypt‘s radio stations.  Thirdly, television can 
be used for educational purposes to help with basic health and literacy training.  Finally, 
television can contribute to a sense of national unity (Ibid, p.153).    
 
Saudi media, and especially television, have moved from initially being quite open to 
discussion about a woman‘s place in society, in the 1960s, to a far greater degree of 
conservatism in the 1980s and 1990s, and to more openness in 2005, in the reign of King 
Abdullah (Sakr, 2008, p.391, 392).  Two extremist, Islamist-led actions, one internal, the 
other external, both of which took place in 1979 – changed the direction of Saudi society and, 
mainly, the Saudi media, especially in how they treated women.  One was the attack on, and 
takeover, by Juhaiman Al-Otaibi and his Islamist followers of the Al-Masjid al-Haram (The 
Grand Mosque) in Mecca, and the second was the Islamic Revolution in Iran.  Both the Al-
Otaibi assault and Iran‘s Khomeini Revolution were widely condemned in Saudi Arabia but, 
because both criticized and embarrassed Saudi Arabia – the country that includes the two 
holiest mosques, at Mecca and Medina – as not correctly representing Islam, the Islamist 
outlook was adopted as Saudi Government policy, and the foundational Wahhabism of the 
Kingdom was aggressively reinforced (Al Saied, 2012).  Before 1979, women‘s presence in 
the media had been established for many years.  The number of women working in 
broadcasting grew in the 1960s, in parallel with the expansion of local Saudi broadcast 
media.  Abeer Mishkhas, a journalist with Ashar al-Awsat, recalls open-air film screenings 
run by a state-owned company in the 1970s, where segregation was not enforced (Sakr, 2008, 
p.392).   
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As a result of the Juhaiman siege and then the Khomeini Revolution, all plays, fashion shows, 
international events and cinemas were banned in Saudi Arabia. The Commission for the 
Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice, known as the "religious police," or "the 
Commission" (hai'a in Arabic), increasingly harassed people on the street, and "control" 
became the watchword of the 1980s, particularly for women. Female broadcasters were 
prevented from reading the news, all female singers and other women vanished completely 
from the television screen; women without their ID cards could not walk around, even with 
their husbands, and sometimes even ID cards were not enough for the "religious police" (Al 
Saied, 2012).  After the shock of September 11, 2001, when 15 of the 19 hijackers were from 
Saudi Arabia, the Kingdom was under pressure to reform, and this included its media.   
 
Although Saudi female broadcasters were much more visible after 2005, others think that 
changes were slow and imperceptible.   Akeel said that little had changed with the situation 
of women in the media either quantatively or qualitatively between 2004 and 2006.   Akeel 
stated that only 5% of those employed in radio and television in Saudi Arabia women and 
none had been promoted to senior positions in the Ministry of Information.  This shortage is 
down to a lack of professional and academic training, driven by laws restricting women in the 
media (quoted in Sakr, 2008, pp.396, 397).  Due to these restrictions in local media, 
privately-owned satellite channels located abroad might be expected to give greater visibility 
to women and allow greater freedom to discuss sensitive social matters related to women.     
 
Privately-owned satellite channels first came to the Arab region with the launch of the Middle 
East Broadcasting Corporation (MBC) Group in London in 1991.  As the first privately-
owned Arab broadcaster, it transformed Arab television from the traditional school of 
coverage confined to national boundaries, to the modern school of channels judged not only 
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in terms of their programme topics and technical excellence, but for contributing to critical 
and constructive debate on issues facing Arab societies (Ayish, 2007, pp.473, 474).  
However, these privately-owned channels ‗amplify the picture of state-private interpretation‘ 
because their owners have links to governments (Sakr, 2002, p.6).  Due to these links, private 
Arab satellite channels are not entirely financially independent and are therefore still under 
the influence of the state (Saeed, 2006, p.35). 
 
Private satellite channels have emerged as competitors to local television channels in several 
Arab countries, especially in Saudi Arabia.  Despite these satellite channels being owned by 
Saudi businessmen or members of the Royal Family, they are located outside Saudi Arabia, 
either in neighbouring Arab countries or in Europe, which frees them from governmental or 
clerical control and makes them more courageous in dealing with sensitive subjects and 
interesting controversial debates.  Many Saudi media professionals, whether men or women, 
prefer to work for these channels, and some Saudi specialists want to participate as guests on 
their talk shows, to discuss the problems and issues of Saudi society. These subjects include 
women‘s status and the barriers that hinder their development (Akeel, 2010, p.114).  
 
These channels address liberal topics and seem to lack bias towards any gender.  They are 
still constrained by political considerations and legal regulations, but the proportion of local 
channels‘ viewers has decreased, because the satellite channels offer entertainment and 
educational programmes presented in a professional manner and containing up-to-date 
events, which is not the case in the local television channels that are censored by the 
government.  Drama serials and soap operas that are shown on local channels are out-dated 
and censored, having already been broadcast, uncensored, on satellite channels (Ibid, p.130).   
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2.2.1 Media economics and power  
In order to reveal what powers drive privately-owned television, this section examines ideas 
about media and dominant ideologies.  Since private pan-Arab satellite television channels 
have adopted the business models of privately-owned television stations in Western 
countries, the section will also shed light on the function and economics of Western media.         
     
2.2.1.1 Western private television and economics  
Marx stated that ―the ideas of the ruling class are, in every age, the ruling ideas: i.e. the class, 
which is the dominant material force in society, is at the same time its dominant intellectual 
force‖ (quoted in Strinati, 2004, pp.116).  Murdock and Golding used this theory of 
dominance to analyse the economics of the media.  They argued that the production of ideas 
is under the control of those who run the media and, as a result, their ideas will dominate the 
thoughts of the subordinate class.  This dominant media perpetuates the idea of class 
inequalities and makes them look natural, as it generates these ideas as popular culture 
(Golding & Murdock, 1991, pp.117-122).  Gramsci accepted Marx‘s analysis from the 
previous century and believed that the struggle between the ruling class and the subordinate 
working class was the driving force that moved society forward.  At the same time, however, 
he rejected the economic reductionism of such an analysis.  Instead, Gramsci stated that 
hegemony presents a constant contradiction between the dominant ideology and the social 
experience of subordination, engendering ideological struggle (Abercrombie et al, 1980, 
p.15).  In order to reduce this struggle, most authoritarian regimes sustain popular support 
and legitimacy by using different tools, such as the media, because they can be the cultural 
means by which the dominant class gains the consent of the dominated class.  This is 
accomplished by ―the negotiated construction of a political and ideological consensus which 
incorporates both dominant and dominated groups‖ (Strinati, 2004, p.148).   
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One of the most important means by which media diffuses ideology is through television.  
The key characteristic of television, particularly of privately-owned channels, is that the 
diffusion of ideologies is restricted to powerful media conglomerates, while its consumption 
is unrestricted.  Ideologies diffused through television are transmitted to large and varied 
audiences, regardless of their level of education or knowledge, compared to print media, 
because the prerequisites for decoding are less erudite (Thompson, 1990, p.267).   
 
The struggle to obtain the consent of the dominated class, to which Gramsci refers, is 
revealed in – different media forms in the television sectors, public service: broadcasting and 
private commercial satellite television.  Initiated by John Reith, the founder of the British 
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), public service broadcasting (PSB) rejected the idea of 
commercialisation because programmes should be for everybody.  There should be strict 
regulations in broadcasting, and high standards needed to be upheld (Ibid, p.255).  However, 
PSB as exemplified by the BBC, has been criticised for several reasons.  The following 
limitations were found: the concentration of power in the hands of a bureaucratic elite; the 
government as the dominant power; and a traditional broadcasting service that could not 
compete with the new private sector (Ibid, pp.256-257).  PSB was also challenged by social 
phenomena, such as the ―rise of feminism‖ and the ―expansion of ethnic communities.‖  The 
other factors that have undermined PSB have been the emergence of a gigantic lobby against 
PSB led by Rupert Murdoch; an Australian-American media magnate, and the advent of 
satellite television (Curran, 2002, pp.200-201).      
 
Liberal media theory says that the media should examine the state, monitor its actions and 
disclose its violations.  This definition is actually that of a watchdog, and its main function is 
to protect people by preventing those in power from controlling them (Ibid, pp.215, 225).  
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However, although this theory is ideal on paper, it has played out differently in reality.  
Private satellite television mostly broadcasts entertainment programmes, and news on public 
affairs is allocated only a small amount of air-time, with only ‗official‘ wrongdoings being 
disclosed.  The consumer has little influence, because the channel is owned by giant media 
conglomerates that control competition, making them less concerned with audience demand.  
That most media are controlled by a few media moguls increases the market cost, making it 
difficult for competitors who might enter the market to enlighten the public with their 
programmes.  This can be interpreted as indirect censorship (Ibid, pp.219, 229)  
 
Governments increasingly depend on media to maintain power, so there is a growing 
relationship between governmental officials and media business moguls.  This is best 
illustrated by the relationship between Tony Blair and Rupert Murdoch in the 1990s and such 
collaboration can be theorised as being fundamental to the extent that media owners are 
actually part of the dominant power.  In fact, privately-owned media have not played the role 
of an independent watchdog that serves the public interest, but rather that of a commercial 
company that serves both the media owners‘ investments and the ruling elites.  In sum, this 
overly simplistic media theory did not take into account the collective power of the media 
(Ibid, pp.220-222).  
 
2.2.1.2 Arab private satellite television and economics    
Most Arab private satellite television channels operate according to the same strategy as 
Western channels, using the approach referred to in the preceding sections.  This illustrates 
the ―modernization theory‖; the Arab media have been encouraged to imitate the West.  This 
imitation of Western media promotes capitalist and consumerist values, which bolster 
America‘s hegemony in global media.  Hall describes it as the ―American conception of the 
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world‖ (quoted in Curran, 2002, pp.169, 171).  However, media theory that assumes that the 
ultimate goal of commercial media is only to make profit does not always apply to Arab 
private satellite channels.  In fact, there are businessmen who are motivated by other factors, 
such as political influence or philanthropy.  Each company or organisation has its own 
organisational structure and different priorities depending on the owners (Doyle, 2002, p.5).   
 
Even though the structure and framework of Western, and mainly American, broadcasting 
have been adopted by Arab private satellite television, the content also contains Arab cultural 
and hegemonic dynamics, which means the Arab media are subject to both external and 
internal influences.  Despite the paradigm shift in Arab private satellite television away from 
state ownership, the Arab private market is still under state control, reflecting what is called 
―political capital‖.  This term suggests that the main purpose of launching this private market 
was political, not commercial.  It also suggests that the majority of these Arab private satellite 
channels cannot afford to rely on commercial revenues alone without the financial and 
political support of the state (Saeed, 2006, p.35).  As mentioned above, these privately-owned 
satellite channels show how inter-linked the private and the state are, because the channels‘ 
owners have links to governments (Sakr, 2002, p.6).  For example, Sheikh Waleed Al 
Ibrahim, the MBC Group‘s Chairman and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) is King Fahd‘s 
brother in-law, and is connected to the Saudi royal family, which helped him to finance the 
MBC, especially when it was in its infancy (Sakr, 2001, p.12).   Arab Radio and Television 
(ART) is owned jointly by the Saudi businessman, Sheikh Saleh Kamel and Prince Al 
Waleed bin Talal bin Abd Al Aziz, a member of the Saudi royal family (Sakr, 2002, p.5).   
Dream TV is a private Egyptian television channel co-owned by Ahmad Bahgat, an Egyptian 
businessman whose, close ties with the Mubarak government, enabled him to launch Dream 
TV on 2
nd
 November, 2001 (Sakr, 2006, pp.70, 72).    
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Mamoun Fandy, an Egyptian-born American scholar and president of a research group and 
think tank, elaborated on this idea, (Un) Civil War of Words: Media and Politics in the Arab 
World.  Despite the claims of some private Arab satellite channels that they are independent, 
the state remains a major player in the establishment of private satellite television channel; it 
is not solely subject to market forces.  This is reflected in the state‘s influence over 
programme content, a standard practice in private channels.  This is evidenced by the large 
amounts of money given by the state for very little, if any, financial return.  For example, the 
annual cost of running the Arab media is said to be US $ 17 billion, while net advertising 
revenue in the Gulf countries was no more than US $ 3 billion, in 2004, revealing the hand of 
the state in making up the difference (Fandy, 2008, p.11).  The Emir of Qatar spent US $ 137 
million to cover the initial start-up costs for Al Jazeera and he continued to fund it until it 
reached an annual turnover of US $ 300 million (Ibid, p.47).  MBC started in 1991 with US $ 
300 million in capital and annual costs of US $ 60 million (Sakr, 2001, p.45).  In 2003, the 
MBC Group launched Al Arabiya with US $ 300 million, and it remains very far from 
balancing costs and revenues.  Al Arabiya‟s estimated annual outgoings were US $ 70 million 
in the mid-2000s, while its revenue from advertising was no more than US $ 10 million 
(Fandy, 2008, p. 54).  If Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya operate at a loss, there must be non-
commercial reasons that motivate Qatar and Saudi Arabia to spend such huge sums of money 
on unprofitable channels (Ibid, p.40).       
 
Ironically, it is the state that has become the primary entrepreneur in private television, a 
sector about which it was initially sceptical.  This has created ―state capitalism‖ that puts the 
state in control of programme content (Guaaybess, 2008, p.211), e.g., Ahmad Bahgat, an 
Egyptian businessman and co-owner of private satellite television channel, Dream TV, had 
close ties with the Mubarak government, enabling him to launch Dream TV on 2
nd
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November, 2001.  Bahgat had to offer a 10% stake in Dream TV to the Egyptian Radio and 
Television Union (ERTU).  Although Bahgat‘s initial idea was to screen bold topics to attract 
larger audiences in order to draw more advertisers and to increase profits, his financial 
relations with the government forced him to avoid broadcasting controversial content (Sakr, 
2006, pp.70, 72).  Similarly, the Saudi private satellite channels follow the same pattern, 
where ruling elites and businessmen have established control of television content, 
production and distribution, with little regard for profit (Sakr, 2008, pp. 189-195).  However, 
in Saudi Arabia, delimiting the state is more complicated, especially when it comes to private 
satellite television.  Despite King Abdullah‘s promises of reform, he is just one player in a 
circle of powerful princes.  These multiple power sources have created two opposing groups: 
the reformists and the conservatives.  These contradictions undermine the state‘s coherence 
as it has begun to embody unprecedented contradictory powers.  However, in both cases, 
power has remained concentrated in the hands of traditional power holders, mainly a number 
of princes (Al-Rasheed, 2008, pp.13, 17, 18).                
 
Owen and Wilden have highlighted the significance of the way in which the economics of 
broadcast media produces audiences not programmes: 
 
“The first and most serious mistake that an analyst of the television industry can 
make is to assume that advertising-supported television broadcasters are in business 
to broadcast programs.  They are not.  Broadcasters are in the business of producing 
audiences” (quoted in Ferguson, 2004, p.156).   
 
Owners of Arab satellite television channels want to have as many viewers as possible, but 
each channel has its own style and priorities, depending on the owners‘ agenda.  When MBC 
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emerged on 18
th
 September, 1991, it tried to attract viewers by transforming Arab television 
from the traditional school, confined to national boundaries, to the modern school, judged not 
only in terms of programme topics and technical excellence, but also for its contribution to a 
constructive debate on the issues facing Arab societies (Ayish, 2007, pp.474-491).  LBC and 
Future TV exploited women to attract male audiences, which was described at that time as 
―like beaming Beirut nightlife into Gulf homes‖ (quoted in Sakr, 2007, p.94).  Al Jazeera 
attracted viewers through controversial and uncensored political debates, which were not 
common in the region (Sakr, 2005, p.67).  Al Arabiya tried to attract viewers‘ attention with 
non-political news, such as health, entertainment news and mainly through its business news 
and coverage of the stock market (Sakr, 2007, p.148).  However, Yosri Fouda, an Egyptian 
anchor on Al Jazeera until 2009, now a presenter on ON TV, explained that such editorial 
policies are not ―the result of structural economic and political independence, but of a grant 
from upstairs – a grant that could be claimed back at any moment for whatever reason‖ 
(quoted in Sakr, 2005, p.87).   
  
MBC imported numerous ready-made American and European programmes, or produced 
Arabic version of TV formats, e.g., Man Sayarbah Almalion, which is taken from Who wants 
to be a Millionaire, and Kalam Nawaim (Sweet Talk), which is taken from The View (Ibid, 
pp.113, 105).  Jihad Fakhreddine, Gallup‘s Regional Research Director for the Middle East 
and North Africa, warned that there should be more opportunities available for local people 
and local production (Ibid, p.112).  This lack of encouragement of creativity and creative 
endeavours has not only been due to concerns around financial risk, but also because such 
posts could threaten the political status quo (Ibid, p.134).  Arab media entrepreneurs have 
thus promoted the mimicking of western styles.  
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This section has considered the economic models that see Arab private satellite channels as 
dependent on governmental capital and power.  The next section will consider links between 
such dependence and the possibility that private media fulfil the political goals of 
governments rather than the social and economic needs of the people.     
 
2.2.2 Arab identity and satellite television 
The Arab media have always been at the centre of conflicts over Arab identities.  Some claim 
these conflicts are framed as East vs. West, and others think they are driven by intra-regional 
conflicts, but in both cases, they are politically driven.  Some researchers think Arab 
identities, as depicted in the Arab media and, mainly, on satellite channels, need to be 
critiqued to make them more inclusive, especially regarding the development of women‘s 
status.     
 
After Arab countries gained their independence in the 1950s and 1960s, the Arab media were 
manipulated to legitimise the new local systems and to mobilise the public behind Arab 
nationalism.  As a result, some critics believe that the Arab media were exploited for political 
ends, rather than to serve people‘s needs.  In this context, Sawt Al-Arab (Voice of the Arabs), 
a prominent Egyptian transnational Arabic-language radio service, emerged as a key tool 
used by Nasser to determine the content of Arab nationalism.  Arabic is the common 
language of countries in the region and has facilitated the spread of ideas among the public.  
Nasser established Sawt Al-Arab on 4
th 
July, 1953.  Since illiteracy was common and people 
relied on audio information, radio was a perfect tool to reach audiences and influence them.  
Nasser was a popular anti-colonialist, and many Arabs enjoyed listening to his speeches.  
Nasser used the state-owned radio station to promote his policies at the local level and 
throughout the region.  Fandy believes that Sawt Al-Arab was the blueprint for all pan-Arab 
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media and the beginning of its politicisation.  Nasser used Sawt Al-Arab to attack Arab 
leaders who challenged Egypt‘s regional hegemonic ambitions, e.g., Saudi Arabia was one of 
the main targets of these attacks during the Yemeni Civil War, and King Hussein of Jordan 
was another target during a struggle between the King and pro-Nasser elements in his 
government (Fandy, 2008, pp.40-41).   
 
In 1967, Israel defeated Nasser and the Arab armies.  During these defeats, Sawt Al-Arab 
reported fake military victories.  When the Arab people discovered the defeat, they shunned 
the radio station as it had lost its credibility.  After 1967, with the idea taking hold that Arabs 
had to return to religion because Israel‘s victory over the Arabs was due to piety and religion 
in Israel, not to its military superiority, television was dominated by a mix of Arab nationalist 
and Islamist ideologies, the latter strengthened by the 1979 Khomeini revolution in Iran  
(Ibid, pp.42-43).    
 
The pace of change in Arab broadcasting was accelerated by the outbreak of the 1991 Gulf 
War, and the emergence of private satellite channels.  Even MBC‘s launch was politically 
motivated, in response to the way CNN covered the 1991 Gulf war.  Apparently, MBC 
expressed a desire to have an Arabic version of CNN (Sakr, 2001, p.84).  Al Jazeera 
television was founded by Qatari royal decree to legitimise the regime after the Emir of 
Qatar‘s 1995 coup against his father (Fandy, 2008, p.47).  Al Jazeera became the most widely 
viewed news network in the Arab world due to its willingness to break taboos by criticising 
Arab governments.  Several Arab governments view Al Jazeera with suspicion and have 
accused it of criticising Arab countries while not delving into sensitive issues in Qatar 
(Hamada, 2004, p.10).  Saudi Arabia responded too, by launching Al Arabiya in February 
2003.  Sheikh Waleed Al Ibrahim said his goal was to position Al Arabiya as the equivalent 
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to CNN, while Al Jazeera was more like Fox News (Shapiro, 2005).  He also declared in the 
Washington Times that the motivation behind setting up Al Arabiya was ―to get rid of the 
Taliban mentality‖ (Sakr, 2006, p.74).  
  
The different treatments of Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya reflect government control.  Some 
analysts see Al Jazeera‟s editorial line as being in favour of the Islamist and Arab nationalist 
agenda, while Al Arabiya is more liberal, even though it has less freedom to cover 
controversial political issues (Hroub, 2009, pp.223, 224).  Some have accused Al Arabiya of 
following American policy (and even Israeli policy) in the region, especially with regard to 
the invasion of Iraq (Al Dahmashee, 2010), constrained by the editorial policies of the Saudi 
princes who finance it (Miladi, 2006, p. 952), and some call Al Jazeera ―Osama bin Laden 
TV‖ (quoted in Sakr, 2004, p.158).  In spite of their claims to independence, it is the state not 
market forces that is the key player in these two news channels (Fandy, 2008, p.3).    
 
Due to this lack of independence, Arab satellite channels have seldom tried to clarify the 
identities that will lead to development, or examine how Islamism and Arab nationalism can 
be liberated from the dominant ideologies of racist nationalism and sectarianism and be based 
on enlightenment and development (AlSaied, 2011).  There has been no investigation into the 
correlation between people‘s frustration with western policies in the region, corrupt Arab 
dictatorial regimes, and the emergence of radical political Islamist discourse that does not 
want just to embrace an individual path to salvation of faith, but also to embrace a political 
and socio-cultural system (Hroub, 2009, pp.217, 235).  These channels have rarely traced the 
impact of such political Islam on social development, modernity, and mainly, on the 
development of women‘s status in the Arab world.         
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This study seeks to discover whether private pan-Arab satellite television can contribute 
towards development issues, in particular to young, disadvantaged women‘s development, 
and can satisfactorily address their social concerns.  The MBC‘s founder, Sheikh Waleed Al 
Ibrahim‘s words; ―I want my networks to make a difference in the Arab world‖, suggest his 
channels have higher goals that could potentially contribute through news and entertainment 
to women‘s development.     
 
2.3 Communication for Development Theories     
Since this study focuses on improving disadvantaged women‘s status in society with an 
emphasis on doing so from the bottom- up, this section will shed some light on participatory 
communication for development and for women‘s empowerment.  The ultimate goal of 
participatory communication is social change, and it is viewed as a potentially 
transformational means of rebalancing power structures.  There are numerous approaches to 
communication for development: the dominant paradigm, social marketing, health education, 
entertainment education, modernisation, dependency, multiplicity, diffusion of innovation 
theory, and participation (Servaes, 2007, pp.487-493).  However, the main concern is that 
development organisations in general and UN agencies in particular, have not achieved 
women‘s empowerment.  White explains that theories of communication for development are 
central to empowerment.  However, in the field of communication for development, most 
governments and major non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are not using radio, 
television or other media effectively to educate the rural/village and urban poor or to provide 
support for their development.  Why is there so little development in the area of development 
practice? (White, 2004, p.7)      
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Melkote points out that, although participatory communication focuses on collaboration, 
equitable knowledge-sharing between people and experts, taking into account local cultural 
contexts, the outcome in most cases has not been real empowerment for people but the 
attainment of some indicator of development as articulated in the modernisation paradigm.  
Melkote also added that most theories and approaches, including the participatory model, 
have essentially been ‗old wine in new bottles‘.  Two areas and concepts in communication 
for development that seem suitable, in terms of achieving social change, are participatory 
action research (which is a deconstruction of the participatory development paradigm) and 
empowerment strategies (Melkote, 2006, pp.116-117).   
 
Participatory Actions Research (PAR):  
PAR is dedicated to reviving both the power of marginalised people and their popular 
knowledge.  The knowledge that PAR attempts to generate is specific, local and an 
application of the bottom-up approach.  Importantly, it is used to initiate collaborative social 
action in order to empower local knowledge and to wrest social power, which is inherent in 
knowledge, away from the privileged (Friesen, 1999, pp.281-308).     
 
A study by Johnson, Media and Social Change: The Modernizing Influences of Television in 
Rural India (2001), concentrates on the role television plays in social change in rural India.  
The study analyses the influence of television on various social, economic and political 
perspectives that are revolutionizing village life in the country.  The data for this research was 
collected in two villages in the mountains of Western Maharashtra by way of ethnographic 
fieldwork between 1995 and – 1996, and on a subsequent visit in 2000. The researcher used 
participant observation and in-depth interviews to explore television‘s role in the structure 
and dynamics of everyday life.  The research process also showed structural changes taking 
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place, as well as changes at a psychological level.  The former focused on variables such as 
marriage, religion and gender, whilst the latter centred on changes in attitudes, fears, values 
and opinions.  Television has brought about changes in people‘s attitudes, such as a shift 
towards openly and freely denouncing prejudice.  Another change has been the rise in 
materialism; people aspire to own products they see on television programmes.  At a 
structural level, it is more difficult to see change, because it is not a simple process and 
involves several factors (Johnson, 2001, pp.147-167).   
 
Empowerment:   
Melkote (2006, p.117) states that it is unethical to use communications to help solve minor or 
immediate problems whilst ignoring the systemic barriers erected by societies that permit or 
perpetuate inequalities among their citizens.  Sustainable change is not possible unless we 
deal with the crucial problem of a lack of economic and social power among individuals at 
the grassroots.  Individuals are impoverished not because they lack knowledge or reason, but 
because have no access to appropriate or sustainable opportunities to improve their lives.  If 
communication for development is to continue to play an effective role in social change 
processes, researchers and practitioners must address the fundamental problems of unequal 
power relations (Ibid, p.166).      
 
In fact, participation in communication barely exists in experiments.  There is a remarkable 
difference between theoretical analysis and the practice of development.  Even though the 
dominant paradigm in communication is not recommended, it is frequently applied in 
practice.  Meanwhile, the participatory paradigm in communication is extensively supported 
in theory, but rarely applied in practice (Sparks, 2007, p.59).   
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One of the obstacles that the participatory paradigm in communication faces, especially under 
authoritarian regimes, is its challenge to the existing social structure and confrontation with 
political power.  This can be targeted through the ―negotiated variant‖, communication that 
focuses on smaller scale problems and does not threaten those in power.  Accordingly, it is 
possible to gain support from governments or international development organisations (Ibid, 
p.72).  The development communicator should not challenge or threaten the powerful so that 
they receive financial support for the project and do not hamper it (Ibid, p.68-69).   
 
2.4 Women and Television Genres     
2.4.1 Women’s consumption of entertainment channels   
Most studies that scrutinise how women decode media messages are conducted in the West 
and focus on Western audiences (Khamis, 2009, p. 453).  This dearth of research on women‘s 
media consumption in the Arab world risks baseless generalisations being made about the 
impact of television on women.  Van Zoonen has drawn attention to such generalisations and 
how they imply that women are all the same, regardless of their class, education or age.  
When talking about women‘s media consumption, it is therefore important to specify the kind 
of women (van Zoonen, 1994, pp.119, 123) to whom we are referring.  This study intends to 
shed light on a particular class and age group, who are routinely ignored in research on Arab 
media consumption in general and studies conducted in Saudi Arabia, in particular.  
 
Whilst there is a tendency to try to educate village women through different genres of 
television programmes, for Nair & White (1993; p.170) these women actually want 
entertainment programmes just like urban women, and their main motivation for watching 
television is for entertainment, not to learn.  Alterman (2002, p.146), in his analysis of Arab 
television, also describes television as predominately an entertainment medium.  The pleasure 
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gained from television has been utilised in development communication in what is called 
‗entertainment-education‘ - the process of purposefully devising and distributing a media 
message to both entertain and educate, in order to increase audience knowledge about an 
educational issue, create favourable attitudes, and change overt behaviour (Singhal, 1999, 
p.122).  Egyptian melodrama, for example, adopts many of these characteristics.  Abu-
Lughod (2002, p.300) describes it as a ―technology for the production of new kinds of 
selves.‖  
 
Soap operas have often been created for social and behavioural development, especially 
among women.  Bill Ryerson, founder of Population Communications International (PCI) 
noted that entertainment programmes like soap operas can engage people and influence 
attitudinal and behavioural change because their emotional content makes them memorable.  
These changes can be behavioural, such as health tips, to lower the fertility rate, and HIV 
awareness to reduce incidences of infection, or may be attitudinal in nature, focusing on 
social issues, like women‘s rights and adult education (Weinreich, 2006).    
  
Education through entertainment is criticised by participatory communication advocates for 
taking a top-down approach.  Social mobilisation, on the other hand, integrates top-down and 
bottom-up approaches that include political will and public resources to create social change, 
bringing together government agencies, NGOs and the media to work towards a common 
goal.  Satellite television can contribute to this in two ways: by working with civil society 
organisations and NGOs to generate public awareness, or, by acting as an independent agent 
for change (Adams, 2006, pp. 179, 180).  Nonetheless, social mobilisation is unlikely to be 
easily achieved in the Arab world due to governments‘ control of the media and their 
reluctance to cooperate with NGOs (Kandil, 2009, pp.25, 28).            
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Abu-Lughod has highlighted the lack of research into media consumption amongst 
disadvantaged women in rural or village communities by investigating soap opera messages 
on Egyptian television, Dramas of Nationhood.  Due to a lack of audience research amongst 
disadvantaged, peasant women, soap operas have been criticised for their unrealistic portrayal 
of rural women.  They erroneously appear over-dressed, with heavy make-up, long nails, and 
speaking an incorrect dialect (Abu-Lughod, 2005, p.73).  Abu-Lughod (Ibid, pp.85, 104) 
explained how television drama serials reveal the dominant development paradigm through 
showing how elites are responsible for modernising disadvantaged rural people, without 
explaining the obstacles that rural people face in gaining an education in the first place (Ibid, 
pp.84, 104).  The dominant message of development in Nuna al-sha‟nuna, a television drama 
serial directed by In‘am Muhammad Ali and written by Salwa Bakr, is that the importance of 
education for national development is overshadowed by illiteracy caused by class and gender 
discrimination, without spelling out who is responsible for this (Ibid, p.89).  
 
Khamis, in her ethnographic study of an Egyptian village, attempted to reveal the dominant 
paradigm in televised governmental literacy campaigns.  The women in her study 
demonstrated different interpretations of these televised texts:  dominant, oppositional and 
negotiated.  Most of the dominant interpretations came from formally-educated women whilst 
oppositional interpretations were exhibited by women who had no formal education. Finally, 
negotiated interpretations were recorded among those who either had no formal education or 
who had left school early.  The main reason for an oppositional interpretation is that women 
see how these televised messages have substituted for other ‗forms‘ of education.  These 
dominant paradigms make women more defensive, since they present women as victims of 
bad circumstances, and they lay the blame on people who exploit illiterate women (Khamis, 
2007, pp.89-106).    
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A few studies have been undertaken that focus on television consumption among rural village 
women in Arab society.  For example, Katab (2008) has published a paper on the ‗Image of a 
Rural Woman in Arab Drama Serials as Presented on Egyptian Television and its 
Relationship with the Public‟s Perception of Her Social Reality.‟  The study was based on a 
content analysis of nine drama serials, and a questionnaire was sent to a random sample of 
400 participants from the Egyptian general public.  The content analysis‘ results found that 
the main problems faced by rural women, as depicted in the drama serials, were social in 
nature, yet in the questionnaire 52.8% felt that the actual problems that rural women faced 
were economic, the primary problem being poverty.  Of those questioned, 94% also said that 
rural women were presented as passive, with no role in society, which is an unrealistic image.  
 
A study by Amer and Kamal: The Opinion of Rural Women about Family Planning 
Campaigns on Television (2002) explored the views of rural women who had been exposed 
to family planning campaigns on various television channels.  The study involved 
interviewing 200 married women in one of the villages of the Giza province.  The key 
findings were that rural women were not sufficiently familiar with the family planning 
programmes broadcast and the best way to convey health messages was through drama, 
rather than through other television programmes (Amer & Kamal, 2002, pp.255-309). 
 
There has been other research about rural women and the media in non-Arab societies, where 
the context has been quite similar to the Arab one.  For example, a study by Prathap (2004), 
Relative Effectiveness of Agricultural Communication through Mass Media Including New 
Media: an Experimental Approach with Rural Women, examined the impact of radio, 
television, print media and the internet on the cognitive behaviour of rural women. The study 
was conducted among 144 women in rural India in order to measure the extent to which these 
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women relied on the media for agricultural knowledge.  One of the study‘s main findings was 
that television was used to access information about agricultural technology.  Participants 
stressed the importance of using local language in the media.  
   
It is difficult, in fact almost impossible, to determine the effects of media on their audience.  
Gerbner‘s cultivation theory explains that a viewer‘s behaviour will not be changed 
immediately by watching a programme or a film on television, but, rather, that exposure to 
several thousand images might eventually encourage a particular behavioural change over 
time.  Gerbner argued that those who watched a great deal of television were more likely to 
see the world according to the social reality constructed by what they watched.  This, 
however, does not take into account social and psychological factors amongst viewers.  
Gerbner‘s theory also places great emphasis on the primacy of the scripts, whereas other 
researchers highlight the significance of audience research, in the belief that viewers are 
heterogeneous and diverse in their interpretations of television programmes.  Hall is of a 
similar view and underlines the importance of investigating how viewers interpret 
programmes before assuming a necessary effect:   
 
“Before this message can have an effect (however defined), satisfy a need or be put to 
a use, it must first be appropriated as meaningful discourse and be meaningfully 
decoded.  It is this set of decoded meanings which have an effect, influence, entertain, 
instruct or persuade” (quoted in Livingstone, 1998, pp.16-19).      
 
A major concern amongst some women is the ineffectiveness of women‘s programmes, 
whether they are drama or talk shows.  They believe that development of women‘s status 
concerns the whole of society, not only women, and these women‘s programmes make them 
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feel further marginalised (Sakr, 2005, p.2).  Some feminist critics argue that the programme 
or a talk show‘s presenter is important, but the presenter should not speak as a formal expert, 
rather as a peer (quoted in Cragin, 2010, p.157).  Factors that might attract viewers are: the 
programme format, the presenter‘s personality and knowledge depending on how much 
freedom the presenter had on the show, and how thorough the programme is in providing the 
viewer with an overview of the problem, robust analysis and alternative solutions.         
 
Media monitoring was one of the activities recommended to the Gulf media targeting women.  
Such monitoring could draw comparisons between the various interpretations of women in 
the media and could focus on scenes of physical and psychological violence against women 
and how this is treated in the media.  All the outcomes could then be reported to the Global 
Media Monitoring Project (GMMP) (Ibid, p.6).     
  
Private Arab satellite channels might also be accused of having purely commercial objectives 
and there is an assumption that they are not interested in national development or social 
change.  This assumption, however, is premature.  Development and social change are long-
term processes and it is too soon to judge the role of the new satellite media (Hroub, 2006, 
p.92).  
 
2.4.2 News and women  
Having exposed these oppressive modes of authority and domination, this study believes that 
such oppression has to be disclosed and discussed at a much more official level in order to 
motivate public opinion and exert pressure on decision-makers to assist those in need.  Al 
Arabiya, a satellite news channel, was selected in the case study for its programmes on 
development and social issues to be scrutinised, and to analyse to what extent a news channel 
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is concerned with the trials and tribulations of the disadvantaged, especially those of women.  
Since Arab private satellite television is considered a new media genre and few studies have 
been done on it, especially ones relating to its coverage of development and social issues, it is 
crucial to target both news and entertainment satellites channels (Hroub, 2006, p.101).    
 
Disadvantaged women, who are oppressed and struggling under different kinds of 
domination, are not only looking to see their problems represented in drama on an 
entertainment channel, but they are also looking for solutions.  Some might argue that the 
role of satellite media is to transmit information, not to create social change and development.  
This argument may apply in developed countries but not in developing countries where, 
development indicators are low and every tool must be employed to aid development (Ibid, 
p.92).  Van Zoonen (1994, p.124) has lamented that ―research about the public sphere of 
news has been seriously neglected by feminist researchers.‖  Although women make up half 
of the world‘s population, the Global Media Monitoring Project (GMMP) stated that the 
percentage of news coverage featuring women was only 17% in 1995 and 18 % in 2000 
(Sakr, 2004, p.1).      
  
One of the main challenges in news broadcasting in developing countries is that their content 
depends on the output of developed countries.  Since the cost of producing original 
international news is so high, it is more likely that content will be taken from one of the big 
news agencies.  These agencies are Associated Press (AP), United Press International (UPI), 
Reuters, Agence France Press (AFP) and the Soviet agency (TASS), and they concerned with 
their respective national interests and news from developed countries.  Their dominance over 
information flow has affected developing countries in many ways.  News about developing 
countries is filtered through the preferences of news agencies, and is determined by the nature 
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of the relationship between these news agencies and the governments of developing 
countries.  Since, the flow of information from developing countries to these agencies is 
limited, the result may be irrelevant news and biased portrayals of these countries.  This lack 
of information from developing countries means people learn more about sports and film 
stars in developed countries than they do about worthwhile information on development in 
their own countries.  This information might sometimes satisfy the elites of these developing 
countries, but not the common people.  One writer from a developing country describes this 
dominance of information: ―the transfer of modern media technology may, in fact, increase 
the dependency on foreign capital, and on foreign sources of information and culture, and 
consequently may exert control over the tastes and wishes of the inhabitants of developing 
countries‖ (quoted in Sparks, 2007, pp.101-103).       
 
Commercialisation and privatisation have controlled media coverage in both the North and 
the South, affecting coverage of development issues around poverty, class inequality and 
corruption.  Issues related to poverty do not make television news, and journalists covering 
such issues get little in return if compared to journalists covering political elites or rich 
celebrities.  Most journalists from the South are trained by Western media organisations to 
cover news on the ruling elites, rather than on the ordinary people (Thussu, 2004, pp.54-56).   
 
News in the Arab world has not been a public commodity, but rather an instrument for 
governments to use to exert and extend their influence.  News has played a central role in 
politics and the ruling elite‘s needs since the emergence of satellite channels in the 1990s.  
Abdel Nabi, an Egyptian journalist, defines news as ―a process through which the reader 
acquires real knowledge of the different events that took place in society during a certain time 
span.‖  Abdel Nabi also thinks that news has a development role in society, but, in reality, the 
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Arab media are more preoccupied with the elites and disregard rural people.  Arab 
professionals usually reside in urban areas where the elites live, and they neglect rural areas 
unless a high official is on a visit there.  In Egypt, for example, even though 70% of 
inhabitants are from rural areas, only 5% of media coverage focuses on them (Mellor, 2005, 
p.81, 82, 92).    
  
There are several reasons for the reduced amount of coverage of disadvantaged people on 
Arab private news satellite channels.  One is ―national pride‖, whereby programmes focus on 
exemplary citizens who have excelled in their careers.  These citizens are national icons who 
make the nation feel proud.  Disadvantaged people‘s representation in the media is avoided, 
not only because such people do not do the nation proud, but because their exposure in the 
media might flag up the authoritarian regime‘s violations and so distort this proud national 
image (Ibid, p.93).  Another reason is that Arab news is influenced by Western news values 
in giving priority to newness and immediacy.  After the launch of these satellite channels in 
the 1990s, following the Gulf War, satellite news channels were competing to broadcast 
breaking news.  These channels surpassed state channels in live breaking news and also in the 
quality and quantity of news coverage.  Live coverage is one of the main competitive factors 
that distinguish satellite channels from state channels (Ibid, pp.94-95).   
 
Arab satellite media have adopted the Western media‘s techniques in political news coverage, 
such as Crossfire on CNN, which was reproduced in an Arabic version as The Opposite 
Direction on Al Jazeera, but they have been reluctant to adopt the Western media‘s reduction 
in hard news in favour of more soft news.  Ordinary people now have more air time on 
American television, whereas the common people, mainly those who are marginalised and 
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women are not considered when compared to the dominant politicians on Arab satellite 
channels (Mellor, 2005, p.96).      
 
Al Arabiya, however, is characterised by non-political news and programmes.  By featuring 
business trends on the stock market and updated business news, it has attracted viewers from 
Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries.  It also covers soft news, such as a morning show called 
Sabah Al Arabiya, which covers health, entertainment and sport (Sakr, 2007, p.148).  It also 
presents documentaries and talk shows that highlight social and development issues 
(Shaheen, 2008, p.244).     
     
There are some studies that show Al Arabiya‟s coverage of issues relating to Saudi society. 
The study by Al Dahmashee (2010), Addressing issues of Saudi society in Al Ekbareya and 
Al Arabiya and the Opinions of College Students Towards Them, 2010, focused on content 
analysis undertaken between October and November 2009.  The study randomly selected 400 
students during the academic year 2008/2009, from three Saudi universities: King Faisal 
University, King Saud University, and King Abdulaziz University.  The research method 
used was a questionnaire.  The results of the news content analysis were that 53.5% of airtime 
was devoted to Arab countries‘ news, 45.6% to Saudi Arabia, 25.5% to international news 
and 12.9% to non-Arab Muslim countries.  The least amount of coverage was given to Saudi 
political issues, such as women‘s political participation at 2.2%, 1.9% was given to voting 
and elections, 0.6% to democracy, and 0.3% to freedom of opinion and expression.  The 
results of the programmes‘ content analysis were that talk shows attracted 82.5% of viewers, 
especially if the presenter was popular.  Al Arabiya hosts guests who specialise in politics, 
economics, and society.  Political experts are hosted by 45.9% of talk shows, economic 
experts by 44.8%, and social experts by 32.5 per cent.  The audience interactivity in these 
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programmes was low, at only 26.1%.  The results of the field study were that 45.5% of 
participants were keen to follow up on local issues and 31.8% on other issues.  A very high 
percentage of participants, at 85.1%, thought that Al Arabiya was concerned with social 
issues in Saudi Arabia.   
  
Another study looked at the extent to which the Saudi youth depends on various media.  Al 
Nemer‘s study (2007), The Dependency of the Saudi Youth in Gaining Knowledge of Local, 
Arab and International Issues - A Comparative Study Between Traditional and New Media, 
involved a research sample of 200 high school students from different regions in Saudi 
Arabia: Riyadh, Jeddah, Mecca, and Asir.  The researcher used a survey to conduct the 
research.  The results were that 52% of the participants depend on satellite channels, 27 per 
cent on the internet, 5.5% on newspapers, 4.5% on MBC FM radio, and 4% on Saudi local 
channels.  The most preferred news channels were Al Arabiya at 81%, followed by Al 
Jazeera at 74&, then Al Ekhbariya at 66% and, lastly, Saudi local channels at 11%.  
 
To know more about the reasons behind satellite news channels‘ reluctance to cover women‘s 
issues requires further research.  Research on Arab women on Arab news satellite channels is 
limited and there are no studies of disadvantaged women.  This implies that further research 
is urgently needed to fill this gap.  Al Alrabiya‟s tackling of non-political topics and the high 
percentage of Saudi viewers
9
 were the main reasons for selecting the channel as a case study.  
Interviews with the elite at Queen Rania‘s Media Office and at the MBC Group were 
conducted to determine their views on Al Arabiya‟s development programmes.  The study 
also conducted a textual analysis of a talk show on Al Arabiya, Hewar AlArab (Arab 
Dialogue) – that focuses on development issues to determine what proportion of air time is 
                                                 
9
 40.5% of Saudi male viewers and 12.5% of Saudi female viewers above +35 years of age, 23.5% of Saudi 
male viewers and 9% of Saudi female viewers between 25-34 (Audience profile-MBC Group, 2010)  
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given to topics about poverty, illiteracy and violence against Arab women.  The analysis will 
focus on episodes aired between 2006 and 2010.      
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Chapter 3 
METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction 
 
“You will need to be aware of the choices of method and approach and of what the 
consequences are of making particular choices in order to make the most of your 
research topic and to produce good work” (Gray 2003, p.6).   
 
Throughout this chapter, I will use methods best suited to answering my research questions 
but first, it is important to distinguish between the terms method and methodology.  ‗Method 
refers to those different techniques of research which any researcher employs in order to 
construct data and interrogate its sources, while methodology describes the overall 
epistemological approach adopted by the study‘ (Ibid, 2003, p.4).  Since I aim to investigate 
the codes of practice behind television programmes‘ coverage of issues relating to the 
development of Arab women‘s status, I am using qualitative methods.  Qualitative methods 
focus on assigning meaning to my observations as a researcher and produce non-numerical 
data that quantitative methods will not offer me (Green, 2008, p. 46).    The main thing is to 
not dichotomise quantitative and qualitative approaches; rather the choice of method should 
be based on the goals of the research (Brannen, 1992, p. xiv).  A qualitative approach is 
designed to explore and develop the research questions, while a quantitative approach tests 
hypotheses.  In order for the research questions to be explored, the research method requires 
the attributes of a qualitative approach, which are explanation, personal interpretation and 
knowledge construction (Stake, 1995, p. 37).  Accordingly, the study adopts a qualitative, 
ethnographic methodology, which utilises ‗between-method‘ triangulation consisting of in-
 82 
depth field observation, in-depth one-to-one interviews, and focus groups.  The study also 
conducts elite interviews and textual analysis.    
 
3.1.1 Triangulation 
Triangulation can be defined as data obtained from a wide range of different sources, using a 
variety of methods.  Triangulation‘s main purpose is to minimize the occurrence of errors or 
of drawing inappropriate conclusions, which may result from relying on only one method.  In 
addition and most importantly, ‗approaching research questions from different angles and 
bringing together a range of views has the potential to generate new and alternative 
explanations‘ (Arksey & Knight, 1999, pp.21, 22).  ‗Within method‘ triangulation means 
using a variety of techniques within one method and  ‗between-method‘ triangulation is 
where two or more distinct methods are employed to investigate the same fact, but from 
different angles (Ibid, 1999, p.23).    
 
There are two groups involved in this study.  The first is made up of young, disadvantaged 
Saudi Arabian women between 15 and 30 years of age.  I lived among them in order to 
interview them and to conduct focus groups to discover their perceptions and opinions of the 
MBC1 programmes that relate to poverty, illiteracy and violence.  Here, I used a qualitative, 
ethnographic methodology, which utilised the ‗between-method‘ triangulation consisting of 
in-depth field observation, in-depth one-to-one interviews, and focus groups.  The second 
group is is made up of elites from Queen Rania‘s Media Office and from the Middle East 
Broadcasting Corporation (MBC) Group, with whom I conducted interviews.  I interviewed 
Suzanne Afaneh, who managed the media section of Queen Rania‘s Media Initiative.  The 
interview was coordinated by Ethar Khawasnah, the Chair of Queen Rania‘s Media Office.  
The interview‘s purpose was to examine the motivation behind and the, methods employed in 
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Queen Rania‘s Media Initiative on the development of women‘s status, and to find out how 
the initiative was implemented.  In addition, the interview sought to determine whether there 
are other similar media initiatives on women‘s development in which pan-Arab television 
corporations are involved.  The interview also examined their opinion of the MBC Group and 
whether they were cooperative during the Media Campaign.  It also asked about their 
opinions, mainly of the Al Arabiya channel and how they view its development programmes.  
I interviewed Sheikh Waleed Al Ibrahim, the MBC Group‘s Chairman and Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO), and Abdul Rahman Al Rashed, Director of Al Arabiya.  Additionally, I  had a 
long conservation with Nakhle El Hage, Director of News at Al Arabiya, and met Ali al-
Hadithi, Deputy Director of the MBC Group; Ahmad Hatoum, Senior Marketing Manager at 
Al Arabiya; and Nabeel Alkhatib, Executive Editor at Al Arabiya.  I also met Ali Jaber, Dean 
of the Mohammed Bin Rashid School for Communications at the American University of 
Dubai, one of the judges on Arabs Got Talent at MBC4.  Jaber was due to be assigned as 
MBC Group TV Director in September, 2011, succeeding Tim Riordan on the latter‘s 
retirement in October.  The main purpose of these interviews was to know the extent to which 
they applied these media initiatives, and to understand their opinions of them.  Moreover, the 
purpose was to explore opportunities for and barriers to presenting programmes on the 
development of women‘s status.  My research methods also include a textual analysis of three 
programmes from MBC1 and one programme from Al Arabiya, which will be explained in 
detail in Chapter 6.  I used textual analysis by combining quantitative and qualitative 
methods.  The quantitative method seeks to determine what proportion of air time was given 
to topics relating to poverty, illiteracy and violence against Arab women.  It focused on three 
programmes on MBC1 — Kalam Nawaim, Tash Ma Tash, a few episodes from a Saudi 
drama series called Al Sakenat fee Golobena (The Female Inhabitants of our Hearts) and one 
programme from Al Arabiya, which is focused on development — Hewar Al Arab (Arab 
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Dialogue).  The analysis focuses on episodes broadcast between 2006 and 2010.  The purpose 
of this analysis was to determine what proportion of air time was given to topics tackling 
poverty, illiteracy and violence amongst and against Arab women. The qualitative method 
seeks to use critical discourse and semiotic analyses.    
   
 
3.2 Fieldwork in Goz Al Jaafarh   
The study‘s qualitative, ethnographic research began with participant observation in a village 
called Goz Al Jaafarh that lasted for one month and was conducted in June, 2010.  The key 
methods of ethnography are ―participant observation and oral testimony: the first 
emphasising the legitimacy of a researcher‘s interpretation of observed cultural phenomena 
from their participation; the second emphasising a researcher‘s ability to allow people to 
‗speak for themselves‘- to construct their own texts – via the recording and transcription of 
interview material‖ (Scheyvens & Storey, 2003, p.65).   
 
I conducted focus groups and in-depth, one-to-one interviews, in the second stage of my 
fieldwork in February, 2011, for a period of one month.  The ethnographic approach used in 
the first stage of my fieldwork in, 2010, helped me to develop a rapport and familiarity with 
the women, which allowed for a relaxed setting in the focus groups and interviews.     
 
Lull believed in the significance of personal interaction in media studies through conducting 
ethnography and argued that ―one of the most promising ways to study mass communication 
is to look at the details of interpersonal interaction‖ (quoted in Gillespie, 1995, p.58).    
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3.2.1 In-Depth Field Observation  
One of the main reasons I used the ethnographic approach in my study was the absence of 
any studies on disadvantaged Saudi women.  There is a widespread idea, worldwide, that 
disadvantaged Saudis do not exist, and everyone in Saudi Arabia is rich.  In addition, there 
are one or two books in Arabic on Saudi women in the media, for example Saudi Women in 
the Media by (Akeel, 2010), but there is no study on Saudi women‘s media consumption and 
nothing about the underprivileged.  Published studies on Saudi women‘s lives mostly deal 
with elites (Altorki 1986; Atrebi 1994; AlMunajjed 2006; Al-Baz, 2009).  I commenced the 
study with exploratory fieldwork via in-depth field observation, before conducting focus 
groups and in-depth one-to-one interviews, in order to establish a rapport with participants.  
Before visiting the study‘s location and meeting participants, I used the distance axis style, 
where the researcher is rendered absent because it is more typical of research that the author 
is not declared.  However, after staying in the village and spending time with participants, 
becoming involved in their day to day lives, I realised the importance of using the presence 
axis.  The first person is used in the text to declare ‗I was there‘, putting, the researcher at the 
centre, and speaking from a position of authority in order to explore my eye-witness 
experience, not to distance myself from participants and to give myself and the participants a 
voice.  I agree with feminist critics who suggest that using the distance axis denies 
responsibility for the text and this non-reflexive mode produces groundless knowledge (Gray, 
2003, p.177).  
 
I kept detailed field notes to record important phrases, comments, and to keep track of 
important events and a log of significant observations.  It was considered that this might 
prove to be an effective method of data collection as it could yield a significant amount of 
primary data about the village community, and women‘s roles within it (Khamis, 2009, 
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p.457).  I also detailed the women‘s patterns of media usage and their television viewing 
habits.   
 
When I first arrived in Goz Al Jaafarh and started to ask women questions about their lives, 
families and television viewing habits, I was given formal answers without detailed 
responses.  Generally, older women were bolder and more open to answering than my target 
audience, younger girls between 15 and 30 years of age.  I realised from looking at the girls 
that they wanted to talk and express themselves more, but they were either afraid or shy in 
front of the older women.  Afterwards, I asked if I could be alone with the younger girls in 
another room, realising that the girls were much more comfortable and relaxed talking to me 
in a separate room, rather than being among the older women.  They started to talk more 
frankly about their lives, families, dislikes, preferences, television viewing habits and 
favourite programmes.  Whenever I asked them bold questions about whether, for example, 
they could confront their parents in order to study for their desired university degrees without 
their interference, all the girls drew their fingers across their necks, indicating that they would 
be killed.  I imagined, at that time that I was among a nation of fearful women.  Even though 
the girls were talkative when I was alone with them, they had mixed feelings when I asked 
them for their opinions on day-to-day life issues and on television programmes.  Some were 
‗surprised‘, others were ‗flattered‘, and some were ‗puzzled‘ (Gillespie, 1995, p.68).  I will 
never forget when I asked one of the girls, Sameera
10
, for her opinion on television 
programmes and she started to look around the room pointing to herself saying: ‗do you 
really mean me?‘  These girls‘ marginalisation by their families and society has damaged 
their self-esteem.  The main advantage of my ethnography was that it enabled me to get to 
know and experience the harsh circumstances of the disadvantaged girls there.  This made me 
                                                 
10
 The names used are pseudonyms for their protection  
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believe even more in my research‘s aims and the importance of integrating the viewpoints of 
the voiceless into media research and television programmers (Seiter, et al, 1989, p.4).  I 
recognised Dervin‘s claims that: 
 
“…feminist scholarship lies in its desire to give women a voice in a world that defines 
them as voiceless.  It is transformative in that it is concerned with helping the silent 
speak and is involved in consciousness raising” (quoted in van Zoonen, 1994, p.128).         
            
With every day spent in the village, I built stronger rapports with the women and girls.  
Gaining their trust was not easy and I was extremely glad that I carried out exploratory 
fieldwork before conducting the focus groups and in-depth one-to-one interviews.  The first 
obstacle faced in the first stage of my fieldwork was suspicion.  They wondered whether I 
really was a researcher, rather than an employee from the Ministry of Social Affairs or a 
reporter.  Furthermore, in the beginning, they were unsure that I was in fact from Saudi 
Arabia, but once this became known in the village, things changed.  I discovered that village 
women will not talk openly with non-Saudis.                       
  
For Clark (Clark, 2006, p.418), the literature on qualitative research methods focuses on 
conditions under democratic rather than authoritarian regimes.  Surveys reveal that the 
greatest challenges to conducting qualitative research in the Middle East relate to the 
authoritarian political conditions prevalent in most of the region‘s countries.  In previous 
research, the political climate has affected researchers‘ interview techniques and has raised 
ethical dilemmas in the field (Ibid, 2006, p.419).  This illustrates the importance of 
interviewers taking time to build trusting relationships with their interviewees in order to 
overcome their suspicions, which needs to be taken into account when researchers locate and 
 88 
contact interviewees.  Another difficulty is the degree to which those being surveyed are 
familiar with the meaning of the concept of the research as intended by the researcher.  This 
is particularly difficult amongst marginalised groups, such as women and/or those with a low 
socioeconomic status who, due to lack of education and/or familiarity with survey methods, 
are likely to require assistance in understanding the survey instructions in order to ensure the 
validity of the research.    
 
As already stated, there are specific ethical considerations when researching this target group.  
The most common discomfort that researchers have documented relates to interviewees 
requesting services or favours in return for participating in the interview, where a friendship 
had developed during the research process.  The researcher struggles to balance his/her role 
as a friend to the interviewees and that of a professional researcher (Clark, 2006, pp.418-
420).  Accordingly, fieldwork becomes an exchange of knowledge, specifically with regard 
to concerns about human rights, intellectual freedom, family violence and corruption 
(Carapico 2006, p.430).  To overcome this, the interviewer must stay focused on the research 
without isolating the subject through cold and impersonal behaviour, whilst also maintaining 
his/her professional boundaries (Green, 2008, p.57).  These skills can be developed through 
practice, supervision and counselling.  I will now detail the benefits accrued through my 
exploratory fieldwork via in-depth field observation ahead of conducting the focus groups 
and in-depth one-to-one interviews. 
 
I tried my best throughout my stay in the village to balance my relationship with the women 
so that it was neither too formal and impersonal, nor so friendly that I would become 
involved in interviewees‘ personal lives.  My main concern was to get sufficiently close to 
them so that I could understand what would make them trust me so that they would talk 
 89 
openly with me.  Before undertaking this fieldwork, I took into consideration that researchers 
have come to utilize more creative approaches to audience research.  Gauntlett believes new 
and creative methods of audience research using focus groups and interviews are necessary, 
because studies into media effects seem to be designed in a manner that ―trap[s] participants 
into giving just one or two pre-set responses, rather than allowing them to communicate their 
own experiences or engage in a meaningful way with researchers‖ (quoted in Gauntlett, 2002, 
pp.128-130).  
 
Gauntlett states that a creative method he used when conducting a group interview discussion 
with children, was to encourage participants to make videos (Gauntlett, 2007, p.94).  Another 
creative visual method uses photo-elicitation interviews.  I planned to use the same creative 
visual method of photo-elicitation by providing the participants with cameras, asking them to 
take photographs and conducting discussions based on them.  Having done the fieldwork and 
experienced first-hand the village‘s conservative culture and tradition, I realised that none of 
these creative approaches would work, or even be permitted in the village.  Asking women to 
use a camera or video camera, and then conducting a discussion would not only be 
impossible, but would ruin all my efforts to build trust.  I did not even use a tape recorder and 
relied on memory, later writing up notes, because I was afraid that using a tape recorder or 
even writing notes in front of them in the early stages of conducting my exploratory 
fieldwork could have generated doubt in their minds and undermined my efforts to gain their 
confidence.  I decided to use the tape recorder in the second stage of my fieldwork.        
 
However, I came to recognise the importance of language among the women of Goz Al 
Jaafarh, who lacked any formal education, especially because of the widespread oral 
traditions among women in the village.  I realised that a creative approach needed to be more 
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embedded in language than in the visual.  It is much easier for informally educated and 
conservative women to narrate events and tell stories about life histories, personal matters, 
and views about television programmes, than to try to represent these views using a camera 
or video; such forms of apparatus were almost taboo in the village.  This demonstrates why a 
qualitative approach was much more relevant than a quantitative method for these women, 
who preferred to narrate stories, rather than give numbers and figures.  I also realised that the 
best way to establish a rapport with the women in the village was to be an active listener and 
to engage myself in, and be responsive to women‘s conversations.  Theories of language 
claim that language refers to facts and truth, emphasising the social and ideological functions 
of language above and beyond its use for communication (Gray, 2003, p.20).  I endeavoured 
to take advantage of any clues embedded in language that would guide me to better 
understand the respondents, especially as there are no studies of village Saudi women.  As 
noted above, most studies that deal with Saudi women focus on the privileged and the 
educated; disadvantaged Saudi women are not just anonymous, but, in the literature, it is as if 
they simply do not exist.  
      
Snowball sampling was used to recruit the women.  This approach necessitated identifying a 
member of the population who would lead the researcher to other members of the same 
population and so on (May, 1997, p.88).  I admit that this approach helped me a great deal in 
my introductions to the village women, and without it I would not have been able to meet any 
of them.  I resided with a lady called Ama
11
 Asma, who is from Goz Al Jaafarh and who 
introduced me to other women between 15 and 30.  She was the local coordinator in the 
second stage of my fieldwork.  She called the girls to the focus groups for me and took me to 
their houses to do the one-to-one interviews.  Ama Asma is 46 year old, underprivileged and 
                                                 
11
 The entire village calls Asma, Ama Asma out of respect.  Ama means literally aunt (sister of the father) 
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not formally educated.  She is a divorced mother with four daughters and two sons.  She 
supports herself through working as an assistant in a dispensary. She is also dependent on 
social security and charitable donations since her husband divorced her and left their children 
without any financial support.   
 
Staying at Ama Asma‘s house helped me in several respects.  Living in her household 
provided me with key information about the village‘s traditions and customs, through 
gatherings with guests, attending the wedding of Ama Asma‘s daughter, Haya, and helping 
with daily activities.  The only thing that I wanted to do in the first stage of my fieldwork, but 
was unable to do, was to watch television with a group of girls in the village and to discuss 
the programme, film or soap opera episode that we would have watched.  The main reason 
for not being able to do this was that each house-hold has only one television, which the 
children watch most of the time.  I was hoping at least to have this opportunity at Ama 
Asma‘s house, but I could not, because the youngest son watched television the whole time, 
and even when the television was available, the room was extremely hot and humid as it did 
not have air conditioning, so we could not stay there.  However, I tried to compensate for this 
through talking about television programmes with the girls of Goz Al Jaafarh.  I also tried to 
learn more about the girls‘ television watching habits from Ama Asma‘s daughter, Haya, who 
is 22 years old.  She was still living in the house at that time, so I was able to learn about the 
girls in the village through her, especially regarding their education, their grievances and their 
views on television programmes.  Ama Asma was extremely kind to me and introduced me to 
several other families and girls in the village.  I asked these girls questions regarding their 
lives and their television viewing habits.  With time, I started to feel immersed in the village‘s 
life.  In ethnography, induction begins with the researcher‘s ‗immersion‘ in the field 
(Brannen, 1992, p.6).  This is summarised by Gillespie‘s statement:   
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“One is involved in a struggle to make sense of the complexity of social interactions, 
and so, inevitably, processes of selection are involved.  Learning how and what to 
observe is as much a part of writing fieldnotes as the act of writing itself” (Gillespie, 
1995, p.63).            
 
It was through Ama Asma, Haya and, later, Haya‘s elder sisters, Lila and Hanan, that I 
learned how women and girls in the village viewed me, e.g., I was told that women in the 
village liked that I was sociable and concerned about their problems and complaints.  They 
were also happy that I am also a Saudi, which made me feel that I was one of them and not a 
stranger, although Ama Asma and her daughters also mentioned that most village people 
were suspicious of my true identity and whether I was really a reporter, or an employee from 
the Ministry of Social Affairs.  Some thought I was there to improve their situations.  The 
fact that I took pictures of some girls and women, with their permission, generated more 
rumours in the village about my true identity.  I took these photos only to evidence my 
fieldwork in the village, which I explained to them, but my actions were still misinterpreted.   
I was even told that most of the village women were jealous that I did not stay at their houses 
instead of Ama Asma‘s.  They thought I was paying her and that she allowed me to stay for 
the money.  They even mentioned to her what they might gain from being interviewed or 
participating in focus groups, suggesting that they wanted money for it.  I caused even more 
problems for Ama Asma in the second stage of my fieldwork, when the fathers of the 
participants threatened to stop her hosting me, saying that I should also stop conducting the 
focus groups because they were not happy with the topics raised in the discussion.  I was not 
convinced, nor did I feel it was necessary to give fictitious names to my participants in the 
first stage of my fieldwork, because I wanted to give credit to the people who helped me and 
who had participated in my research.  However, the threats and intimidation that I dealt with 
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alongside Ama Asma convinced me of the necessity to conceal the names of my participants 
so as to avoid any harm they might suffer from my revealing their names.          
 
One of the main things I learned in this exploratory fieldwork was to avoid certain terms 
when describing disadvantaged women.  For example, I avoided using ‗illiterate‘ women, 
opting instead for ‗informally educated‘.  I also avoided using the term ‗subjects‘, and used 
‗participants‘.  After being with women in the village, and after spending time at Ama 
Asma‘s house, I learned that there are different kinds of literacy.  In a world without literacy, 
where nobody reads and writes, people are respected for other abilities, such as their 
intelligence, manners, compassion, wisdom and other qualities (Davies et al, 1993, p.158).  
Even the reasons the girls gave me for dropping out of school, or for not going to school 
regularly, were realistic and rational.  There are numerous reasons for a lack of education 
such as, poverty, lack of transportation, unfair treatment of girls at schools, and the high 
unemployment rate among graduates that discourage those who are studying.  The girls 
impressed me with the way they decoded television programmes, and I consider them to be 
active rather than passive viewers.  I also discovered in the second stage of my fieldwork that 
it is not necessarily the case that educated women will always support women‘s rights more 
than the uneducated ones.  For example, the girls who dropped out of school supported 
controversial ideas in Saudi Arabia, such as women driving, more than the girls in college.   
 
After the exploratory stage of my fieldwork, I changed my plan from using the continuity 
variant of the dominant paradigm of communication for development (Sparks, 2007, pp.50-
51) as a theoretical tool for understanding the processes at work in the screening and 
reception of television programmes on disadvantaged women –to using participatory theory 
instead.  The continuity variant of the dominant paradigm is between modernisation theory 
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and participatory theory, but it retains many of the former‘s values (Ibid, 51).  I thought 
before visiting the village that women needed a higher level of development and education 
before they could benefit from the participatory approach.  In fact, I discovered after meeting 
the women there that there are different kinds of literacy, and academic education is just one 
form of education.  I also learned that taking a participatory approach is a way to further 
people‘s empowerment, because individuals actively contribute to the development process 
by contributing ideas, showing initiative, articulating their needs and problems and asserting 
their autonomy (Melkote, 1991, pp.237-239).    
  
3.2.2 Focus Groups 
Conducting an ethnographic study in Saudi Arabia, particularly in a village, as a woman, 
focusing on disadvantaged women is not an easy mission by any means.  After all the 
obstacles that I encountered, I realised why few researchers, especially non-Saudis, can 
conduct research there.  Although I am from Saudi Arabia and my hostess welcomed me into 
her home and introduced me to the women in the village, it was not easy to gain the trust of 
the participants and their families.  I also faced several financial and logistic obstacles, 
including finding the place, abiding by the village culture and rules, securing transportation, 
having a male relative as a guardian during my field work, adjusting to the village‘s lack of 
basic services, and detaching myself from the participants after finishing the fieldwork.
12
      
 
Throughout this chapter I have discussed how research methods should be able to explore the 
research questions and test the theories behind them.  Since the ultimate aim of my research 
is the empowerment of disadvantaged women, based on participatory theory, focus groups 
are an appropriate method.  Community development and participatory approaches have used 
                                                 
12
 I intend to write an article in a Journal about the dilemmas and obstacles I faced in my fieldwork in Saudi 
Arabia. 
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focus groups because some have argued that focus groups have the potential to empower 
people and provide authentic data (Barbour, 2007, pp.5, 10).  It has also been said that focus 
groups with women may prove to be an excellent way to examine gendered features of their 
experiences and can transform ‗personal troubles‘ into ‗public issues‘ (Ibid, 2007, p.12).  The 
method was selected as appropriate for eliciting the perceptions of women because of its 
resemblance to ‗feminized‘ conversations.  It was also chosen due to its suitability for 
marginalised or ‗hard to reach‘ groups, because it encourages participants to talk about 
subjects that are not often raised (Ibid, 2007, p.21).        
    
After conducting in-depth field observation during the first stage of my fieldwork, I carried 
out the focus groups during the second stage, which lasted for one month.  My first trip 
helped me enormously in conducting my focus groups.  Firstly, since I had already developed 
a rapport and become familiar with the women and girls in the village, they were relaxed 
during the focus groups.  Secondly, by talking and sharing experiences with them on my first 
trip, I had some insights in order to be able to select video clips that generated productive 
discussions.  The DVD I made was composed of clips, lasting 32 minutes in total that were 
taken from different MBC1 programmes.  There were three clips from three different 
episodes of Al Sakenat fee Golobena, one clip from an episode of Tash Ma Tash, and three 
clips from three different episodes of Kalam Nawaim each clip last from two to ten minutes.  
I carried out a discussion after each clip to keep the participants engaged and so that they did 
not become bored.  Creating these video clips consumed a lot of time and effort.  In order to 
choose the right clips that related to my research‘s focal points, namely, poverty, illiteracy 
and violence against women, meant I had to go through all the episodes between 2006 and 
2010, and choose the most suitable clips.  Selecting and editing the clips of these programmes 
took me 14 days, working at least 10 hours every day, but I felt that my efforts were not in 
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vain when I saw the discussion in the focus groups.  More details about the clips are found in 
Chapter 7.  In all, I held seven focus groups.  Each was composed of ten women, with the 
exception of the first focus group, which was made up of 22 due to a misunderstanding made 
by my hostess, and the last focus group of only eight participants.  The total turned out to be 
80 participants, which was more than I was aiming for.  The duration of each focus group 
was two hours, long enough for me to understand participants‘ television-watching habits.   
The focus groups were selected using a snowball sampling technique.  Ama Asma facilitated 
my access to the local community.  The number of focus groups was more than expected.  I 
aimed to form seven to ten focus groups composed of not more than six women, totalling 60 
participants, but I ended up with 80 participants.  The women‘s educational backgrounds 
were varied.  Educational backgrounds ranged from those who had never been to school, to 
those who had completed elementary school, secondary school, high school, to those who 
were still in college.
13
  The age group that was selected ranged from 15 to 30 years of age.  
The main reason for choosing this age group was because they should have a sufficiently 
developed moral reasoning, unlike that of a child.  At this age, most of the girls were 
dropping out of school, and discussion through focus groups and interviews could explain the 
impact and reasons behind that.  Unfortunately, none of the participants were employed; 
accordingly, employment was not a factor here.  However, further analysis was conducted 
relating to the impact of education and age on their interpretation of the MBC1 programmes 
and on their life styles in general.  The focus groups were conducted at Ama Asma‘s house, 
but she told me that to keep the focus groups running smoothly, I should not take any 
pictures.  She said that she had been questioned by people in the village about the pictures 
that I had taken on my first trip.  I listened to her and I did not take any pictures.   
      
                                                 
13
 It is important to highlight here that primary education in Saudi Arabia is not compulsory. 
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When I arrived at Ama Asma‘s house on the first day of the focus groups, I provided her with 
a television with a DVD player in order to play the clips.  Even though I discussed with Ama 
Asma that the participants of each focus group should not be more than four to six, I found 22 
girls at her house.  This number contradicted what I had read about conducting focus groups, 
which encouraged small groups.  Researchers who have conducted focus groups with women 
in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) made the same point.  They said that due to the culture 
within that community it was common for women in larger groups to talk at the same time or 
to hold side conversations.  Consequently, it was impossible to hear parts of the tape clearly 
and data was lost.  Accordingly, in order to overcome these problems, it was suggested that 
four to five participants is optimal (Winslow et al, 2002, p.573).  When I told Ama Asma that 
the group was too big and that I had not been expecting that number, she said she could ask 
some of them to leave but I did not let her do that.  I was afraid participants would feel 
disrespected and would not come again, or that they would urge others not to participate later.  
Building good relationships, especially on the first day of the focus groups, is crucial.  
However, I did not experience what the researchers in the UAE had: a larger group talking at 
the same time or holding side conversations.  The participants in my focus group were 
attentive and silent while the clips were played.  One of the main reasons was that the clips I 
selected were extremely appealing to the participants and attracted their attention.  Moreover, 
each clip was short; the longest being 10 minutes, and the rest five, four and two minutes in 
length.                 
   
There was also a power cut on the first day of the focus groups, which meant that I could not 
play the clips when I wanted to.  Ama Asma told me that this was common in the village, and 
we would have to wait until the power returned.  I took advantage of this time to converse 
with the participants, especially since the group was large and it would be useful to introduce 
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myself and explain my research and the exact purpose of these focus groups.  I also asked 
them to write their names, ages, and the level of their education on a piece of paper.  I was 
glad that all the participants fell within the age group that I had planned for in my research.  
After the power returned, I started the discussion.  I used the same method: talking to the 
participants and asking them to write their personal details in my notebook in all the sessions.  
The first focus group was the largest but the number of participants in the others ranged from 
six to ten.      
 
It was essential to explain my research, the goals of the focus groups and the content of the 
clips, to the participants.  For a successful interview, there are some basic preconditions: 
namely, accessibility, cognition, and motivation.  For the interview to be accessible, the 
researcher must ensure that the participant has enough knowledge to answer the questions 
asked. Cognition means that the person being interviewed must understand the questions.  
The researcher must also motivate the participants by making them feel valued and by 
explaining that their cooperation is fundamental to the research‘s success (May, 1997, p.116).  
One of the ways to motivate participants is to provide them with food and drink, which are 
considered an inherent part of Arab hospitability.  Researchers conducting focus groups with 
rural women in the UAE explained that nothing was possible until the women ate an 
extensive breakfast, which was part of their normal morning routine (Winslow et al, 2002, 
p.574).  I offered participants food and refreshments during the focus group at Ama Asma‘s 
house as a nonmonetary incentive.  On the first day of the focus groups, I found that Ama 
Asma, with her daughter Haya, gave the participants food and served coffee and tea.  I asked 
her kindly not to do that again because I did not want to saddle her with expenses. 
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When Ama Asma told me on my first trip that women were hesitant to participate in the 
focus groups, hinting that they wanted money for it, I was concerned that the women might 
not show up at the agreed time.  I thought that since I was conducting focus groups among 
disadvantaged women, money would inevitably be an incentive.  Money has several 
advantages, such as being immediately appreciated and useful, especially among those who 
are in need.  When considering money as an incentive, it is better given as cash in an 
envelope at the conclusion of the focus group discussion (Krueger & Casey, 2009, p.78).  I 
gave each participant in the focus group 50 SR in an envelope at the end of each session.  
When I asked Ama Asma whether this motivated the participants, she asked them, and 
confirmed to me that it did.  She told me that their primary motivation was curiosity, to know 
what was in the envelope.  The only ones who were reluctant to take the envelope were the 
ones in a better financial situation, and of those there were very few.     
 
When I carried out the focus groups, I had in mind all that I read on the matter as well as the 
recommendations that I had been given by my two supervisors.  Questions in focus groups 
are categorised into opening questions, introductory, transition, key and ending questions.  
The opening questions make everybody talk, not with the intention of obtaining information 
but to get people feeling comfortable.  Introductory questions get people to start thinking 
about their connection with the topic, such as asking participants to remember when they first 
came across this topic and to describe that experience.  Transition questions move the 
conversation into the key questions that guide the study, by requiring participants to go into 
greater detail about their experiences.  Key questions drive the study.  There are usually 
between two and five key questions to be discussed, and that may take between 10 and 20 
minutes.  The ending questions conclude the discussion, let participants reflect on previous 
comments, and include the summary and final questions (Krueger & Casey, 2009, pp.38-40).  
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All these techniques helped me to ask my questions and guide the discussions based on the 
sequence of the clips.     
      
Each focus group lasted two hours, and that enabled me to understand participants‘ television 
watching habits, which I was unable to achieve on my first trip.  It is worth noting that not a 
single group refused to be tape recorded.  Here, I shared the same experience as the 
researchers conducting focus groups with women in the UAE, who were surprised that 
participants had not objected to being tape recorded (Winslow et al, 2002, p.569).  I also did 
not experience any interruptions in any of the sessions as to Ama Asma and Haya did not 
allowing any children into the room where we conducted the discussions.  There was only 
one occasion when Ama Asma‘s little son and her grandchildren knocked on the door to get 
chocolates.  I gave them the whole basket of chocolate and asked them not to come in again, 
and they did not.     
 
The challenge of having different types of participants in focus groups is that this might not 
allow the discussion to be conducted as planned.  The challenge is having all four types of 
participants present: the expert, the dominant talker, the shy participant and the rambler.  
Experts perceive themselves to have more experience, or better information about the topic 
than the others.  The best way to handle experts is to emphasise that everyone is an expert 
and all participants have important insights that need to be shared.  Dominant talkers 
sometimes consider themselves to be experts, but most of the time they are oblivious to how 
they are perceived by others.  One way to handle dominant talkers is to seat them beside the 
interviewer or group leader in order to exercise control over them through the use of body 
language.  Another tactic is to thank the participant and then ask the other participants‘ 
opinions, or to avoid eye contact with the talker and look at others in the group.  Shy 
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participants are inclined to say hardly anything, because they might be thinking before 
speaking.  Shy participants may have interesting perceptions, but it requires extra effort to 
encourage them to share them.  There are various tactics to overcome this shyness, such as 
placing them directly across the table from the group leader to maximize eye contact, or by 
calling them by their names.  Rambling participants use a lot of words and take forever to get 
to the point, if indeed they have a point.  These individuals are keen to talk, but they are 
usually off-track.  The best way to handle ramblers is to discontinue eye contact with them 
after about 20-30 seconds.  As soon as the rambler stops, the group leader should be ready to 
run with the second question (Ibid, 2009, pp.100, 101).  I tried to use all of these tactics when 
I was conducting the focus groups.  There were participants who were talkative and more 
dominant than others and I tried not to make eye contact with them and thanked them so as to 
give others a chance.  Some of them allowed others to speak, but some kept talking even 
while another participant was answering the question.  By contrast, shy participants required 
more encouragement from me to talk.  Once, I sat next to one of the participants and I teased 
her that I would not let her leave the room without hearing her voice.   
 
It is here that the importance of triangulation in utilising these research techniques (in-depth 
field observation, in-depth one-to-one interviews, and focus groups) is reached.  The 
weakness and failure of one technique will be the strength and success of another.  I 
conducted in-depth one-to-one interviews with shy participants who were embarrassed to talk 
in the focus groups.  Such different techniques also enabled me to make comparisons 
between the women‘s responses, both in a group and individually.    
 
Borkan, in his study in the Middle East, described the importance of selecting a focus group 
approach for a number of reasons.  For example, not only is the researcher able to collect rich 
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and diverse data, but this approach fits well with Bedouin patterns of socialization that are 
characterised by tribal structures, are generally divided by gender, and focus on meeting for 
leisure and discussion in homes, tents, or designated places (Borkan, 2000, p.209).  The 
setting and the approach I chose enabled me to have varied and deep discussions that were 
related to my research topics.      
 
I became aware, through my discussions, of the impact of religion on their views of the clips.  
Similarly, researchers conducting focus groups with women in the UAE recognised the 
importance of culture and religion to the focus groups.  They even proposed that further 
research is needed on religion and its impact on women‘s health (Winslow et al, 2002, 
p.572).  When I asked the participants whether it is common for a father in the village to call 
his daughters to greet his friend or boss, as Abu Saud did in one of the clips from Al Sakenat 
fee Golobena, all the participants were against the idea.  They assured me this would never 
happen in the village and even if they were asked to, they would refuse to do it, because it is 
against Islamic doctrine.       
 
One of the participants said that wearing the veil was not practised years ago in Jazan, but the 
school religious curriculum and the clerics have taught women that wearing the veil is 
compulsory.  Women in Jazan used to greet their cousins in the normal way, but they have 
now been told by clerics that this is not allowed and is a taboo.   
 
In addition to religion, it is important to shed light on how educational background and class 
have impacted on the participants‘ understanding of the themes discussed.  Van Zoonen 
revealed that the mass media should be seen in ‗contingency‘ with individuals‘ backgrounds 
not as ‗isolated phenomena‘ which will help in interpreting participants‘ readings (van 
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Zoonen, 1994, p. 132).  Through my discussions, I realised that it is not always the case that 
those in college are necessarily more likely to accept controversial opinions than those with 
less education.  After I played a clip from Tash Ma Tash that discussed the importance of 
women‘s driving in fulfilling women‘s economic and educational needs, I observed that 
participants in college, and those who were slightly better off, were not supportive of the 
idea, while most of those who had less education and were of a lower socio-economic status 
agreed with the idea.  Saeeda and Fareeda, who were both in college, said, ―We don‘t see the 
need for driving and transportation is accessible to us.‖  Seham, who is also in college, said, 
―I am against women driving, but if a referendum was held, I wouldn‘t support or be 
against.‖  Samia on the other hand, who had just finished 2nd grade said, ―I want to drive, 
when my brothers and father refuse to give me a lift, I wish at that time I was independent 
and could drive myself.‖  Hadeel added ―we all can‘t complete all our tasks because of our 
dependence on men to get about…70% of the girls in the village couldn‘t complete their 
education because of the lack of transport.‖    
 
Class is another important factor.  When I played one of the clips from Kalam Nawaim, most 
of the girls‘ reactions were summarised in one of the participant‘s comment, ―The problem of 
Kalam Nawaim is that it focuses on the middle and upper classes, while I prefer programmes 
such as Sabaya, on the Al Mehwar Egyptian channel, because it shows all the classes‖.  She 
later expressed her anger to me over the clip, because of the presenters‘ insensitivity to 
people in their situation.   
 
I agree with van Zoonen completely when she says that the ―group interview enables women 
to exchange experience, build on each other‘s ideas and enhances awareness of their 
situation‖ (Ibid, 1994, p.138).  Even though I did not encounter some of the difficulties that 
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other researchers have had in conducting focus groups, such as participants‘ boredom or 
refusal to be tape recorded, I did face tremendous problems in dealing with some 
participants‘ male relatives.  The threats that Ama Asma and I received were frightening.  
They varied, such as forbidding me and Ama Asma to conduct the focus groups, calling the 
police, and tarnishing my reputation in order to decrease my popularity among the 
participants.  To my surprise, those who wanted to call the police on me were the fathers of 
the college participants, whom I had assumed to be the most educated and therefore the most 
enlightened.  I did not expect that giving ‗voice‘ to the ‗voiceless‘ would lead to such 
harassment.    
 
3.2.3 In-Depth One-to-One Interviews 
After I finished the focus groups, I started with the in-depth one-to-one interviews.  Ama 
Asma took me to the homes of the interviewees whom I had selected.  The fact that I 
deliberately did the in-depth one-to-one interviews after conducting the focus groups was 
extremely useful.  The focus groups helped me to become familiar with, and to build a 
rapport, with the participants, which facilitated the interviews.  By overcoming the 
difficulties and doubts that I faced in the focus groups, and by revealing my father‘s identity, 
I was able to visit the participants‘ homes, as they felt surer about me.  In addition, it enabled 
me to meet those I did not have the chance to interact with fully while conducting the focus 
groups.  Most of those I interviewed were from the first focus group, because it was such a 
big group and I was not able to hear everybody talk.  In addition, I interviewed those who 
were shy about speaking in public and also those who had family problems or personal issues 
and were embarrassed to talk about them in public.                               
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I conducted in-depth one-to-one interviews for a number of reasons.  First and foremost, 
interviews revealed the individual perspectives of these women and offered insights into their 
lives - a wealth of data that cannot be garnered by using quantitative measures.  Secondly, the 
interviews provided me with very useful background information about development and 
change in the villages, which would be particularly interesting given that they were first-hand 
accounts.  Finally, such interviews were likely to enrich the conversation, affording a more 
thorough understanding of the women‘s lives and their views on the selected programmes, 
offering insights that group discussions might not (Khamis, 2009, p.457).   
 
I experienced this with my participants, who told me stories that I would never have heard 
without conducting the interviews.  I heard a number of stories, e.g., physical abuse by a 
parent, whether against themselves or their mothers, the generation gap in mentality, the 
impact of parental divorce, and dealing with relatives‘ drug addictions.   
 
I used a mixture of semi-structured and unstructured interviews for a number of reasons.  In 
semi-structured interviews, questions are normally specified, but the interviewer is free to 
probe beyond the initial answers given.  This interview format elicits a broader, more 
personal response from the subjects, while still providing a level of comparability between all 
the interviews.  It combines the most useful features of the structured and unstructured 
interview: comparability across the sample and further clarification of the subject‘s 
responses.  The unstructured interviews allow participants to discuss topics in a flexible way, 
exploring their own understanding of the question (May, 1997, pp.111-112).    
  
The types of questions that I asked participants were a mixture of open and closed questions.  
Open questions are most useful in soliciting opinions and personal perspectives, and require 
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the interviewer to record as much as possible of the answer (often using a recording device). 
Closed questions restrict possible answers to a pre-determined set, so analysis is quicker and 
cheaper, and this allows for greater comparability of responses (Ibid, 1997, p.94-95).   In 
using both techniques, a range of both qualitative and quantitative results are generated, 
benefiting from the advantages of both approaches.  The various techniques that I used 
helped me to stimulate the interviewees to speak.   
 
 Before asking a question and turning on the tape recorder; it is important to consider 
thematising the interview.  Thematising refers to the why, what and how of the interview.  
Why is to clarify the purpose of the study; what is to gain pre-knowledge of the theme to be 
examined and how is to become accustomed to diverse techniques of interviewing in order to 
determine which to employ to gain the required knowledge (Kvale, 2007, p.37).  A high 
quality interview not only considers thematising, but also designing, interviewing, 
transcribing, analysing, verifying and reporting.  The more attention that is given to the pre-
interview stages of thematising and designing, the easier the post-interview stages of 
transcribing, analysing, verifying and reporting will be (Ibid, 2009, p. 50).  
 
Even though MBC1 is the most widely watched by Saudis, being watched by 70 % (Arab 
Media Outlook 2009-2013, p.104) of Saudi families, it is important to know how the viewers 
perceive MBC1 programmes and to know what their favourite programmes are on other 
channels.  
 
There are certain techniques in beginning an interview.  The interview is introduced with a 
briefing in which the interviewer defines the purpose of the interview, the reasons for using a 
tape recorder, and asks if the interviewee has any questions before starting the interview.  A 
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good relationship should be established with attentive listening, by putting the interviewee at 
ease and being clear about the interview‘s purpose (Kvale, 2007, p.55). 
  
My semi-structured and unstructured interviews were composed of three sections.  The first 
section was about individual backgrounds, which enabled me to listen to the interviewee‘s 
personal stories.  The importance of knowing these stories is to take into account how their 
lives impact on their television watching habits and preferences.  The second section was 
about television watching routines and their preferred programmes that deal with poverty, 
illiteracy and violence on television and that they would like to see on MBC1.  The third 
section was about the programmes on MBC1, especially those that I selected for textual 
analysis, which are Kalam Nawaim, Tash Ma Tash, and Al Sakenat fee Golobena.  The 
interviews gave me an idea of the viewers‘ overall views about these programmes, while the 
focus groups concentrated on feedback on the clips.     
 
Each interview lasted, on average, between 40 and 60 minutes.  I interviewed 20 women and 
girls.  Mason mentioned that ―you sample until you reach theory-saturation point…when 
your data stop telling you anything new‖ (Mason, 2002, p.134).  I asked each interviewee for 
permission to record the interviews, and not one participant objected.  I should say here that 
as I got to know the participants better, I become more and more impressed with their natural 
intelligence.  Their feedback and analysis were remarkable, and made me realise things of 
which I was not previously aware.  Ama Asma helped me here, by explaining to the mothers 
the importance of me being with the participants in a separate room, alone, because of my 
research‘s requirements.  I did not experience any noise or disturbance with the interviewees 
while recording, allowing me to generate valuable data from them.     
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The interviewees‘ perceptions of the programmes proved to me that the viewer‘s sentiments 
are more real than the producers‘, because they reflect their actual lives.  If the producers, 
actors or actresses portray a scenario that does not reflect reality, this is revealed by the 
viewers‘ rejection of it, revealing that they know more (Hobson, 1989, p167).  
 
3.3 Elite (Arab Officials and Media Professionals) Interviews   
3.3.1 Methods Used to Gather Data from Elites  
This chapter has discussed the methods used to explore research questions and theories.  My 
study explores whether the old dominant ideology paradigm of communication for 
development is the one that the elites involved in Saudi television programming draw on 
when designing programmes to promote the development of women‘s statusin the Arab 
world.   This has been done through in-depth one-to-one interviews with elites, by 
accumulating documents and archives about the elites and about subjects relating to the 
research, building trust with the elites through time, and contact via emails and telephone, 
and a pilot interview.  In addition, completing the focus groups and interviews with 
disadvantaged women in Jazan beforehand, gave me credibility and confidence when 
interviewing the elites, because the experience gave me a more concrete vision of my 
research‘s purpose.  It enabled me to see the whole research process to draw a holistic 
framework for my methodology.   
 
3.3.2 Interviews with Queen Rania’s Media Office in Amman 
After I left Jazan, I travelled to the Jordanian capital, Amman, and met representatives from 
Queen Rania‘s Media Office.  I was flattered by their generosity and hospitality, to the extent 
that my hotel booking was under the name of the Royal Court, which afforded me extra 
special treatment.  All my transport in Amman was organized by Queen Rania‘s Media 
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Office and the chauffeurs were her officers.  Ethar Khawasnah, the Chair of Queen Rania‘s 
Media Office, arranged everything for me, the bookings, transport and the interviews.  I had 
contacted Ethar a year before I travelled to Jordan, and I obtained informal consent from him 
to visit and interview representatives from Queen Rania‘s Media Office.  At his request, I 
also sent him the interview questions before I arrived in Jordan.  He sent me a number of 
documents and video clips about the initiative via email.  Being in phone contact with 
Khawasnah on a regular basis before going to Jordan, made him knowledgeable and excited 
about my research, which ensured that my visit to Queen Rania‘s Media Office was fruitful. 
 
The interviews also ran smoothly due to the techniques I had read about before conducting 
them.  I used both structured and semi-structured interviews.  In a structured interview, each 
person selects a response to a standardised question, so any differences in response are taken 
to be real differences in experience or opinion, rather than as a result of the way a question is 
asked. In a semi-structured interview, questions may be standardised, but the interviewer can 
ask follow-up questions to elicit more information or clarification. The semi-structured 
approach gives an opportunity for participants to respond more freely, but still allows for 
comparability between interviews (May, 1997, pp.110-111).     
  
Khawasnah arranged an interview with Suzanne Afaneh at Queen Rania‘s Media Office.  I 
had contacted Suzanne a year before, so she knew about my research.  Since this study seeks 
to expose and critique the power of dominant ideology when constructing initiatives for the 
general public, it is important for a researcher to expose the power of the embedded dominant 
ideology by making the interviewee trust the researcher so as to reveal concealed information 
about inequities (Kezar, 2003, p.398).  The interview with Suzanne Afaneh lasted for two 
hours and I learned important things about the initiative that I would never have found out 
 110 
without conducting the interview.  The chairmanship of the Committee at that time before the 
transition of the initiative to Abu Dhabi was with Suzanne Afaneh.  Afaneh was Director of 
the Official Bureau of CNN in Jordan.  Afterwards, she was assigned to be Deputy General 
Manager of the Zain Company for Media Affairs and Communication.   Then she was 
appointed as Minister of Tourism in Jordan, and she is now the President of the Board of 
Directors of the Dead Sea Area and Ajloun for Development.  Afaneh told me the Arab 
Media Campaign for Women‟s Development was expanded to the Arab Media Network for 
Human Development so as not to be confined to just women's affairs but to cover human 
development in general.  She explained that the main reason for expanding the Campaign 
from women to human development was that by labelling topics concerned with women as 
women's issues‘, only women took an interest.  However, if we call these topics human 
rights‘ issues, and state that the lack of women‘s economic participation will affect the Arab 
world‘s economy, we make the problems faced by women into a national issue, raising the 
profile of the human rights agenda in general.  When she told me this, I remembered one of 
the participants in the village, who had said she would like to see the stories of Al Sakenat fee 
Golobena acted out on Tash Ma Tash so women‘s empowerment issues can be observed by 
all of the society, not only women, so solutions can be found.  At that I realised the value of 
the focus groups and interviews that I had already conducted in the village, because they 
made me articulate everything together.  I also noticed Queen Rania took over the Arab 
Women's Summit in 2002 from Egypt, and the President of the Arab Women's Summit at the 
time was Suzanne Mubarak. Egypt was the first Arab country to initiate the Arab Women‘s 
Summit, which was then transferred to Jordan and Queen Rania became its President.  The 
main reason for Queen Rania‘s initiative was the lack of women's employment across the 
Arab world.  According to the booklet produced by the Media Committee at the Second Arab 
Women‘s Summit (2002), the highest percentage of women's employment in an Arab country 
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is no more than 30%, while the rest of the Arab countries vary between 5 and 15%.  40% of 
the Arab population are unemployed due to illiteracy.     
 
3.3.3 Interviews with Officials and Professionals of the MBC Group in Dubai 
Next I traveled to Dubai to interview officials from the MBC Group.  Luckily, my family 
lives in Dubai, so I did not have any additional hotel expenses.  I interviewed Sheikh Waleed 
Al Ibrahim and Abdul Rahman Al Rashed.  I also had a long conservation with Nakhle El 
Hage.  Before I went on my second trip, I conducted a pilot interview with Erfan Arab, 
anchor on BBC Arabic in London.  This pilot interview helped me a great deal with my 
interviews, where I was able to rephrase my questions and render them into an ‗interview 
dialogue‘ (Kvale 2006, p.483).  Erfan‘s experience as an anchor and television journalist 
showed me the technique of turning an interview into a conversation of interest to both the 
interviewer and interviewee.  He recommended that I start immediately with my research 
questions because several introductory questions might distract the interviewee from the 
research‘s purpose.  He told me to keep in mind that I would be interviewing elites and time 
is an important factor, so I had to save every minute for the core questions of my research.  
He also trained me in how to make eye contact and when to sharpen and soften my voice.  
The pilot interview took us six hours and it was worth every minute.                  
    
The pilot interview that I conducted put my reading into practice.   In addition to academic 
readings, reading the interviewees‘ historical backgrounds and all their previous interviews 
helped me to carry the conversation.  The best interviewers of elites are not those who write 
the best questions but, rather, ‗excellent interviewers are excellent conversationalists that 
make interviews seem like a good talk among old friends‘ (Berry, 2002, p.679).   
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Once I arrived in Dubai, I called Abdul Rahman Al Rashed and asked him about a suitable 
time for him to be interviewed.  I contacted him one year before the interview and kept in 
touch with him by emails and text messages.  He already had an idea about my research and 
one day before the interview, I sent him the outline of my research questions via email to 
refresh his memory.  Contacting him in advance helped me to break the ice before conducting 
the interview.  Interviewing and making appointments with officials in the Middle East are 
not easy tasks, and you have to be prepared for the time to be changed at any moment.  We 
decided to meet at 2 p.m., Abdul Rahman called at 10 a.m. on the interview day and asked 
me if we could make the interview at 12 noon as a trip had suddenly been added to his 
schedule and he had to travel.  Fortunately, I was home when he called, and my father‘s 
house is one block from the Dubai Media City, where the MBC Group building is located.   
 
The interview lasted an hour and was tape recorded with his permission.  One of the main 
factors that made the interview so interesting to both of us was the events that were 
happening at that time, and that are still happening now in the Arab world.  The revolutions 
that took place in a number of Arab countries were mostly due to poverty, unemployment and 
lack of freedom, which are subjects related to my research, and that turned the interview into 
a hugely relevant conversation.   
 
I learned some useful tips about how to conduct interviews with a member of the elite, such 
as challenging the interviewee, focusing on questions that might have a higher payoff, being 
knowledgeable about the interviewee and the subject, and knowing when to probe and when 
not to (Berry, 2002, pp.680-682).  I used these tips when I asked Al Rashed if talking about 
corruption, which is one of the causes of poverty, would be an obstacle to the production of 
development programmes.   
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Al Rashed was extremely gentle and helpful.  After the interview, he called Ahmad Hatoum 
to provide me with any document or piece of information I might need.  I asked him to 
introduce me to Nakhle El Hage especially since Suzanne Afaneh had encouraged me to meet 
him, since he was one of the most active participants in Queen Rania‘s initiative.  My 
meeting with Nakhle El Hage exceeded my expectations.  Even though the meeting was not 
planned, it lasted for 45 minutes and provided me with important information.  Nakhle gave 
me his frank opinion about Queen Rania‘s and other initiatives.   
 
Then I interviewed Sheikh Waleed Al Ibrahim.  The fact that I did not contact his office 
before I arrived in Dubai, meant it took me twelve days to arrange the interview.  Getting 
access to high ranking officials such as Sheikh Waleed, proved to me that women‘s higher 
education, especially in a city like London, is really appreciated and respected among Saudis 
and in most of the Arab world.  I tried first to arrange this interview by contacting Sheikh 
Waleed‘s secretary, but my attempts failed.  The secretary asked me to send him the 
questions and then he promised to call me back, but he did not.  I was worried that time 
would fly by without me conducting the interview.  Later I got the mobile number of Ali al-
Hadithi and introduced myself to him, explaining to him that interviewing Sheikh Waleed 
was crucial to my study.  He told me that he would call them, and two days later, Sheikh 
Waleed‘s office called me to give me an appointment.  Sheikh Waleed does not like to be 
interviewed by the media, generally, and I was extremely privileged that I was able to 
interview him.  The interview was delayed by an hour and I waited in the lobby until they let 
me in to Sheikh Waleed‘s office.  The interview lasted for 40 minutes and it was recorded.  
Ali al-Hadithi was with us in the office while I conducted the interview.  Both were 
hospitable and provided me with documents afterwards.                                      
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Although I was extremely excited before the interview, I wished that I had delayed it until 
after I had met the programme managers and producers from MBC1.  That might have made 
the interview much more fruitful, for two reasons.  Firstly, my questions would have been 
better filtered and this would have enabled my probing to be more productive.  Secondly, I 
realised that interviewing media specialists and journalists is different from interviewing 
business men in media.  Journalists and media specialists are more expressive and talkative, 
while business men are more secretive.  I was worried that probing more than once with a 
high official might make the interview antagonistic.  The main advantage of one-to-one 
interviews is that it offers insights as to the intended meaning, which is sometimes more 
important than the exact words (Stake 1995, p.66).  Sheikh Waleed‘s opinion of Queen 
Rania‘s initiative was that the principles of this initiative are integrated into the MBC 
programmes in a broader way than in the initiative.  The MBC Group‘s motivation to produce 
programmes on development and women‘s empowerment issues was already present and it 
was not inspired by the initiative.   
 
I also met Ali Jaber at the American University of Dubai.  Ali Jaber was one of the 
participants in Queen Rania‘s initiative, and I was advised by Suzanne Afaneh to meet him.  
Jaber shared a similar opinion to that of Nakhle El Hage, in so far as the initiative was a PR 
campaign rather than being about achieving actual change.   
 
I was not trying, through conducting these interviews and meetings, to be a detective or to 
play the role of a journalist collecting data, but to generate research data by using a 
qualitative approach.  Qualitative research ―implies data generation processes involving 
activities that are intellectual, analytical, and interpretative‖ to yield constructive knowledge 
and appropriate findings (Mason, 2002, p.52).    
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3.4 Textual Analysis  
3.4.1 Methods Used for Textual Analysis  
The methods used here are quantitative and qualitative analysis.  I used textual analysis by 
combining quantitative and qualitative methods.  The quantitative method seeks to determine 
what proportion of air time is given to topics relating to poverty, illiteracy and violence 
against Arab women.   It focused on three programmes on MBC1 — Kalam Nawaim, Tash 
Ma Tash, a few episodes from a Saudi drama series called Al Sakenat fee Golobena and one 
programme from Al Arabiya, which is focused on development — Hewar Al Arab.   The 
analysis focuses on episodes broadcast between 2006 and 2010.  The episodes and sessions 
selected focused specifically on the development of women‘s status issues.  The qualitative 
method seeks to use critical discourse and semiotic analyses.  Critical discourse analysis 
involves a close examination of language and focuses on Fairclough‘s work around identities 
and relationships (Hesmondhalgh, 2006, p.150).  Since the study‘s target group is 
disadvantaged women in the Arab world, with a focus on Saudi Arabia, the identities 
discussed will be class, gender, and religion.  Since there are three different genres in the 
study; talk shows, drama and situation comedy, the relationships examined are those between 
hosts, guests, experts and the fictional characters.  A semiotic analysis, as viewed by de 
Saussure, is much broader than linguistics.  De Saussure showed how language is made up of 
signs that communicate meaning.  Charles Sanders Peirce explained that social life is 
pervaded by messages that contain signs, mostly visual and oral, gestures, dress codes, tones 
of voice and facial expressions, all of which have embedded connotations (Bignell, 2002, 
pp.5, 14).    
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3.4.2 Talk Shows  
3.4.2.1 Soft Talk Show: Kalam Nawaim is a talk show for women, which is similar in format 
to the US show The View, on ABC.  The programme discusses several issues pertinent to 
Arab women.  The research examines how this private television channel presents issues 
relevant to poor, village young women and further, how this group of women perceive these 
messages.  It will also trace how this ‗soft‘ women‘s talk show presents and analyses the 
serious topics in this study. 
 
3.4.2.2 Hard Talk Show: Hewar AlArab focuses on development issues. Episodes have titles 
such as ‗Arab women... Governments interested in concrete buildings and neglect the rights 
of women‘; ‗Governments conceal the role of the citizen and are concerned with Foreign 
Affairs‘; ‗Water security in the Arab world‘, etc., and is presented by Taleb Kana‘an.  I chose 
this programme because it is aimed at development topics that are mainly presented to the 
elites in the Arab world.  The analysis will determine what proportion of air time is given to 
topics about poverty, illiteracy and violence against Arab women, and whether the elites feel 
inspired to help the disadvantaged after viewing such episodes.    
 
3.4.3 Situation Comedy  
Tash Ma Tash – the title of the series can be roughly translated as It‟s No Big Deal – is a 
popular Saudi situation comedy, which began in 1992 and has been running for 17 seasons; it 
only runs in the month of Ramadan.  It was aired on Saudi Channel 1 for 13 seasons but in 
2005 it was acquired by the MBC.  The MBC Group bought Tash Ma Tash from Saudi 
Channel 1 due to its popularity with Saudis and to provide the comedy series with more 
freedom to handle sensitive issues in Saudi society in return for advertising space during the 
programme, either in the standard advertisement breaks, or by using product placement in the 
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programme itself (Deejani, 2006).  Tash Ma Tash is admired by most Saudis because it 
satirises the social, political and economic concerns of Saudis.  The series is also admired by 
hundreds of Saudi women because they perceive it as doing justice to Saudi women‘s 
empowerment issues by presenting the difficulties they face due to customs and traditions 
that are prejudiced towards women.  The episode Soor AlHarem (The Wall of the Harem) was 
one of the most popular episodes with Saudi women, although most of the feedback on this 
episode came from educated Saudi females living abroad (Saudi Forum website, 2009).  
None of these episodes were investigated from the point of view of disadvantaged, young 
village Saudi women and instead they focused on educated Saudi woman living in the city.  I 
therefore used this episode in the focus groups.      
 
3.4.4 Drama   
Al Sakenat fee Golobena is a popular Saudi drama series, something like a soap opera, 
dealing with women‘s empowerment issues.  In view of its focus and popularity in the 
village, I decided to undertake textual analysis of some episodes.  Bill Ryerson, founder of 
Population Communication International (PCI), noted that entertainment programmes like 
soap operas are able to engage people and influence attitudinal and behavioural change 
because their emotional content makes them memorable (Weinreich, 2006).   
 
3.4.5 Elements Enhancing Textual Analysis   
The three MBC1 programmes that I intended to analyse, Kalam Nawaim, Tash Ma Tash and 
Al Sakenat fee Golobena, were played in the focus groups.  Conducting focus groups around 
these three programmes would give me extra depth when I textually analysed them.  
Fairclough explained that one of the approaches of discourse analysis is conversation analysis 
through ethnomethodology.  Ethnomethodologists tend to focus on notions such as class and 
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power, interpretatively (Fairclough, 1992, p.17).  The fact that I have used the ethnography 
approach, focus groups, and in-depth one-to-one interviews, will enable me to analyse the 
texts, not merely in line with existing theories, but in the light of the findings from an actual 
ethnographic study that will generate more theories.  This coincides with Stuart Hall‘s words: 
―I am not interested in Theory, I am interested in going on theorizing‖ (quoted in Ang, 1989, 
p.110).   
 
Since the study investigates voluntary media codes of practice in their coverage of issues 
around the development of Arab women‘s status, I will be analysing the texts in light of the 
recommendations of media initiatives such as Queen Rania‘s.  In addition, since the target 
women‘s group in this study are the disadvantaged in the Arab world, focusing on Saudi 
Arabia, the textual analysis will be based on class, gender, and religion.   
 
As the study critiques the dominant ideology and the textual analysis will be of television 
programmes, it is important to discuss the scripts‘ ‗hidden power‘.  In television, there is an 
acute division between ‗producers‘ and ‗consumers‘, since the former does not know the 
mind-set of the latter, so interpretations are based on assumptions.  The producers have the 
dominant power here, because it is they who determine what is to be presented on television 
(Fairclough, 1989, p.49).       
 
Fairclough explains that social classes are derived from economic and political powers that 
are reflected in discourse (Fairclough, 1989, p.33).  In this textual analysis, I will trace the 
impact of economic, political and also religious power in the scripts.  Since the media 
conglomerate I selected for my case study is not totally free of government control and 
religious pressure, utilising these elements in the textual analysis is essential.  
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Chapter 4 
 
ARAB MEDIA INITIATIVES FOR WOMEN’S DEVELOPMENT ON 
ARAB SATELLITE TELEVISION   
  
“Media mirrors reality.  The typical image of women in the Arab media is the same as 
that embraced by Arab society...At the same time media cannot be passive, but must 
be an instrument of change since it is one of society‟s most important institutions.  If 
reality is to be changed by using the media to reconfigure the typical image of women, 
then it should be done by drawing up strategies, making plans and implementing 
them” (Abu Zeid, 2005, p.10).     
   
One of the main things that this study tries to investigate is the extent to which MBC1 and Al 
Arabiya have applied voluntary media codes of practice that were devised as part of a pan-
Arab initiative in their coverage of Arab women‘s development issues.  Accordingly, this 
chapter tries to shed light on media initiatives that discuss the role of Arab satellite television 
in women‘s development.  One of the main initiatives that discusses the exact focal points of 
this study and the role of Arab satellite channels in addressing these issues, is Queen Rania‘s 
Media Initiative.  This chapter will also explore other initiatives, such as Sheikha Fatima bint 
Mubarak Al Ketbi‘s Media Initiative and the White Hands Campaign.  It will also discuss 
whether the dominant ideology has been applied, and will examine what kind of women‘s 
development is envisaged by these initiatives.  Whether it is Women in Development (WID), 
where women are not integrated in the development process but, rather, are encouraged into 
the productive sectors of the existing economic system (Beneria & Sen, 1997, p.49); or 
Women and Development (WAD), which focuses on the relationship between women and 
developmental processes, but fails to analyse the relationships between patriarchy, different 
modes of production and women‘s subordination and oppression; or Gender and 
 120 
Development (GAD), which questions the basis for assigning specific gender roles to 
different sexes, rejects the public/private dichotomy and focuses on challenging existing 
power structures in society between men and women (O‘Brien et al, 2000, p.125).      
 
The chapter is divided into four sections.  The first will discuss development and Arab 
satellite television to show the need for media initiatives that tackle development, and 
women‘s development, in particular.  The second section will explore Queen Rania‘s Media 
Initiative, drawing on the opinions of Suzanne Afaneh and Ethar Khawasnah whom I 
interviewed at Queen Rania‘s Media Office.  The third section will highlight other media 
initiatives, and the final section will discuss the views of the MBC Group‘s officials on 
Queen Rania‘s and other media initiatives.   
 
4.1 Development and Arab Satellite Television 
  
Arab satellite channels have helped to underpin pan-Arab identity, but have undermined other 
broader developmental and social needs.  It has been reported that the number of Arabs living 
in poverty stands at 65 million.  One aspect of poverty is youth unemployment, which is a 
crucial challenge in the Arab world.  Unemployment rates for Arab women are higher than 
for men and are amongst the highest globally, suggesting endemic discrimination against 
women, which has contributed to women‘s disempowerment (Arab Human Development 
Report 2009).  Globally, there are 771 million illiterate adults (aged 15 years and older); two-
thirds of them are women from developing countries, particularly Sub-Saharan Africa and the 
Arab States (UNESCO 2006).  Arab women suffer from physical violence, such as beatings, 
rape, and honour crimes.  Those who are the most impoverished, uneducated and exposed to 
violence are Arab women in rural or village and desert areas.  Women also lack basic 
nutrition, as well as basic shelter, clothing, and social support (Arab Human Development 
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Report, 2009).  These are serious development issues that need to be addressed on Arab 
satellite channels.  Television has a particular advantage over other means of information 
dissemination mainly due to the region‘s high levels of illiteracy.  Since the emergence of the 
Arab satellite channels, a greater number of ordinary people have enjoyed access to a number 
of television programmes on them, broadcast in competition with local television channels in 
several Arab countries (Akeel, 2010, p.114).  As these channels address liberal topics and 
seem to lack a bias towards either gender, the proportion of viewers of local channels has 
decreased, as the satellite channels offer entertainment and educational programmes 
presented in a professional manner and contain up-to-date events, which is not the case for 
channels under government censorship (Ibid, p.130).  However, ―it is unfortunate therefore 
that there is very limited development programming on satellite TV in the Arab world.  
Indeed Arab television at large is not a vibrant force for knowledge or culture‖ (Arab Human 
Development Report, 2009).      
 
Arab countries can no longer afford to close their eyes to developmental and social issues, or 
claim that everything is as perfect as it is presented on state television.  Arab satellite 
channels do generate discussion about development and social change, but it is superficial 
(Hroub, 2006, pp.91, 94).  The focus on Saudi-owned channels tends to be on foreign and 
regional, rather than local news.  Nabil Al Khatib, Executive Editor at Al Arabiya, said: 
 
“For 50 years, all Arabs have heard about is Israelis, Palestinians, Americans, Arab 
summits and so on, and nothing about real answers to the real questions of why he is 
poor, frustrated and unhappy with the level of health care and education for his kids”  
(quoted in Sakr, 2007, p.56).   
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Faisal Al-Kasim, anchor on the “The Opposite Direction” on Al Jazeera, hosts a programme 
centred on core politics, but most episodes discuss Arab nationalism, liberation issues and 
imperialism, and only a few episodes touch on development or social change.  He says that 
―it is time to start from the bottom up, to humanize the Arab media by tackling human and 
social problems‖ (Ibid, p.56).  International and regional politics, including the 
Palestinian/Israeli conflict, are the focus of Arab satellite channels, which leaves only limited 
space for national matters, such as development indicators and policies on poverty and 
unemployment (Karam, 2007, p.82).  Both news and entertainment satellite channels 
broadcast few development programmes.  There is a dearth of such programmes that target 
young people on issues such as employment, education and social betterment (Ibid, p.81), as 
well as a lack of programmes targeting women on gender equity and empowerment, to 
address the fundamental problems of unequal power distribution (Melkote, 2006, p.117).      
   
Whenever topics of development and social change are discussed, usually relating to women, 
arguments centre on Islamist and secularist views.  Discussion of these matters on Arab 
satellite channels usually gives rise to loud, polarising debates between traditional Islamists 
and modern secularists.  Satellite media are not acting as a catalyst for progress.  Few 
programmes discuss the bridges that must be built between the two ideologies in order to 
achieve developmental and social change.  Instead of having heated adversarial debates, 
overcoming differences is important particularly where complex issues, such as the Islamic 
interpretation of women‘s rights and equality, are concerned (Hroub, 2006, pp.89, 92, 93).  
Nabil Dajani, a Professor at the American University of Beirut, said:   
 
―As far as bringing the secularist and Islamic perspectives together is concerned 
generally the interest of satellite channels is not in dialogue or public service, but 
 123 
agitation...the concept of social and national responsibility is still very narrow on 
satellite channels” (Ibid, p.98).      
   
It is unreasonable for Arab media to rely mostly on ready-made American and European 
programmes, or on Arabic versions of them, as this could discourage local productions and 
talents and engender greater dependency on Western media (Sakr, 2007, p.112).  Some might 
argue that the role of satellite media is to transmit information, not to create social change 
and development.  This argument may apply in developed countries, but not in developing 
countries, where development indicators are low and every tool must be employed to aid 
development (Hroub, 2006, p.92).  Low development indicators in Arab countries, including 
poverty, illiteracy, youth unemployment, women‘s rights, social and health problems, mean 
Arab satellite channels must take these issues more seriously.  The importance of 
broadcasting development programmes on satellite channels in particular, lies in that they 
operate a less restrictive and more open policy than state television, and so they attract larger 
audiences.  Despite impediments and limitations, Arab satellite channels make commendable 
contributions to political discussions, but their role in broadcasting development and social 
change is superficial (Ibid, pp.117-118).   
 
International non-governmental organisations (INGOs) have drafted proposals for the Middle 
East to develop a ―global framework for a democratic media‖, but instead of cooperating with 
international organisations, NGOs and the media to promote development, governments and 
the ruling elites in the Middle East have tried to block such collaboration, while 
simultaneously continuing to pressure the media in their respective countries to be their 
mouthpieces (Ibid, pp.99, 169, 188).      
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The sections below detail Arab media initiatives that are focused on women‘s advancement 
for Arab satellite channels that might be viable alternatives to the international NGOs‘ 
proposals.     
 
4.2 Queen Rania’s Media Initiative 
Since this study explores the extent to which MBC1 and Al Arabiya have undertaken media 
initiatives, or have applied voluntary media codes of practice in their coverage of issues 
around Arab women‘s development, it is crucial to discuss and examine existing initiatives.  
This section will do this and will determine whether they have applied the dominant 
ideology, also investigating what type of women‘s development and empowerment have 
promoted in the initiatives.                
      
A number of media initiatives focus on Arab women‘s empowerment and quite a few have 
discussed the coverage by private Arab satellite channels of poverty, illiteracy and violence 
against disadvantaged women.  However, the role of private Arab satellite television in this 
particular agenda has only been a priority since the launch of Queen Rania‘s Media Initiative 
in 2002.  In 2002, Queen Rania took over as President of the Arab Women's Summit from 
Egypt‘s Suzanne Mubarak.  Egypt was the first Arab country to host an Arab Women‘s 
Summit, and it was then transferred to Jordan and Queen Rania became its President from 
2002 to 2004.  The Arab Women‘s Summit is hosted by a different Arab country every two 
years.  In her time as President, Queen Rania formed an executive committee dealing with 
media affairs for Arab women.  Suzanne Afaneh was coordinator of the media initiative and 
it was the Queen‘s idea to launch a media project for Arab women.  Afterwards the Arab 
Media Campaign for Women‟s Development was launched and was later expanded to become 
the Arab Media Network for Human Development, and should not only be confined to 
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women.  Several satellite channels participated in this campaign, including MBC1 and Al 
Arabiya.  Both aired the campaign over a one-year period, between three and six times a day, 
for a total of 90 minutes each month (Arab Media Network for Human Development, 2004).    
 
Asked about how the media initiative had evolved, Suzanne Afaneh‘s comments reflected 
changes in global thinking about women‘s rights as human rights:    
 
“If we restrict the topics related to women by calling them so-called women's issues, 
only women will take an interest.  Meetings are often among women activists and 
discussions take place within these circles.  If we want to break out of this framework, 
we must make women‟s rights a human rights issue.  If we call the matter women‟s 
issues, we constrain it within a rigid mould.  But if we call them human rights‟ issues 
and explain that non-participation of women in the workplace will affect the 
economies of the Arab world, we will have framed women‟s issues as matters of 
national importance.  Therefore, it is called the Arab Media Network for Human 
Development”.  (Amman, 2011) 14      
 
Critiquing the rights and laws that privileged male control over women, such as in family and 
civil laws, among international organisations and officials may improve the chances of 
women‘s equality and empowerment (Beneria & Sen, 1997, p.41).   
  
Discussing the initiative‘s evolution, Afaneh seemed to switch between different approaches 
to women, gender and development.  At one point she explained that there were two reasons 
                                                 
14
 A list of the interviewees, with their positions and the date and place of interview, is given in the Appendix    
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for the launch of this initiative: one for development purposes, the other so that women could 
have a presence on satellite television.  She said:   
 
“They say that the Arab world is working at half capacity because so few women are 
working.  The highest percentage of women working in any Arab country is no more 
than 30%, while most Arab countries vary between 5 and 15%.  If women were 
involved in the labour market, there would be economic growth”.  (Amman, 2011)   
 
Here, Afaneh explained women‘s advancement as it is defined in WID, grounded in the 
traditional modernisation theory that wrongly assumes women are not integrated in the 
development process.  It accepts existing social structures and does not question the sources 
of women‘s subordination and oppression, or why women have not benefited from 
development strategies.  WID encourages women‘s organisations to focus on production as a 
means for women to increase their input to the economic system.  Yet, in relation specifically 
to media, Afaneh indicated recognition of the need for a GAD approach.    
 
For example, she noted:  
 
“The members of the media initiative explain these issues and argue that women-only 
programmes are inadequate for tackling these issues.  For example, Lelnesaa fakat 
(For women only) on Al Jazeera, whose title is enough to ensure that only women will 
tune in.  The subjects will be treated as women‟s issues and therefore any discussion 
will be restricted to women only.  So how can we change reality?”  (Amman, 2011) 
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Afaneh  and Queen Rania‘s team came to this conclusion because they believe that women-
only programmes, such as Lelnesaa fakat (For women only), form a kind of ‗ghettoization‘ of 
women (quoted in Sakr, 2005, p.130).  Accordingly, important discussions covered in 
women-only programmes will not be a public concern that reaches decision-makers.  The 
team thinks that mixed-sex forums can transform women‘s basic needs, such as a steady 
source of income and education, as well as aid more strategic gender interests, such as 
challenging male control of women‘s labour and women‘s restricted access to valued 
social/economic resources and political power (Young, 1997, p.368).     
 
She added:   
 
“Instead of producing women-only programmes, women should be integrated into the 
mainstream because we do not want to watch programmes only for women.  We 
would like to have women‟s issues addressed as public issues.  If there are economic 
programmes working women will feature and if there are political programmes 
female politicians will be present.  In this way, women can participate as effective 
members of society in all areas of life”.  (Amman, 2011)   
 
Here, the concepts of mainstream programming or mixed-sex programmes does not focus on 
women per se but on how gender relations have caused such subordination (Wong, 2003, 
pp.308-318).  However, even if women are aware of their subordinate positions, it does not 
mean they understand the structural causes of this unequal balance of power, explained in the 
GAD approach.  It was not clear from Afaneh‘s comments whether she saw any link between 
the structural causes and the nature of the media initiatives in which she was involved.   She 
explained that due to the restricted duration of the Arab Women‘s Summit in each Arab 
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country, limited to only two years, the initiative could not reach disadvantaged women, 
decision-makers and media officials in such a short space of time.  The initiative targeted the 
elites who are actually the ones who can produce programmes for these disadvantaged 
women.   
 
Implicit in this observation is the admission that the media initiative conducted no 
Participatory Actions Research (PAR).  PAR is dedicated to reviving both the power of 
marginalised people and their popular knowledge.  The knowledge that PAR attempts to 
generate is specific, local and applies a bottom-up approach.  Importantly, it is used to initiate 
collaborative social action in order to empower local knowledge and wrest social power, 
which is inherent in knowledge, away from the privileged (Friesen, 1999, pp.281-308).  Due 
to such a short life span, the initiative targeted decision-makers and media officials, rather 
than disadvantaged women, which is a clear application of the top-to-bottom approach.  
 
Afaneh said:       
 
“We should be focusing on something specific so that we can actually accomplish 
things... If the campaign continues, it will certainly discuss development issues.  If you 
want to be effective, you cannot move too quickly and against the current, especially 
at the beginning.” (Amman, 2011)  
  
As these summits and organisations are usually chaired by first ladies, no one dares to 
criticize them (Boerwinkel, 2011, p.22, 23).  As suggested by the fact that Queen Rania 
launched her own initiative, it can be argued that first ladies are more interested in making 
their own mark than in exploring what works best in the chosen field of their initiative.  
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Discussing the practicalities, Afaneh highlighted the amount of money allocated to the 
initiative launched by Queen Rania, but also emphasised that there was no intention to launch 
any new type of programming.  She said:        
  
“The executive managers of the satellite channels were keen to set up programmes for 
women but the initiative‟s leaders refused to do so, explaining that this was not their 
aim.  They clarified that they do not want them to change their programmes.  They 
just want them to integrate women into existing programming.  We do not want them 
to create a new audience.”  (Amman, 2011)   
 
Adding:  
 
“Our first objective is to gain air time from the executive managers, which is 
extremely expensive.  The media campaign they initiated costs millions.  The Arab 
Women's Summit is covering all the expenses.  The second objective is to monitor the 
programmes on satellite channels and talk shows.   They would like to get women out 
of their ghettos and for them to be integrated into political, social and economic 
programmes.  But the Summit did not discuss any changes to movies and soap operas, 
because these are confined to a few Arab countries, such as Egypt and Syria, for 
export to the rest of the Middle East, and their analysis needs more time and 
planning.” (Amman, 2011)                
 
Based on my discussion with Afaneh, I learned that the media project was chaired by Afaneh 
and that Queen Rania was Chair of the Committee because she was then President of the 
Summit.   The Arab Women's Summit funded all the costs, and the campaign‘s success came 
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down to these women‘s power to persuade the channels‘ decision-makers of the campaign‘s 
importance.   
 
This kind of contribution to programming rarely happens, as officials in power fiercely resist 
interference.  This is revealed in Afaneh‘s comment:  ―If you want to be effective, you cannot 
move too quickly and against the current, especially in the beginning‖ and when she said:    
“You do not want to run into several battles at all levels... If you want people to be 
responsive to your opinions, you have to start with modest goals.  If you attack 
officials and accuse them of being on the wrong path, and that their scripts and 
programmes do not meet the objectives of the United Nations, no one will respond”.  
(Amman, 2011) 
  
Afaneh added:   
 
“If the project were still in Jordan it could have been institutionalized and they could 
have attracted donors, but the campaign was launched to serve the Arab Women's 
Summit during this period.  The idea of institutionalizing the project is still valid.  The 
Arab Media Network for Human Development was a step taken towards 
institutionalization.  They got approval for the project‟s institutionalization from most 
of the executive managers, but it was not taken to the executive level because the 
Summit moved to the UAE and there was no follow-up.  One of the initiative‟s goals 
was to institutionalize the Arab Media Network as a regional NGO, but this did not 
materialise because the Summit was transferred to the UAE.  Before the Summit 
moved to the UAE, they had been working, on a new media strategy for women 
involving discussions with media specialists but we do not know how far the media 
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strategy in the UAE got.  We are the only ones who thought outside the box, but when 
the Summit was transferred to another country, the executives reverted to the same 
programme template for women.” (Amman, 2011)  
 
Afaneh said that one of the initiative‘s goals was to institutionalise the Arab Media Network 
for Human Development as a regional NGO.  This is similar to the social mobilisation that 
integrates top-down and bottom-up approaches to include political will and public resources 
for social change, bringing together government agencies, NGOs and the media to work 
towards a common goal.  Satellite television can contribute to this in two ways: either by 
working with civil society organisations and NGOs to generate public awareness, or by acting 
as an independent agent for change (Adams, 2006, pp.179, 180).  Nonetheless, social 
mobilisation is unlikely to be easily achieved in the Arab world due to governmental control 
of the media and their reluctance to cooperate with NGOs (Kandil 2009, pp.25, 28).  In 
addition, even if such NGOs were established, they would most likely be First Lady 
Organisations (FLANGOs), operating indirectly under governmental control, so it would be 
hard to make them accountable for mistakes, or to criticize them.  It is also possible that they 
would select, rather than elect, their executive committee members (Boerwinkel, 2011,pp. 22, 
23).      
     
4.3 Other Media Initiatives 
There are fifteen Arab countries who are members of the Arab Women‘s Organisation: 
Jordan, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Tunisia, Algeria, Sudan, Syria, Oman, 
Palestine, Lebanon, Libya, Egypt, Morocco, Mauritania and Yemen (Abu Zeid, 2005, p.65).   
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The Arab Women‘s Organisation and the General Union of Arab Journalists held a workshop 
on ―women and media‖ 28 and 29 May, 2005.  Its two main subjects covered were the 
media's role in tackling women‘s issues, and correcting the negative portrayals of women.  
The latter refers to problems facing women in the media.  It has been mentioned that the 
media focuses on the elite and on ‗role model‘ women, while ignoring women of other 
classes in Arab societies.  It has been also noted that interest in women's status is largely 
fleeting and is directed by politicians and sometimes even by foreign influences (Ibid, p.55).         
 
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) took over the presidency of the Arab Women's Summit in 
its third session (2007-2009).  The Media Strategy for Arab Women was launched under the 
auspices of Sheikha Fatima bint Mubarak Al Ketbi and discussed media issues in relation to 
Arab women.  Sheikha Fatima is the third wife of the founder of the UAE, who was also its 
first President, and the late Emir (the ruler) of Abu Dhabi, Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al 
Nahyan. She is called the Mother of the Nation and is considered the most prominent of 
Zayid's wives.  Her sons outnumber all other groups of siblings from the different mothers 
within the Al Nahyan family and they all hold the highest positions in the country.  Sheikh 
Mohammed, the current Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi; Sheikh Abdullah, the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs; Sheikh Mansour, the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Presidential 
Affairs; Sheikh Hazza, the National Security Advisor and the Chairman of the Abu Dhabi 
Board; Sheikh Tahnoun, Executive Board Member and Chief of the Emiri Aviation 
Authority; and Sheikh Hamdan, the Ruler's Representative in the Western Region.  Sheikha 
Fatima‘s sons are sometimes referred to as the Bani Fatima, which points to their power and 
privilege (Al Sheikh, 2011, p.10).   
 
 133 
Even though Sheikha Fatima does not herself appear in public and does not allow her pictures 
to be published in any media, she is very active in supporting women‘s rights in the UAE.  
She is the Chairwoman of the General Women‘s Union (GWU) of the UAE and the Supreme 
Chairperson of the Family Development Foundation.  She founded the GWU in 1975 to 
facilitate women‘s opportunities to realise their full potential through education and training.  
She has been an active advocate of women‘s equality and rights, encouraged the provision of 
free state education for girls, and promoted adult literacy in the UAE (Ibid, p.10).   
  
 Sheikha Fatima's media strategy was not the same as Queen Rania‘s initiative, nor even is it 
in any sense a continuation of it, but it was another strategy concerned with women in the 
media and the problems they face.  Starting another media initiative from scratch laid waste 
to the efforts and money that had been spent by Queen Rania.  Afaneh‘s information about 
Sheikha Fatima‘s media strategy is:       
 
“Sheikha Fatima's initiative was about an Arab women‟s strategy for the Arab print 
and broadcast media.  The initiative was nothing like Queen Rania‟s.  Sheikha 
Fatima's initiative involved collaboration with media specialists to determine the 
obstacles that prevented topics such as women‟s education or violence against 
women, being tackled in the Arab media.  They wrote to foundations and conducted 
workshops about what those channels and newspapers should do.  Then they 
developed a strategy, but we do not know to whom it was distributed and we have not 
been notified of what steps were then taken.”  (Amman, 2011)    
 
According to the official documentation it produced, the vision behind Sheikha Fatima‘s 
media strategy was to establish media that empowered Arab women and would harness their 
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energies for sustainable development.  The strategic objective was to build a positive image 
of a woman‘s role in the Arab world.  The strategy proposed several projects, including 
research to document the amount of media coverage given to women‘s political, economic 
and social issues (Arab Women's Organisation, 2007, p.12). The strategy, therefore, focused 
on women in the media and not on female viewers.    
 
According to the report Media Strategy for Arab Women, Sheikha Fatima‘s media strategy 
proposed several projects.  One focused on women's participation in political and economic 
life, highlighting an urgent need to strengthen women's confidence in dealing with political 
and economic issues that are usually left to male analysts.  Another, the   ‗Information 
Network for Arab Women‘, sought to provide a comprehensive structure of communication 
and reliable information to serve women by providing information that enhances women‘s 
skills and knowledge.  The project focused on building partnerships for justice and equal 
opportunities, which includes partnerships between media organisations, public and private 
agencies, and, in particular, civil society organisations to promote the value of gender 
equality.  Finally, a project on women's leadership sought to get the media to promote the 
concept of women‘s leadership (Ibid, pp.4-8).   
   
Unlike Queen Rania‘s Media Initiative, which was media for women and mainly for those 
who were disadvantaged, Sheikha Fatima‘s media strategy was about women in the media 
who are considered privileged women, such as journalists and broadcasters.  Queen Rania‘s 
Media Initiative was focused on satellite television, while Sheikha Fatima‘s media strategy 
was about media in general including both print media and terrestrial television.     
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As with Queen Rania‘s initiative, Sheikha Fatima‘s strategy applied the dominant ideology, 
because the projects were designed by decision-makers and individuals connected to the 
ruling elites, rather than being shaped by discussion with junior female journalists, who 
would have been most affected by unequal opportunities.  As a result, neither initiative 
contributes towards any form of empowerment for the actual target groups, whether in terms 
of ‗power-from-within‘, ‗power to‘, ‗power-with‘ or ‗power over‘ (Wong, 2003, p.308).       
   
There are other media campaigns that are not under the auspices of the Arab Women's 
Summit, such as the White Hands Campaign, launched by the Arab Producers Union for 
Television Production (APUTP) in 2008.   The Campaign is funded by the APUTP, which 
operates under the auspices of the Arab League and the Council of Arab Ministers of 
Information, and is based in Cairo.  The Union‘s most important annual activity is the Forum 
of Arab Producers, held annually in the Arab League headquarters in Cairo, where the the 
Arab world‘s most distinguished media specialists are honoured including ministers, directors 
of media organisations and writers (White Hands Campaign, 2008).  The vision of the White 
Hands Campaign is to bring women‘s concerns into the spotlight, in order to develop 
women‘s social, intellectual and economic roles until women's rights are realised in all areas 
of life.  The campaign also launched a television programme, The Distinguished Woman, 
which was broadcast on different Arab satellite channels.  The programme is comprised of 40 
episodes and each episode is 50-minutes long.   The programme has experiences of 
distinguished Arab women in society.  Khawasnah‘s view (interviewed at Queen Rania‘s 
Media Office on 2
nd
 March, 2011) about the White Hands Campaign:    
 
“The Al Ayadee Al Baydaa (White Hands) initiative was sponsored by the Arab 
Producers Union for TV - Production and is similar to the Ahl El Himma (Provoked 
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People) initiative.  Those who were running the White Hands initiative took many 
names of female professionals and leaders that were on their database and hosted 
them on the White Hands programme.  Their programme hosted women from 
Palestine, Jordan, Syria, Tunisia and elsewhere, and was similar in format to the 
programme Ahl El Himma.  We found ourselves reverting to the same old mould for 
women‟s programmes. So the number of viewers watching the White Hands 
programme is low and it is broadcast late at night, at 11pm or 1am.  In Queen 
Rania‟s initiative, the executive managers were partners in the decision-making, 
which is different from taking a decision to the managers and asking them to 
implement it.” (Amman, 2011)    
 
The White Hands Campaign received the same criticism that the Arab Women‘s Organisation 
and the General Union of Arab Journalists mentioned in the workshop about ―women and 
media‖: the media focuses on the elites and ‗role model‘ women, while ignoring women of 
other classes in Arab societies.  It has also been noted that interest in women's empowerment 
is largely fleeting and is controlled by politicians, a top-to-bottom approach, and is 
sometimes even subject to foreign influences, so these women‘s programmes have few 
viewers.  The White Hands Campaign is considered a typical women-only programme that 
further marginalises women instead of presenting them as relevant to the whole of society.    
 
There are many civil society institutes that are focused on partnerships between civil society 
and the media, particularly with regard to women's development and the media‘s portrayal of 
women, such as the Arab Non-Governmental Organisations Network and the Arab Network 
to Monitor and Change the Image of Women in the Media (Kandil, 2009, pp.25, 28).  
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However, these organisations and initiatives do not cooperate, so while they present good 
theoretical ideas individually, what is applied is largely ineffective in practice.    
  
The following section will shed light on the opinion of the MBC Group‘s officials on Queen 
Rania‘s and other media initiatives.    
 
4.4 MBC Group’s Officials and Media Initiatives 
 
Generally, Feedback from the MBC Group‘s officials on Queen Rania‘s and other media 
initiatives was not positive.  Some think the initiatives were a good idea, but that they have 
failed to have any actual impact on the media, while others think that the media needs more 
than public relations (PR) initiatives launched by first ladies.   
 
Sheik Waleed Al Ibrahim, the MBC Group‘s Chairman and Chief Executive Officer (CEO), 
thinks that the programmes on the MBC Group‘s channels cover the initiatives‘ ideas in a 
much more comprehensive way.  He said:   
 
“The principles of this initiative are already embedded in our programmes in a much 
broader way than the initiative envisaged.  For example, in Kalam Nawaim, Sabah 
AlKer ya Arab (Good Morning Arab), and Sabah Al Arabiya (Al Arabiya‟s morning).  
We are not producing these programmes because of the initiative.”  (Dubai, 2011)         
  
The Director of Al Arabiya, Al Rashed‘s response to institutionalising Queen Rania‘s Media 
Initiative as a regional NGO:  
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“NGO is a bad word in the Arab World.   It has gone through a difficult phase in the 
last ten years.  I have participated in NGOs and the problems are:  1) Governmental 
organisations are always cautious about NGOs.  They think they are working in 
parallel to what they are doing, which is not true.  2) Governmental organisations 
think that NGOs receive money from abroad, which makes them less trusting of the 
NGO‟s aims. 3) They realise that the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions were 
supported by NGOs.  NGOs will remain something forced upon governments.  
Institutions of civil society must and will exist and nobody can change them for now.  
They will be with us for a long time.” (Dubai, 2011)   
 
Governments and ruling elites in the Middle East have always tried to block NGOs‘ work and 
their collaboration with the media, claiming that the funding has come from foreign 
governments and this could be considered a form of cultural imperialism (Fowler, 1992, pp.9-
10).  As a result, partnerships between civil society institutes and the media in the Arab world 
are hard to establish.  In some Arab countries, like Saudi Arabia, NGOs do not even exist.  
The Arab media initiatives for women‘s development are mostly under the auspices of first 
ladies whose power is derived from their husbands (Nelson, 1991, pp.310-334).  As a result, 
these Arab media initiatives can never be institutionalised as NGOs, because they would be 
indirectly under the influence of those in power.    
 
Nakhle El Hage, Director of News at Al Arabiya echoed the same views about Arab media 
initiatives under the auspices of the first ladies.  He said:  
 
“In the Arab world, there were good initiatives, such as Queen Rania‟s initiative, but 
unfortunately at one point we felt that the initiative was more about public relations 
 139 
than achieving results; PR for the Queen, or for the Arab Women's Summit.  The Arab 
Women's Summit is abusive and uses women, because it represents men‟s authority.  
These women are leading these Summits because they are the wives of powerful 
individuals, not because they are powerful in their own right.  These initiatives have 
insufficient efficacy.  Our problem in the Arab world, as shown by the United Nations‟ 
Human Development Report, is that Arabs spend only 0.5% [of the budget] on 
research, while in other countries this can be up as high as 8% or even more.  We 
don‟t invest in research.”  (Dubai, 2011)     
 
Jaber, the MBC Group‘s Director, shared the same El Hage‘s opinion about the initiatives.  
He said:    
 
“These initiatives are promoted through media campaigns but then nothing is 
actually done on the ground.  The Arab world needs institutions for television 
scripting more than PR media initiatives.” (Dubai, 2011)   
 
El Hage said:  
 
“Queen Rania‟s Arab Media Campaign for Women‟s Development was broadcast on 
MBC and Al Arabiya and it was done well.  It shows the role of women in a positive 
way.  The difference between this initiative and other initiatives is that it discusses the 
participation of women in development on the same footing as men.” (Dubai, 2011) 
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4.5 Conclusion     
The data presented in this chapter showed that media initiatives conducted by first ladies, 
such as Queen Rania‘s media initiative and Sheikha Fatima‘s media strategy, represent a 
dominant top-down approach lacking participatory ethics because it does not involve lower 
class women and has no impact on women‘s empowerment.  The Arab Women's Summit and 
these initiatives are more like FLANGOs, because they are controlled by first ladies.  As a 
result, they are indirectly under governmental control, so it is hard to make them accountable 
for mistakes made, or to criticize them.  Moreover, the fact that each first lady wants to prove 
herself by starting a new initiative to which she can put her name, instead of continuing and 
building upon any previous endeavours, suggests that the first ladies‘ primary intention is to 
promote themselves, rather than to contribute to women‘s advancement.     
 
Although Queen Rania‘s Media Initiative came closest to this study‘s aims because it dealt 
with coverage of poverty, illiteracy and violence against disadvantaged women by private 
Arab satellite channels, it still needs more time and coordination with other initiatives to 
ensure that it moves to the next stage of delivering on its promises.  The problem with Queen 
Rania‘s initiative, and others, is that they lack continuity because they fail to work 
cooperatively and build on each other‘s successes, and the initiatives do not run for a 
sufficient amount of time.  Were they to do so, they would research in greater depth the 
issues surrounding the approaches of WID, WAD and GAD.  It would also enable them to 
further research the ways in which the development of women‘s status is part of human 
development more generally, and to discuss this in relation to all classes of women, not only 
in relation to the more privileged and those already in the media.    
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Those who launch such initiatives must bear in mind that what the Arab world needs is 
research centres that can translate information into programming.  These centres would 
combine audience research and television scriptwriting, like the work of the Norman Lear 
Center and Population Communications International (PCI) in the United States, to produce 
and write entertainment programmes like soap operas, for behavioural change based on 
scientific studies.  In addition, establishing media monitoring institutions to discover how 
women are portrayed in different programmes is vital.  These centres can coordinate with the 
media and with other institutions to share expertise to produce better outcomes.   
 
Research centres can establish partnerships between the media and other bodies, such as civil 
society institutes and NGOs.  The dilemma is that local and international NGOs are always 
perceived with suspicion and as institutions of cultural imperialism by governments in the 
Middle East, and in some Arab countries, like Saudi Arabia, NGOs do not even exist.  As a 
result, partnerships between civil society institutions and the media in the Arab world are 
difficult to establish.  The solution is for women and their supporters to work cooperatively, 
both within and against society, until their aims are achieved.  Convincing the ruling elites to 
forge such partnerships can be corrected by the ―negotiated variant‖ method of 
communication that focuses on smaller-scale problems and does not threaten those in power.  
If those in charge of such media initiatives do not convince the ruling elites that such 
partnerships will not challenge or threaten them, they will be no more than the elites‘ 
mouthpieces.  Discussion of women‘s empowerment in these media initiatives will therefore 
remain superficial, ineffective and no real progress will be made. 
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Chapter 5 
 
THE CHALLENGE OF ADDRESSING DEVELOPMENT ON 
SATELLITE TELEVISION:  
VIEWS FROM THE TOP     
   
In this chapter I explore the definition of development that is used by the officials and media 
professionals interviewed.  I also explore whether the dominant top-down approach or the 
participatory bottom-up one, have been applied in the MBC Groups‘ development 
programmes.  The fact that this study has incorporated ethnography, focus groups and one-to-
one in-depth interviews with disadvantaged women in Jazan has meant that I have benefited 
from a deeper insight into the realities they face.  While interviewing the elites, I was able to 
compare the media officials‘ approach with the actual needs of disadvantaged women, 
pushing for suggested solutions and making for a more nuanced discussion.   
 
The chapter‘s first section discusses the interviewees‘ opinions on a definition of 
development and development programming on MBC1 and Al Arabiya.  The second relates 
the difficulties that such programmes are likely to face.  The third section will highlight the 
two channels‘ treatment of political economy.  The final section will discuss future 
opportunities in Arab media, especially in the wake of the changes brought about in the 
region by the Arab uprisings.     
  
5.1 Attitudes to Development and Development Programmes   
 
One of the main things that I tried to find out during my interviews with Sheikh Waleed Al 
Ibrahim, the MBC Group‘s Chairman and Chief Executive Officer (CEO), was his views on 
the definition of development and how this is reflected in the content of the programmes on 
Al Arabiya and MBC1: 
 143 
 
“The term development refers to everything that involves the development of the 
person as wider development in countries and societies follow on from individual 
development.  We concentrate on human development, because it is the backbone of 
any development process.  Man is the leader and manufacturer of development.  
Accordingly, we contribute to programmes that expand the perceptions of Arab 
viewers culturally, politically, scientifically and economically because they are 
considered development programmes.  Al Arabiya and MBC1 support Arab women‟s 
development programmes.” (Dubai, 2011)15      
 
Here, Sheikh Waleed tried to emphasise the importance of human development, which is 
different from the historical meaning of the term ‗economic development‘.  His definition is 
similar to that of Mahbub ul Haq, Professor of Microeconomics at the University of Karachi, 
who profoundly changed the way development policies were formulated by developing the 
concept of human development and the Human Development Report, while advisor to the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 1989-1995 (Haq, 2011, p.1).  He is also in 
tune with Muhammad Yunus‘s thinking, who defined development as a human rights issue, 
not as a question of simply increasing a country‘s GNP (Yunus, 2007, p.146).   
 
However, Sheikh Waleed‘s definition of development differs from the actual development 
that has occurred in Saudi Arabia, according to Al Gethame, a Saudi academic and literary 
critic.  He refers to development in Saudi Arabia as “Tafra”, which means ―economic 
boom‖.  ―Boom‖ is the negative face of development, because ‗building the place‘ has been 
achieved much more quickly than ‗building the person‘ (Al Gethame, 2005, p.169-173).   
                                                 
15
 A list of interviewees, with their positions and the date and place of interview, is given in the Appendix 
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In Sheikh Waleed‘s view, Al Arabiya and MBC1 have contributed to development in their 
programmes.   
 
“Al Arabiya hosts debates, forums and constructive discussions covering economic 
affairs, information technology and socio-political programmes, like Hewar AlArab.  
It also expands the viewers‟ awareness of poverty, illiteracy and violence, through 
programmes like Sena‟at AlMawt (Industry of Death), which sheds light on the 
sources of violence and terrorism and discloses how they are supported, financed, 
and what their ideologies and strategies are.  The documentary-style programme 
Mahama Kasa (Special Assignment), deals with a different theme in each episod.  The 
programme Daleel Al Afiya (Wellness Guide) contributes to raising levels of health 
awareness in the Arab world.  Sabah Al Arabiya (The morning of Al Arabiya), which 
is a daily morning programme, highlights various aspects of daily life.  As for MBC1, 
there are several development programmes that relate to Arab women, and the family 
in general such as Kalam Nawaim, MBC fee Osbo‟o (MBC in the Week), Sabah Al 
Kheir Ya Arab (Good morning Arab) and many more.” (Dubai, 2011)        
 
Sheikh Waleed also stated that the main reason some broadcasting programmes covered 
women‘s issues, like Kalam Nawaim, was to create awareness among women as to their 
various rights.  He stressed that such awareness was for all women, regardless of class, status 
or education, saying that: 
 
“Women‟s awareness is a problem in the Arab world because women do not 
understand their rights.  Women have been raised in a certain way and learned their 
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rights from their mothers, and their mothers learned from their grandmothers.  
Women's education has been fiercely fought for in the past, but even if they have been 
educated, they might know about their rights, but have no practical experience of 
exercising them.” (Dubai, 2011)  
 
That Sheikh Waleed referred to all women regardless of class, educational background and 
age, suggests that he has fallen into the trap of making sweeping generalisations to which van 
Zoonen has drawn attention.  She emphasised how it is important when analyzing women‘s 
media consumption, to specify what kind of women (van Zoonen, 1994, pp.119, 123).  This 
was reflected in the responses of the focus group participants, especially girls between 15 and 
20 years of age who think that Kalam Nawaim does not represent their needs, either in terms 
of age or class (See Chapter 7).      
  
Al Rashed, Director of Al Arabiya, believes that the chief obstacle to development is what he 
called ‗radical thinking‘.  He has gained a reputation as a tough critic of the Jihadist mind-set, 
which he refers to when he talks of ‗radical thinking‘.  After he took up his post at Al Arabiya 
he wrote a newspaper article that provoked anger across the Arab world by saying: ―not all 
Muslims are terrorists, but it is equally certain, and exceptionally painful, that most terrorists 
are Muslims‖ (Worth, 2008, p.2).  According to Al Rashed, there will be no development or 
women‘s liberation as long as this mentality exists, and this is reflected in what they try to 
broadcast on Al Arabiya:     
         
“Al Arabiya was one of the major agents in bringing about a shift from radical 
thinking to reasonable and rational thinking in the Arab world.  The radical thinking 
of those who look to al-Qaeda to express themselves, and who consider violence a 
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result of political crises and is therefore an act of martyrdom, rather than murder, is 
how terrorism is presented on Al Jazeera.  Without fighting this radical mentality, it 
will be difficult for us to convince others of our liberal views, especially about women.  
We need to have support within society.  That will enable us to change many things 
related to women‟s issues, youth development, and poverty.  We have been working 
on this for about five years now.” (Dubai, 2011)     
 
Al Rashed‘s view is that for the Arab world to develop it must be saved from itself, especially 
from this ‗radical thinking‘, and must have more space for moderate and critical thinking.  He 
believes television has an impact on people, as illustrated when he said:  ―People become 
radicals because extremism is celebrated on TV,…If you broadcast an extremist message at a 
mosque, it reaches 50 people.  But do you know how many people can be sold a message on 
TV?‖ (quoted in Shapiro, 2005, p.3).   On this point, he criticised Al Jazeera, because, in his 
view, the TV station promotes extremism.  Some critics have called it ―Osama bin Laden 
TV‖ (quoted in Sakr, 2004, p.158).  Al Rashed explained that one of Al Arabiya‟s goals is to 
change the Arab world‘s thinking from being radical to being reasonable and rational, 
echoing the views of Al-Jabri, a contemporary Moroccan critic and Professor of Philosophy 
and Islamic Thought at the Mohammed V University in Rabat.  Al-Jabri has pointed out that 
the rise of Islamist radical ideologies was due to the dominant thoughts inside the Arab mind.  
In his view, the lack of independent thinking by Islamists, and of any critical analysis of the 
past, has resulted in this failure to develop (Aksikas, 2009, p.93).  To Al-Jabri, true 
development needs to be achieved through a critical analysis of Islamic texts.  Such analysis 
would see Islam aligned with the present so that its positive teachings can be adopted to 
pursue development goals (Ibid, p.70).  Similarly, when Al Rashed said that ‗we need to have 
support within society‘, he meant that Arabs need to be liberated from obscure interpretations 
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of Islam and to be equipped to read Islamic texts in a rational way.  Only then will they 
accept Al Arabiya‟s critical analysis of fundamentalist Islamists and not see it as an attack on 
Islam itself.             
 
When I asked Afaneh, whether, in her experience Al Arabiya and MBC1 were cooperative, 
she said that:  
 
“One of the most cooperative channels was the MBC Group.  Nakhle El Hage and Ali 
Al Hadithi from the MBC were always with us.  Al Arabiya was much more 
cooperative over the media initiative and the media campaign than Al Jazeera.  There 
is no comparison.  This is because Al Jazeera has a political agenda which is more 
important to them than the agenda of development.  On the other hand, the MBC and 
Al Arabiya have more scope for development programmes.  Al Arabiya accepts all 
development topics for women while Al Jazeera only looks for more controversial 
issues.” (Amman, 2011)   
 
One of the reasons Al Jazeera is more focused on politics and does not have the scope to 
cover development issues is due to the reasons for which it was launched.  Al Jazeera was 
founded by a Qatari royal decree to legitimise the regime after the Emir of Qatar‘s coup 
against his father in 1995 (Fandy, 2008, p.47).  It became the most widely viewed news 
network in the Arab world because of its willingness to break taboos by criticising Arab 
governments.  Several Arab governments view Al Jazeera with suspicion and they have 
accused it of criticising Arab countries while not delving into sensitive issues in Qatar 
(Hamada, 2004, p.10).   
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5.2 Attitudes to Disadvantaged Female Audiences Among Executives at MBC1 and Al 
Arabiya  
One of the main lines of inquiry that I tried to pursue in my interviews is the focus of the 
MBC Group on targeting the elites and middle and upper middle class more than the 
disadvantaged in their programmes.  When I mentioned this to Sheikh Waleed, I was told that 
there were studies conducted by the MBC Group that showed that focusing on the working 
class and their problems can cause frustration, and the lower classes would prefer  to see their 
problems played out in the context of the upper classes.  However, when I started to question 
the kinds of studies to which he referred, and when I told him that his findings were different 
from the experiences of the disadvantaged women in my ethnographic study, Sheikh Waleed 
stated that: 
  
“The problem of exposing in detail the problems of the disadvantaged, is that we are 
then accused by the Saudi press of airing our dirty laundry in public.  That‟s why we 
sometimes try to avoid their problems in drama and talk shows…There is no 
programme that causes us more of a headache than Tash Ma Tash, because of its 
criticism of society, officials, ministries and the education system in the Kingdom.  
These issues were presented in dramas and situation comedies because they are more 
influential than talk shows or any other genres.” (Dubai, 2011) 
 
One of the shows that addresses sensitive issues in Saudi society is Tash Ma Tash.  The MBC 
Group bought Tash Ma Tash because of its popularity with Saudis and to inject the comedy 
series with more freedom and professionalism so as to challenge the censorship and threats to 
pull the whole show that Saudi Channel 1 had received because of its coverage of sensitive 
issues (MBC Club, 2005).  The threats were even more serious for Nasser Al Qasabi, one of 
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the show‘s main stars, who was forced to emigrate from Riyadh to Dubai after he and his 
family received death threats from extremists (El Enezi, 2007, p.1).  Sheikh Waleed himself 
was not immune from death threats and fatwas declared by Wahhabi clerics.  This was 
revealed by Saudi Arabia's top judge, Sheikh Saleh Al-Luhaidan when he said: ―It is lawful 
to kill... the apostles of depravation... if their evil cannot be easily removed through simple 
sanctions‖.  It was suggested that one of these apostles was Sheikh Waleed (MENASSAT 
2008).  Even though private satellite channels were located outside Saudi Arabia to ensure 
greater freedom from censorship, they were not immune from political control and religious 
threats.  It is even rumoured that King Abdullah himself personally intervened, asking the 
show‘s creators to treat subjects such as tribalism and religion with greater sensitivity (Sakr, 
2009, p.140).     
 
Sheikh Waleed continued:  
 
―The problem is that enemies of development exist and they believe that any change 
will see their privileges taken away.  They consider themselves guardians of society, 
and anyone who tries to develop or alter that will be at their expense.  Therefore they 
fight us, especially in Saudi Arabia.” (Dubai, 2011)           
 
Here, Sheikh Waleed is referring to Wahhabi scholars or ahl al-sunna wa al-jama‟a, who 
exert strict control over men and women.  Most Saudi private satellite channels are therefore 
located outside Saudi Arabia, either in neighbouring Arab countries or in Europe, which frees 
them from governmental or clerical control and enables them to be more courageous in 
dealing with sensitive topics and controversial debates.  Many Saudi media professionals, 
male or female, prefer to work for these channels, and some Saudi specialists want to 
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participate as guests on their talk shows, to discuss the actual problems of, and the real issues 
in Saudi society. These subjects include women‘s status and the barriers that hinder their 
development (Akeel, 2010, p.114).  However, even though these channels address sensitive 
topics and seem to lack any gender bias, unlike local channels, they are still constrained by 
political and religious considerations (Ibid, p.130).    
 
I also explored with Al Rashed whether a lack of transparency and information impedes 
broadcast development indicators, such as poverty, illiteracy and violence.  He said: 
 
“There are two parts to this problem:  Firstly there is a lack of transparency with 
officials keeping information close to their chests.  They do not want the extent of 
poverty and unemployment in Saudi Arabia to be publicized as they would then be 
obliged to address the problems.  This mainly refers to governments and official 
institutions.  Secondly, and this is the biggest problem, they don‟t actually have the 
information.  The market information does not exist.” (Dubai 2011)    
 
Al Rashed‘s explanation highlights a lack of public domain information that is either the 
result of officials preventing the information from being shared, or of poor information 
management.    
 
I then asked him how women could be integrated into mainstream issues.  He argued that:  
   
“You have different kinds of people: decision-makers, leaders, participants, 
opponents (who are completely against you), traditionalists, and those who are 
somewhere in the middle and do not know where to go.  It is a huge undertaking to 
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change a big size in the Arab society, especially as it is the most backward place in 
the world.  You cannot do it by employing only one method.  There are so many ways 
to do it.  It is a long battle.  The most important tool is awareness.  There are various 
powers bases in society, but those who are religious or conservative are the most 
resistant to change.” (Dubai, 2011)   
 
Althusser argued that societies differ in the kinds and relationships of their Ideological State 
Apparatus (ISA); this is reflected in Al Rashed‘s response when he refers to Saudi Arabia as 
a ‗backward place‘ or, in other words, as a pre-capitalist society.  In Saudi Arabia‘s case, 
since the constitution is based on religion and, specifically, on Wahhabism
16
 this means that 
religion controls all the ISAs, so society is, in effect, still run under a pre-capitalist system.  
The control of religious institutes over the educational system was, for instance, revealed in 
the responses of the formally-educated women in my focus groups, who were willing to 
defend conservative religious patriarchal views, such as keeping women invisible in society, 
not allowing women on the Shura Council (The Consultative Assembly of Saudi Arabia, also 
known as the Majlis al-Shura or Shura Council) and a ban on women driving (See Chapter 7).            
   
Furthermore, when I asked at Al Arabiya whether the main cause of poverty in the Arab 
world was corruption, and whether this was an obstacle to the production of development 
programmes that address the issue of unemployment and poverty, he said: 
 
“We have political and legal problems.  Unlike London, here you have to have a 
licence from the country otherwise they will close your office.  The licence is a 
political decision, not really a commercial one.  Talking about this subject is political. 
                                                 
16
 Wahhabism was founded by Sheikh Muhmmad ibn Abd al-Wahhab 
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I, for example, could not do everything.  If I want to broadcast such a programme in 
Saudi Arabia, for example, the laws will prevent me from doing so.  On the subject of 
corruption, if accusations are made against officials, I cannot make it.  I won‟t lie.  
Anyone who asks me about this, I will be very frank on this matter.  I do not claim 
heroism here.  This is also true in Egypt. This is also true in Tunisia. This is also true 
in Kuwait, in Syria and Lebanon.  States and governments will close down our offices 
if we touch on these kinds of sensitive issues.” (Dubai, 2011)        
 
This demonstrates that he is categorically not allowed to discuss corruption or incompetence 
on Al-Arabiya.      
 
Although he had earlier argued that good media should provide accurate information, Al 
Rashed acknowledged that this is difficult in a society with an absence of transparency and 
constant pressure from officials:  
 
“You try; you could not do it all the way, or do nothing.  It doesn‟t work like that.  We 
try our luck by pushing the roof of freedom.  It is a difficult process.  This is, by the 
way a monthly, weekly, and daily-game.  It is a cat and mouse game.  We progress. 
They run after us.  We move back two steps.  We progress 3 steps, move back two 
steps and so forth.  It is a continuous game.  If you notice in the coverage of Al 
Arabiya, the power that is facing the channel is not always a political power, but also 
a social force.  There are people who speak from religious perspectives, and here the 
religious pressure becomes worse than the government pressure and more dangerous 
to human life.” (Dubai, 2011)    
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Here, Al Rashed explains how satellite television continually contends with political power 
and that religion can exert more pressure than politics, especially in an ultra-conservative 
country like Saudi Arabia. 
     
One of the things that I questioned Al Rashed about was the lack of information about those 
on lower incomes. For example, whereas the channel has given a great deal of airtime to 
stock market news, which is relevant to the upper middle classes in the Gulf, it has not looked 
at poverty, unemployment and development indicators to educate viewers on developmental 
progress in the country.  Al Rashed argued that:  
 
“This cannot be done on an on-going basis but it can be done as periodic reports, not 
weekly or monthly reports, because there are no regular reports in the market about 
poverty, unemployment, etc.  As a matter of fact, there are no institutions that 
constantly search out accurate figures.  The UN reports are quarterly or annually and 
if you notice they are written in broad-spectrum and are not broken down to small 
information in order to be understood by the regular viewer.  They are directed to 
those working in international or government organizations.  99% of those who watch 
television won‟t understand the indicators.” (Dubai, 2011)          
 
Here, it becomes evident that responsibility lies not only with the media, but also with 
development organisations in general, and UN agencies in particular.  White (2004, p.7) 
explains that theories of communication for development are central to empowerment.  
However, in the field of communication for development, most governments and major non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) are not using radio, television, or other media, 
effectively in order to educate rural/village populations and the urban poor, or to provide 
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support for their development.  Why is there so little development in the area of development 
practice?  Whilst there is a tendency to educate people through television programmes, 
according to Nair & White (1993; p. 170), information about development indicators 
available from UN or World Bank reports needs to be written more simply if it is to be 
understood by ordinary people. 
 
Nakhle El Hage, Director of News at Al Arabiya, commented on the same matter:     
 
“This is a great idea and we were in discussion at one stage with the UNDP about it.  
If they have a report, we focus on particular issues and broadcast them in Hewar Al 
Arab or Panorama and present them in a spectacular way.  The idea did not last 
because development organisations are looking for diffusion and the media are 
looking for exclusiveness.  I cannot broadcast an item on my channel that is printed in 
newspapers and spread everywhere.  I care about something that distinguishes me as 
media, so I can get more audience.  I still think it is a great idea to present 
development programmes in an attractive approach.  The problem is that those who 
make these studies are rigid, and their target audiences are limited and already 
knowledgeable about the subject.   We want such stories with images and motions to 
make it look media-like.” (Dubai, 2011)   
 
El Hage‘s response proves that the blueprint for the Arab media is political especially when 
he says that he cannot broadcast development news because it is already ‗spread everywhere‘.  
The same thing happens in political news, which is ‗spread everywhere‘ yet the media makes 
the same news exclusive with its unique editorial line and analysis.  The Arab media have 
always been at the centre of conflicts; some claim these conflicts are framed as East versus 
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West, and others think they are driven by intra-regional conflicts, but in both cases, they are 
politically driven.  As discussed in Chapter 2, ever since the 1950s and 1960s after Arab 
countries gained their independence, Arab media have been highly politicised.       
       
 Jaber thinks the problem lies in a lack of institutions for television scriptwriting in the Arab 
world.  He cited the example of the Norman Lear Center, based at the University of Southern 
California‘s (USC) Annenberg School for Communication.  He said that the main function of 
such institutes is to combine accurate scientific information with entertainment programmes 
so information and entertainment cannot be integrated.  Added to the lack of institutions and 
research centres in the Arab media, Al Rashed pointed out that there is also a shortage of 
skilled professionals and trained staff capable of producing development programmes that 
specialize in local issues.  El Hage said that the Arab media are, in general, uncultured.      
 
Adding to that, Al Rashed stated:  
 
“Attracting an audience depends on the style of programmes‟ presentation.  If you 
broadcast a programme about poverty that preaches to people, you will not get the 
viewers.” (Dubai, 2011) 
  
Alterman, in his analysis of Arab television, describes television predominantly as an 
entertainment medium (2002, p.146).  The pleasure gained from television has been utilised 
in development communication in what is called ‗entertainment-education‘ – the process of 
purposefully devising and distributing a media message to both entertain and educate, in 
order to increase audience knowledge about an educational issue, create favourable attitudes 
and change overt behaviour (Singhal, 1999, p.122).  
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5.3 The Political Economy of the MBC Group   
Sheikh Waleed started MBC in 1991 to provide an Arab alternative to CNN by launching a 
satellite channel that sought to transform Arab television.  One of the main methods that 
Sheikh Waleed uses to run his business is advertising.  One reason for Saleh Kamel‘s 
withdrawal from a partnership with Sheikh Waleed in MBC in 1993 was that the latter 
wanted to run his business with a focus on advertising, while Saleh Kamel was keen on 
generating revenue through subscriptions (Sakr, 2001, pp.12, 78).   
 
Sheikh Waleed‘s explained the positive correlation between viewers‘ loyalty, the advertiser‘s 
trust of the and how it can create a successful channel.  He explained that:  
  
“In the media industry there is no successful media without advertising and this is the 
rule.  Advertising is the basis of profitability for television stations and without the 
financing of advertising, the content cannot be developed; therefore, there cannot be 
a successful private satellite television without advertising.  In terms of the MBC 
Group‟s programmes in general, and those that fall under the term "development 
programmes" in particular, which achieved high ratings and consequently they win 
the confidence of the advertiser.  The result is that such programmes are profitable.  
A successful formula in programming is one that wins the loyalty of the viewer and 
the trust of the advertiser.  This is what all the channels in the MBC Group have 
achieved after a long journey that has extended over more than two decades”.  
(Dubai, 2011)                  
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I asked Sheikh Waleed how a huge media conglomerate, like the MBC Group, covers its cost 
from advertising alone, especially since he had previously stated that there is no independent 
media without financial independence.  He answered:   
 
“If the advertisements are from the advertiser, and the proportion of advertising 
depends on the viewers, so, indirectly, the financier is the viewer.  This rule, of the 
viewer being in control, applies to everything except the subject of the law.  The 
subjects we present must abide by the law.” (Dubai, 2011)    
 
I then probed further and asked how, in instances where the advertising did not cover the 
cost, the financial gap can be covered.  He answered:  
 
“We do not look at profit for each programme individually but as part of a grid.  For 
example, if a programme generates only a small amount of profit, then another 
programme that has lower costs and higher profits will compensate for it.  Usually in 
large firms economies of scale are used and larger production leads to lower average 
production costs.  Also, in economies of scale, they benefit from specialization and 
segmentation of audience through diverse channels like the MBC.” (Dubai, 2011)  
  
Sometimes it is hard to probe more than once or twice in interviews with elites, because there 
are questions that cannot be answered and the interviewer picks up on this from the 
interviewee‘s gestures and body language.  When Sheikh Waleed said ―MBC was not 
profitable when it started.  It was very difficult before it became profitable.  But the goal was 
not to win quick profits, rather to gain people‘s loyalty.  The focus became more on 
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entertainment programmes to attract more viewers, and the network moved to Dubai in 2001 
to reduce costs and to get closer to their audience (Sakr, 2007, p.169).  
 
In my interview with Al Rashed he said Al Arabiya was losing money.   
 
“Al Arabiya is losing money.  Its income from advertisements is eight times more than 
Al Jazeera.  Our income is the highest among news television stations in the Middle 
East.  Even though we are still losing money, we will continue producing development 
programmes as we still want to attract more viewers.  If you make programmes or 
report news that are of public interest and therefore get high ratings, eventually you 
will make money.  We are a free-to-air station.  We are not a cable television station 
like CNN.  There is no revenue from subscribers.  We make money from 
advertisements.  If you have high ratings, you have lots of advertisements.  If you have 
taken on more issues, you will have more viewers.  In theory, high ratings make more 
money.  Covering issues, talking about what matters to people, is supposed to attract 
more advertisers, but not always.” (Dubai, 2011)       
 
Ali Jaber said, at the Annual Arab Media Academics Forum (AMAF), that the cost of Arab 
satellite channels is US $6.5 billion, and the revenue is US $1 billion, thereby running at a 
loss of US $5.5 billion (Al Rakaf, 2011).  The wealthy are paying to make up that shortfall.  
The size of their investment is bigger than any other type of media because the political elites 
think satellite television is the most influential.  
 
Fandy explained that despite some private Arab satellite channels claims that they are 
independent, the state remains a major player in the establishment of private satellite 
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television; it is not solely subject to market forces.  MBC started in 1991 with US $ 300 
million in capital and annual costs of US $ 60 million.  In 2003, the MBC Group launched Al 
Arabiya with US $ 300 million and it remains very far from balancing its costs and revenues.  
Al Arabiya‟s estimated annual outgoings are US $ 70 million, while its revenue from 
advertising is no more than US $ 10 million (Fandy, 2008, p.54).      
 
However, if development programmes can attract more viewers and; therefore, more 
advertisers and eventually greater profit, why are such programmes not on local channels?  
Further, why are these private satellite channels located abroad, rather than in Saudi Arabia.  
Since the government does in fact massively subsidize these private television channels, how 
is it that courageous sensitive subjects and controversial debates are permitted on private 
channels, but rarely on local ones?   
 
Control by Wahhabi clerics and their followers of media content can go far beyond mild 
pressure, and can, in fact, be life threatening in the cases of the fatwa against Sheikh Waleed 
and the death threats issued against Nasser Al Qasabi and his family.          
 
During my meeting with Jaber, he said:  
  
“The difference between Sheikh Al Waleed‟s management and that of state television 
is in what we call “institutional entrepreneurship.  Institutional entrepreneurs handle 
things in different ways.  They draw up their own regulations for the primary 
purposes to attract more viewers.  Sheikh Al Waleed enjoys a larger amount of 
autonomy, but there are limits when it comes to political and religious sensitivity.  His 
main role here is to abide by the rules, but not to the extent that he loses viewers and 
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that is what makes an institutional entrepreneur.  They handle things in different 
ways.  They draw their own regulations.” (London, 2011)                      
 
Gramsci‘s definition of hegemony can be applied to this strategy.  Gramsci stated that 
hegemony presents a constant contradiction between the dominant ideology and the social 
experience of subordination, engendering ideological struggle (Abercrombie et al, 1980, 
p.15).  To reduce this antagonism, most authoritarian regimes garner popular support and 
legitimacy by using a range of tools, such as the media, as the media can be the cultural 
means by which the dominant class gains the consent of the dominated class.  This is 
accomplished by ―the negotiated construction of a political and ideological consensus which 
incorporates both dominant and dominated groups‖ (Strinati, 2004, p.148).  
 
The fact that the media is largely controlled by just a few media moguls, who mostly have 
strong relationships with governments, increases market costs for their competitors, making it 
difficult for them to enter the market and to enlighten the public with their programmes.  This 
can be seen as indirect censorship (Curran, 2002, pp.219, 229).  As a result, the viewer will 
have no option other than to watch channels that are either directly or indirectly controlled by 
the state.   
 
The section below further explores future opportunities in the Arab media, especially after the 
changes that have taken place in the region since the Arab uprisings.   
 
5.4 The MBC Group: Arab Media after the Arab Uprisings    
One of the main issues that I have tried to explore in my interviews with the MBC Group‘s 
officials, particularly because these interviews were conducted during a time of great turmoil 
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in the region, was their perceptions about the future of the Arab media.  The fact that my 
interviews took place at a time of great historical significance in the Arab region, and the fact 
that these uprisings were caused by reasons quite similar to the topics of this study, namely 
issues driven by low development indicators, such as poverty, unemployment and inequality, 
meant the interviewees‘ were enthusiastic.  Responses were varied.  Some were extremely 
optimistic and others were more doubtful about the future. 
  
Sheikh Waleed was quite optimistic about the future of the Arab media after the uprisings.  
He said:    
 
“The map of the media in the Arab world will change.  Media freedom will be greater 
and thus media responsibility will increase.  State constraints will ease up and we 
welcome this.  We have been calling for more freedom for many years.  One of the 
reasons we started out in London was that no Arab country would permit us to launch 
there.  Ten years on, and the laws were relaxed in Dubai at least, so they opened their 
doors to us.  It took that long to return to the Arab world.  It took us another 10 years 
to see the changes that we see now.  I am very optimistic about the future of the Arab 
media.  More action will be taken on youth and development programmes in 
particular.” (Dubai, 2011) 
  
I asked Al Rashed about the prospect for development programmes since the Arab uprisings.  
I told him that the complaints of Arab citizens during the uprisings were not what we usually 
saw in Arab news, we were used to watching news about the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, Iraq 
or terrorism.  However, the uprisings showed us concern abut poverty, unemployment and a 
lack of freedom; issues not usually discussed on these channels.  His said:     
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“[There are]… many reasons [for this].  If you watch multinational television 
stations, such as CNN international rather than domestic versions of CNN, or if you 
take BBC World, rather than BBC1 or BBC2, if you take the Voice of America, if you 
take all these international television stations, they do not cover local news unless it is 
big news.  It is possible, for example, that Al Arabiya is duplicated by CNN local or 
by local news in Saudi Arabia, the UAE or Egypt.  Here, you can focus on local 
issues.  The definition of news differs from category to category, for example, a 
person who has recently been imprisoned, and it is not known whether they have 
committed a crime or not.  Another person is sentenced to two years in prison for 
stealing a chicken.  We don‟t tackle these issues because they are local news.  So now, 
for example, Libya is the biggest news in the world, so we give more dedication, more 
time and more money to cover the news in Libya.  We have five groups working in 
Libya.” (Dubai, 2011)      
 
In this answer we see how Arab news have adopted the Western media‘s techniques in 
political news coverage of giving priority to newness and immediacy, but has been reluctant 
to adopt the Western media‘s reduced focus on hard news in favour of more soft news 
(Mellor, 2005, p. 96).     
 
I asked El Hage why if MBC can challenge the mould of local media, they cannot do the 
same for development programmes.  His answer was:    
 
“Double standards and hypocrisy are obstacles in the Arab world that prevent the 
presentation of these stories, especially in Saudi society.  There is a problem not only 
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with censorship, but with society itself.  Society asks for transparency but cannot 
tolerate the consequences.  We need to be supported in society...Would local culture 
allow me to film rural Saudi women?  I have to get a female presenter and 
camerawoman and this is a task in itself that the Pan Arab media will not bear.” 
(Dubai, 2011)      
 
When El Hage said ―would local culture allow me to film rural Saudi women?‖, I 
remembered my experience with the women of Goz Al Jaafrah, and how the women did not 
allow me to take pictures of them.  I was even told that if I wanted the focus groups to run 
smoothly, I should not take any pictures.  This suggested to me that there need to be changes 
on the ground and the media alone cannot achieve this.     
 
I then asked him about his views on the future of Arab media and whether they can ever be 
fully transparent, especially when it comes to sensitive development issues.  He responded:   
 
“Any media in the hands of governments will not succeed.  The problem is with 
funding.  We are not convinced in the Arab world that instead of having 500 
unprofitable satellite stations it would be better to reduce them to 50 profitable 
satellite stations.  The total advertising budget for all channels is not more than US 
$2 billion; so obviously there need to be subsidies from governments.  There is a 
Lebanese proverb that says: “Who eats from the Sultan‟s bread must use his sword.”  
In order for the media to be accountable they must be free from the government.  We 
should not have a Ministry of Information or National Media Council.  There 
shouldn‟t be licenses authorized by one or two people in order to open a media 
centre.  It shouldn‟t be the case that anyone who has money can open a television 
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station.  Governments shouldn‟t censor the media; on the contrary, media specialists 
are supposed to inspect governments.  I, as a media specialist, am supposed to 
examine institutions, companies, work practices and report everything in the media.   
We, at the MBC Group, were able to follow a certain line of investigation but within 
certain limits and if we ever pass these limits…good bye.  We don‟t want to be killed.”  
(Dubai, 2011)   
 
Afaneh referred to a strategy for how to tackle governments and decision-makers in 
achieving the programming of intrepid ideas and applying untraditional views.  She said:     
 
“You do not want to run into several battles all at once... If you want people to be 
responsive to your views, you have to start with small goals.  If you attacked officials 
by accusing them of being on the wrong path, and that their policies and programmes 
were meeting the United Nation‟s objectives, no one would respond.” (Amman, 2011) 
 
Here, Afaneh and Al Rashed shared the same view about not challenging the existing social 
structure and confronting political power all at once.  The method of communicating 
development should target such powers through the ―negotiated variant‖ of communication 
focusing on smaller scale problems and it does not threaten those in power.  In this way, it 
would be possible to gain support from governments or international development 
organisations (Sparks, 2007, p.72).  
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5.5 Conclusion     
This chapter reveals that there are several challenges facing the Arab media and the private 
satellite channels in particular that are worth being discussed before focusing on the dominant 
top-down approach of the MBC Group in devising development programmes for women.    
 
Dominant ideology exists in many places, which poses a real challenge to private satellite 
channels making progress in producing development programmes, especially for women.  
This was revealed when El Hage expressed the difficulty of filming rural Saudi women, 
requiring a female presenter and camerawoman due to ultra-conservative religious and 
cultural rules, making such filming difficult for Pan Arab media.  I was faced with such a 
difficulty.  Even though I am a Saudi woman, and I conducted an ethnographic study in the 
village, I was not even allowed to take pictures of the women.  There are challenges facing 
the media officials and practitioners, who defy the viewpoints of these clerics and their 
followers in devising programmes that do not match their views.  These can be as dangerous 
as death threats and the fatwas that legitimise killing them, like the fatwa against Sheikh 
Waleed Al Ibrahim and the death threats against Nasser Al Qasabi and his family.      
     
The other dominant power that these private satellite channels face is that of ―political 
capital‖.  Since these channels cannot afford to rely on commercial revenues alone, they are 
controlled by the financial and political support of the state.  This was revealed when Ali 
Jaber said that the cost of Arab satellite channels was US $6.5 billion, but its total revenue is 
only US $1 billion, they are therefore running at a loss of US $5.5 billion.  This suggests that 
the main blueprint for these channels will be political, not developmental.  Due to 
governmental control, the primary goal of these Arab satellite channels is to serve the interest 
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of politicians, not to try to seriously transform Arab media or even to identity the impacts of 
politics on social development, and mainly on women‘s development in the Arab world.         
 
Added to these power challenges is a lack of development data and of skilled professionals in 
the Arab media in general.  According to media officials from the MBC Group, such as 
Abdulrahman Al Rashed and Ali Jaber, there is a need for media research centres and 
institutions for television scripts, in order to gather data and to produce skilled professionals 
who can produce development programmes that combine fact with entertainment to make 
them accurate, comprehensible and enjoyable for the ordinary person.      
 
Since media officials, such as Afaneh and Al Rashed, are in agreement that it is hard to 
challenge the existing social structure and to confront the political elite all at once, 
establishing media research centres and communication institutions, for example, might be 
considered a ―negotiated variant‖, especially in regard to producing development 
programmes that need accurate information and skilled professionals to produce and market 
this information.  The Arab uprisings, brought about mainly by the low development 
indicators such as poverty, unemployment and inequality that add to the turmoil in the region, 
will make production of development programmes that target ordinary citizens, generally, 
and disadvantaged women, particularly, a necessity and not a luxury.    
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Chapter 6 
ANALYSIS OF TELEVISION PROGRAMMES DEALING WITH 
DEVELOPMENT ISSUES 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
“Looking at quantitative and qualitative methods together provides an opportunity to 
think how different methods and techniques can focus on different kinds of meaning.  
This is important to bear in mind while thinking about media texts” (Hesmondhalgh, 
2006, p.121). 
 
This chapter attempts to use the most appropriate method of analysis for television 
programmes in order to know how, and the extent to which programmes on MBC1 and Al 
Arabiya use media initiatives in their coverage of Arab women‘s development issues: namely 
poverty, illiteracy and violence.  The chapter discusses how I have used textual analysis by 
combining quantitative and qualitative methods.  The quantitative method seeks to determine 
what proportion of air time is given to topics relating to poverty, illiteracy and violence 
against Arab women.  It focuses on three programmes on MBC1 — Kalam Nawaim, Tash Ma 
Tash, a Saudi drama series called Al Sakenat fee Golobena and one programme from Al 
Arabiya, — Hewar Al Arab (Arab Dialogue).   The analysis focuses on episodes broadcast 
between 2006 and 2010.  The episodes and sessions selected focused specifically on the 
development of women‘s status issues.   
 
In this chapter, the qualitative method uses critical discourse and semiotic analyses.  Critical 
discourse analysis involves a close examination of language and focuses on Norman 
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Fairclough‘s work around identities and relationships (Ibid, p.150).  Since there are three 
different genres in the study; talk shows, drama and situation comedy, the relationships 
examined are those between hosts, guests, experts and the fictional characters.  A semiotic 
analysis, as viewed by de Saussure, is much broader than linguistics; de Saussure showed 
how language is made up of signs that communicate meaning.  Charles Peirce explained that 
social life is pervaded by messages that contain signs, mostly visual and oral, gestures, dress 
codes, tone of voice and facial expressions, all of which have embedded connotations 
(Bignell, 2002, pp.5, 14).   
 
As this study critiques the dominant ideology through a textual analysis, there will be a 
discussion of the ‗hidden power‘ of scripts (Fairclough, 1989, p.49).  The episodes selected 
for analysis from the three MBC1 programmes, Kalam Nawaim, Tash Ma Tash and Al 
Sakenat fee Golobena, were played during the focus groups.  Conducting focus groups 
around these three programmes gives an extra depth to the textual analysis because it offers 
an insight into the consumer‘s mind-set, which is usually ignored by producers, who usually 
decide for themselves what is to be aired on television (Fairclough, 1989, p.49).  An 
ethnographic approach, combined with focus groups, and in-depth one-to-one interviews has 
meant that the texts have been analysed not merely in line with existing theories, but in the 
light of findings from an actual ethnographic study, one which hopes to generate more 
theories.   
 
6.2 Talk Shows 
This chapter will cover two talk shows:  Kalam Nawaim from MBC1, an entertainment 
channel, and Hewar Al Arab from Al Arabiya, which is a news channel.  Both Kalam 
Nawaim and Hewar Al Arab are daytime talk shows.  Since Kalam Nawaim is a talk show for 
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women on an entertainment channel – it invites ordinary people, experts and celebrities as 
guests, while Hewar Al Arab is a talk show on a news channel, which invites only experts.    
 
6.2.1 Kalam Nawaim (Sweet Talk): is a weekly 60 minutes talk show
17
 for women that 
began in 2002.  The show is produced and broadcast from Beirut, Lebanon.  It discusses 
various issues pertinent to Arab women.  I collected a total of 41 episodes of Kalam Nawaim 
2006-2010 from the MBC Group representing 2460 minutes of television.  Poverty was 
discussed on nine separate segments, totalling 113 minutes in different episodes (4.6% of 
total), violence on 20 separate segments, totalling 200 minutes (8.13%) and education in five 
segments, totalling 30 minutes (1.21%).  The single largest group watching the show in 2010, 
measured by age, were women 25-34 years old, accounting for 12% of the total (MBC Group 
Rating - KSA IPSOS, 2010).  When Kalam Nawaim launched in 2002, it was the only talk 
show on MBC1, so it had no competitors.  After the Arab revolutions in 2011-2012, the MBC 
Group loosened the reins of political and religious power over programming, thus shifting 
programmes‘ focus to serve the public‘s needs.  Al Thamina (8 O‟clock) was created after the 
Arab revolutions, airing on MBC1 in 2012, and it was presented by television host Dawood 
Al Sheryan.  Al Thamina is the first daily Saudi television talk show, addressing everyday 
political, social and economic topics and women‘s issues, such as unemployment, transport, 
the ‗glass ceiling‘ for women in the workplace, etc., with a large degree of freedom and 
entailing bold discussions.  Even though the show only launched in 2012, it quickly achieved 
high ratings and the use of Al Thamina‟s hashtag on Twitter and on its Facebook became 
widespread (MBC.net, 2012).  Mazen Hayek, Director of PR & Commercial of the MBC 
Group, explained that it is difficult to draw comparisons between Kalam Nawaim and Al 
Thamina because one is comparing a daily and a weekly show, broadcast on different week 
                                                 
17
 This excludes the advertising commercials. The DVDs did not include the commercial breaks.   
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nights and time slots, not to mention the different style, treatment, and target audience of the 
shows
18
.  Hayek described Al Thamina as a hard-hitting talk show, while Kalam Nawaim as 
the name suggests, is much less so and is focused on women (Ibid, 2013).  The qualitative 
analysis is conducted on a small sample listed counted above.     
    
There are four presenters on the show: Fawzia Salama, Rania Barghout, Farah Bseso and 
Heba Jamal.  Mona Abu Suleiman left the show in 2008 and was replaced by Heba Jamal.   
 
Fawzia Salama is an Egyptian media and social commentator.  She is a regular writer in 
Sayidaty, a popular weekly – Arabic publication and, a monthly English women's magazine.  
Owned by the Saudi Research and Publishing Company (SRPC) and chaired by Prince Faisal 
bin Salman bin Abdulaziz, Sayidaty is published in both Dubai and Beirut and is distributed 
throughout the Middle East, North Africa, Europe and America.  Salama also has a section in 
Sayidaty where she advises readers with social problems.  She is the oldest presenter and the 
only one who is over weight on Kalam Nawaim.  At 76 years old, she is the most experienced 
in counselling, with people referring to her as ―Mama Fawzia‖.  She studied in England and 
completed a BA degree in English Literature and an MA in Psychology (Awad, 2011, pp.69-
70).  Some at the channel say that Sheik Waleed Al Ibrahim looks up to her due to her age 
and experience (Anonymous source, 2013).  Her relationship with the programme director, 
Samar Al Agroog, is strong, as she reportedly considers Fawzia to be the show‘s backbone.  
Fawzia looks after her appearance and has allegedly tried to rejuvenate her looks through 
using botox, fillers and liposuction (Anonymous source, 2013).  However, she has never 
admitted to this publicly and always speaks out against plastic surgery on the show.  In 
March 2013, Fawzia was diagnosed with pancreatic cancer and has been undergoing chemo-
                                                 
18
 The list can be found in the Appendix, Mazen Hayek (via phone call 2013). 
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therapy.  Staff were shocked by this news, especially as she is the show‘s main presenter.  
Fawzia has been married twice.  She is still married to her second husband and has one 
daughter by her first husband.  
 
Rania Barghout is a Lebanese media specialist and is 44 years old.  She studied media, 
specializing in radio and television.  She started her career presenting entertainment shows 
and was one of the first female presenters to appear on satellite television channels in the 
1990s.  She became famous after presenting the show Ma Yatloboho Al Moshahedon (What 
Viewers Ask For) on MBC (Awad, 2011, pp.69-70).  Some sources at the channel have said 
that after she became famous, she asked the channel to give her a percentage of the 
advertising profits or she would leave (Anonymous source, 2013).  The channel did not agree 
and told her that the MBC creates stars, not the other way around.  She left the MBC to work 
for an Abu Dhabi channel, later returning to MBC1 to present Kalam Nawaim.  Rania 
suffered from depression after her mother died of cancer and her father was murdered in 
Lebanon, which impacted on her work.  Sources at the channel said that these tragedies, 
combined with her being less successful on the Abu Dhabi channel than she had been at 
MBC, led to her husband encouraging her to call MBC and go back to them.  She called 
Sheik Waleed Al Ibrahim, asking to return to the channel, which she did as one of the 
presenters on Kalam Nawaim in 2002.  Rania left the programme in 2011 to present her own 
show, Hatha Ana (This is me) on MBC1.   In this show Rania travelled to several countries to 
meet stars of the Arab world to shed light on their personal lives.  According to some sources 
at the MBC, the show was not a success and some critics said that Rania had not developed a 
strong style after all these years and her questions to the guests were quite shallow, which 
does not fit with someone of her experience.  Rania then returned to Kalam Nawaim in 2012.  
She was divorced in 2011 and has two daughters.     
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Farah Bseso is a 43 year old Syrian actress, originally from Palestine.  Before starting as a 
presenter on Kalam Nawaim in 2002, she presented on Orbit for three months before moving 
to the MBC. She has a diploma in acting from Syria (Awad, 2011, pp.69-70).  Farah has had 
a difficult time.  Her family had to flee Kuwait after the Iraq war in 1991 because being of 
Palestinian origin, they were seen as being loyal to Saddam Hussein.  They moved to Jordan, 
where she missed out on education, finally settling in Syria, where she married an Egyptian 
(MEBJ, 2007, p.37).  However, she does not reveal these past traumas on screen.  Sources at 
the channel said that she has been criticized for a poor line of questioning on the show 
(Anonymous source, 2013).  People see her as an actress rather than a presenter and they 
think that her outfits are quite revealing for a talk show aimed at Arab families.  Farah is 
married and has two daughters.     
 
Mona Abu Suleiman is 40 years old and was the first female Saudi presenter to appear on 
Arab satellite television, as a presenter on Kalam Nawaem.  She was selected as a United 
Nations Goodwill Ambassador in Saudi Arabia and lectures at King Saud University (Awad 
2011, pp.69-70).  Abu Suleiman said in an interview that she is not interested in tackling 
issues that are not ‗religiously or socially acceptable in the Arab world‘.  She said that her 
purpose on TV was to ‗point out to people what is or what isn‘t socially acceptable, not just 
for me, because my opinion counts but it‘s also what society agrees upon‘ (MEBJ, 2007, 
p.38).  Sources at the channel have said that her main drawbacks are her voice, which is 
described as annoying, and her presentation on the cases and topics is not clear (Anonymous 
source, 2013).  She has since left Kalam Nawaem and now works as the Executive Director 
for Strategic Studies at Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal‘s Kingdom Holding Company.  Abu 
Suleiman is divorced and has two daughters.     
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Heba Jamal was 21 years old when she joined Kalam Nawaim in 2007 after Mona Abu 
Suliman left the programme.  Heba had not achieved her Bachelor degree when she joined 
the programme and then she got her degrees after joining the show.  She has a BA in English 
Literature from King Abdul Aziz University in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and an MA in Media 
Marketing from England (Awad, 2011, pp.69-70).  Heba‘s professional experience before 
joining the programme was in fashion design.  She was the manager of her mother‘s tailoring 
company and had two fashion certificates from Italy and England.   She was interviewed in 
2006 in Kalam Nawaim as a guest discussing her experience as a young fashion designer.  
After Mona left the show the channel was looking for a young Saudi presenter in order to 
have more variety in the presenters‘ ages.  Heba was chosen not only because of her age and 
nationality but also because when she was interviewed on Kalam Nawaim she was deemed 
photogenic and well-spoken.  Sources at the channel have said that Saudis do not see her as 
looking typically Saudi, since she has quite fair skin and her features are not archetypally 
Arab (Anonymous source, 2013).  They think she does not represent Saudi women, which 
might be because she is half Turkish.  Heba was single when she joined the programme and 
in 2011 married to Nasser Al-Sarami, a media manager at the Al Arabiya satellite channel.      
 
The episodes below have only the years without the days and months because this is how the 
DVDs were labelled when I collected them from the MBC Group.  I carried out the 
transcription and translation myself. 
      
Episode No. 174 (2006)  
In this episode, the topic of poverty was covered in the viewers‘ letters, which comes at the 
end of the show.  A letter was sent in from a 25 year old Tunisian woman who had graduated 
in fashion design and could not find a job.  Her family‘s income is low and she suffers 
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physical and verbal abuse from her parents and brothers, who treat her as a ‗loser‘.  She is 
unmarried and unemployed.  The treatment of her letter and situation lasted four minutes.      
  
Fawzia: I was touched by her problem, but unemployment is not an excuse to give up.  We 
choose to work, but do not choose our families.  We must live with them so life goes on.  
Since your degree is in fashion design I advise you to set up your own business.   
Farah: You can sell your products to retailers.   
Rania:  You can sell your products to your neighbours.     
Fawzia (carelessly): I suggest that she specializes in making clothes for overweight, short 
women like me.   
Farah:  Family is family; don‘t be upset by them.  Your mother may adore you, but perhaps 
she is unable to show her feelings.    
Rania:  You could talk to your parents.  You could say to them, ‗I live in this house but I feel 
like I do not exist‘.     
Fawzia (sternly): You must take into account that everybody in your family is under 
pressure, not just you.  
Mona: I advise anyone who is unemployed to start volunteering in organizations for orphans 
and disabled children, as they are in need of compassion.  Or to take care of the elderly who 
have been abandoned by their own children.  If a person does not give something to society 
through work, he/she can help morally until God blesses them with employment.    
Fawzia (responding to Mona with surprise):  The girl‘s financial situation is very bad and 
she needs money for transport and clothes   
Mona: She can help the poor who live inside her building.    
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Some critics say that offering therapy in talk shows can be dangerous, owing to the hosts‘ 
lack of qualifications and experience.  ―They may take on the role of a caring parent, an 
understanding friend, a knowledgeable therapist.  They may not have the credentials to give 
professional advice, but they do so freely‖ (Day, 1996, p.48).  The presenters‘ advice, here in 
Kalam Nawaim, did not help the viewer.  When they suggested   to her that she could sew her 
own dresses for clients, or sell her products to shops or her neighbours, it showed how they 
lacked any understanding of the woman‘s situation, a prime feature of which was lack of 
income.  Fawzia‘s suggestion to make dresses for those who are overweight like her was 
flippant, and showed a complete lack of sympathy for the woman‘s painful experiences.  
First, the woman is a fashion designer, not a tailor, and even if she were one, she would need 
equipment and tools in order to make clothes, which she would not be able to afford.  Mona‘s 
answer seems extremely far removed from what the woman actually needs.  She needs 
money, yet Mona‘s advice was that she should find a volunteer role, which is highly 
unrealistic.  The irony is that Fawzia‘s objection to Mona‘s suggestion that the woman get a 
voluntary job was no less inappropriate than her own advice, that the woman makes dresses 
for overweight women.  The woman complained in her letter of experiencing verbal and 
physical at her family‘s hands, yet the presenters tried to find justifications for the abuse.   
 
In daytime women‘s talk shows in other settings, the hostsare usually expected to be warm 
and sympathetic towards participants.  They offer opportunities for people to educate 
themselves by sharing their problems with the general public, as well as a chance to be on 
television (GUN, 2006, p.38, 39).  However, having examined the comments and responses 
of the Kalam Nawaim presenters, it is evident that talk show hosts are not always warm and 
sympathetic.    
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Episode No. 182 (2006) 
This was a segment that discussed women who had experienced violence at the hands of their 
husbands.  It began with a field report about a centre called Hope City in the UAE.  The head 
of the centre, Shahla (Sharla) Musabbah, is originally from the US, but married a man from 
the UAE.  The segment lasted eight minutes and was in the middle of the show.      
 
Farah introducing the centre: Sometimes, if we are not able to solve a problem we must at 
least mitigate its consequences.  That‘s what Shahla Musabbah, an American lady married to 
a man from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) did.  After spending twenty years of her life in 
the UAE, she recognized the problems facing women; in particular that the law does not offer 
them adequate protection.  As a result, she established a safe haven for those women and she 
called it Hope City.  She explained what this city does, how it helps women and how men 
have reacted to it.  Kalam Nawaim has made a field report about this humanitarian centre.  
Let‘s watch it now.    
Shahla: I currently run a successful shelter for women in crisis with a group of good friends 
and it is my pleasure to be here.  My friend and I have lived here for many years.  We used to 
do fund-raisers for a range of different causes, raising money for things such as kidney 
transplants or school fees for those who couldn‘t afford them.  In 2001, my good friend Leena 
found a villa and we established Hope City.       
Abused woman and a resident in the centre:  I live in the UAE, but I am an Iranian Arab
19
.  
I experienced problems with my husband.  Whenever I run away, he calls the police.  They 
tell me I should return to him, because he is my husband.  He beats me a lot.  I always go to 
the police, but they return me to my husband.  Going through the courts takes a long time.  
                                                 
19
 Iranian Arabs are the Arab and/or Arabic-speaking peoples of Iran.  Most Iranian Arabs live in the coastal 
regions of southern Iran by the Persian Gulf. 
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[Then the guest says, with tears in her eyes] where will I go with my children?  I finally got a 
divorce from the court with the help of Sharla and the centre.     
  
After this report, Farah introduced the story of a woman called Samira from Jordan who was 
invited onto the show because she had been physically abused by her husband.  For her 
protection the show hid her identity by concealing her face and changing her voice.    
 
Farah: Allow me to welcome Ms. Samira.  We know that you were physically abused by 
your husband.  Would you give us a brief description of your life and your story?  How many 
children do you have, and for how long have you been married?  Why does your husband 
beat you, and what exactly does he do to you?     
Samira: Firstly, I want to thank the programme, as they have given me the opportunity to 
speak out.  I could not find any such programme to help in Jordan.  I have been married for 
11 years and I have four sons and one daughter.  My husband works in the military.  He has 
this military mentality of issuing commands and treating me as if I am not a human being.  
He verbally abuses me and my children and he beats me severely.  My father used to tell me 
whenever I complained to him that we won‘t accept women getting divorced in the family.  I 
tried on numerous occasions to talk to my husband and to try to fix things, but he continued 
to beat me on my head, eyes and fingers.  He used to extinguish cigarettes on my body, and 
has even tried to shoot me.  One day, I was doing the groceries and on my way home, he 
began to beat me and took off my head scarf.   
Hala Al-Nasser (Editor in Chief of Rotana, a substitute in this episode for Mona Abu 
Suleiman):  Some women are unable to challenge men‘s abuse and after a certain period of 
time the men get used to abusing them and it becomes difficult to change them.  You have 
not resisted this abuse for 11 years.   It will be difficult to change your husband now.   
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Rania: When he treated you cruelly, did you try to calm him down and tell him that you love 
him and would love to live with him in peace?  
Samira: I tried, but without any change.    
Farah: Did you try to get a job?  
Samira: It is hard for me to work because I have small children, in fact, my brother is paying 
my expenses.    
Fawzia (disdainfully):  It was clear that this man had aggressive tendencies, so why did you 
have five children with him?    
Samira:  I tried to get closer to him and I had hoped that he would change one day.    
Rania: I am sure that the agencies responsible for such cases in Jordan have heard your story 
and we hope that you receive assistance.     
 
In this session, no link was made between the report and the discussion with the abused 
studio guest.  The report discussed the centre that helps abused women to exercise their rights 
in the UAE, while the studio guest was an abused woman from Jordan.  The hosts did not 
discuss the laws against women that are enforced by judges and the police, which were 
mentioned in the report.  They did not question why the woman in the report had to go to 
such a centre for help while the authorities did not protect her.  What if such a centre did not 
exist?  Does that mean that women will never be able to get divorced and will be at the mercy 
of these biased laws and their violent husbands?  This is exactly what the disadvantaged 
women in Goz Al Jaafarh told me in the focus groups (Chapter 7): that television 
programmes present unrealistic solutions and offer unsympathetic feedback to women in 
need.    
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The hosts offered neither emotional support nor solutions to the studio guests‘ predicaments.  
Their responses blamed the woman for being silent about her abuse all of these years and 
questioned whether she had been sufficiently persistent in trying to discuss these problems 
with her husband.  Fawzia‘s question, ―why did you have five children?‖ shows the host to be 
condescending and lacking in emotion and empathy.   
    
Grindstaff (2002) explains that in talk shows it is not only what ordinary people talk about 
that is important, but how they talk about it.  Ordinary people are expected not only to discuss 
personal matters, but to do so in a particular way.  They are expected to deliver the ―money 
shot‖ of the talk show through, showing sorrow, rage, and tears.  A hallmark of the talk show 
genre is the equal importance given to the moment when the tears fall from a woman‘s eyes 
and her voice shakes in sadness and pain, as to the details given by the woman describing her 
husband‘s physical and verbal abuse.  This offers ‗authenticity,‘ but has also given talk shows 
their bad reputation for exploiting guests‘ hardships (Grindstaff, 2002, p.19).  Elayne 
Rapping, a popular culture and social issues critic, says that talk shows ―allow women to 
voice their opinions, to argue, and to express emotion.  But women are not encouraged to 
actively work for change‖ (Day, 1996, p.51).   
 
Episode No. 201 (2007) 
Farah started the episode with the story of a Saudi woman being abused by her husband, who 
was complaining about her suffering on one of the satellite channels.  Her husband called the 
show and divorced her live on air.  Farah then said that she hoped something like that would 
not happen on their show.  This segment lasted two minutes.    
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Fawzia: We like to let people get married on air, but not to get divorced.  Our Arab and 
Islamic culture says that when there is a disagreement between husband and wife, there 
should be a relative from the wife‘s family and one relative from the husband‘s family 
present.  Problems should not be broadcast on television.    
Rania Mohamed (A Saudi radio host who was substituting for Mona):  The wife could have 
presented her problems without mentioning names.   
Fawzia: There was a bride from Jordan and, on her wedding day, the groom accidently 
poured juice down her wedding dress, and she said to him ―You donkey‖.  The groom then 
took the microphone and said to the guests that he would be divorcing his bride, whom he 
had married just five minutes before, because she had called him a ―donkey‖, saying he did 
not think she would want to marry a ―donkey‖ like him.  The point of the story is that 
problems should be solved within the family and not in public.   
Rania (responding angrily to the other presenters):  Our programme is on air and is 
targeted at Arab women who should stand up for their rights and speak out. If someone tells 
me I am turning Arab women against their husbands, I say I am not, but that women must not 
tolerate their rights being compromised.  If a woman lives in fear of society, of her husband, 
her father and her brother, her situation will never improve.    
Farah (smiling to the camera):  Arab women are afraid of even saying their name  
 
None of the hosts‘ responses explain why husbands have the right to divorce their wives at 
anytime without any rights to protect women.  Fawzia‘s response seems extremely biased in 
favour of the husband.  She even contradicts herself and the main purpose of the show when 
she says that ―problems should not be aired on television‖.  It is as if she is saying that all 
guests who come onto Kalam Nawaim are not being respectful, because they are talking 
about their problems in public.  Even though the presenters on Kalam Nawaim have 
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experienced divorce, Fawzia, for example, has never thought to draw on her own personal 
suffering on air to show solidarity with those women who have endured similar experiences.  
Usually in popular talk shows such as the Oprah Winfreys Show, we see the host, in this case 
Oprah, appealing to the audience by discussing her own sufferings and experience as they 
relate to the show‘s topic (Day, 1996, p.50).  This sense of solidarity between host and 
participants, brought about by the former sharing their own experiences, is absent on Kalam 
Nawaim.      
 
The same episode also talked about a case of incest in a segment lasting 14 minutes.    
Rania: I was shocked when I read that there are 50 cases of pregnancies in Saudi Arabia due 
to incest and that these are only the officially registered ones.  This figure conceals the 
thousands of incidents of sexual harassment and incest that go unreported.  There is no doubt 
that there are similar cases in other Arab countries, and since our programme seeks to dispel 
fallacies and falsehood, the programme team investigated the prevalence of incest and has 
unearthed some touching testimonies.  Watch this report.    
A Saudi girl (hair and face completely veiled and her voice spoken by an actress):  My 
father took me to live with one of his wives.  One day at around 3 a.m., my half-brother came 
into my room while I was sleeping and started to take off my clothes and urinate on me.  
When I woke up, I escaped but he said that if I told anyone what happened, it would be me 
that would be blamed.  I told my step-mother about the incident, but her son caught me.  He 
took me to the yard and started beating me, pulling my hair and standing on my stomach.  
Then he locked me in the bathroom for three days without food or drink.  When my father 
learned what had happened, he hit me and locked me in the basement.  I went to a psychiatrist 
and suffered from schizophrenia, severe depression and was constantly crying, and I tried to 
commit suicide on three occasions.  I am still receiving treatment for the injuries to my skull 
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caused by the beating, and I also have burns on my back.  I stayed in the Women‘s Protective 
Centre for three months.        
The girl’s mother (hair and face completely veiled):  My daughter is still undergoing 
physical and psychological treatment.  She has been unable to study.  I tried to give her hope, 
but unfortunately I was unable.  It is difficult to play the role of mother and father.  I need 
your help and guidance.  I have not been able to offer my daughters the safety and stability 
they need.     
 
The show invited two experts to discuss the matter: Suleiman Al Sonea, a legal advisor and 
founding member of the Society for the Protection of the Saudi Family, and Rania Mansour, 
a social development specialist from Lebanon.  
Rania Barghout: We read about the 50 cases, but do you have official figures on incest?  
Are there a lot of unreported cases?  
Suleiman:  There is a problem with statistics in the Arab world.  They are not in the public 
domain.  I cannot tell you the real number.  In general, the number of cases does not usually 
exceed 200 or 150 cases annually.  The numbers are not high, but even one case of incest 
should be disclosed and addressed.  
Farah: Are the victims mostly young adults or teenagers? 
Suleiman:  Most of the time; the victims are young children.    
Fawzia: Having discussed this matter on the show, will that comfort the perpetrators that 
they are not the only ones who do this?  Who is responsible, in your opinion, for sowing the 
seeds of evil? 
Suleiman:   In my opinion, the one who is responsible is the victim, because staying silent 
means the offender can continue abusing them.    
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Rania Mohammed (Saudi actress, a substitute in this episode for Mona Abu Suleiman): 
What if the victim were a little girl, and the offender is the father or her brother?  
Suleiman: The victim has to confess to her mother.    
Rania Mohammed: This does not mean that we‘re saying that the victim is responsible for 
what is happening to her.   
Suleiman:   Even if she is a child, she must talk.    
Rania Mohammed: There must be someone who is more responsible.     
Farah (turning to Rania Mansour): What kind of cases do you have in your centre, and 
how do you treat them?   
Rania Mansour: This is a big problem, and I disagree with Dr. Suleiman that the victim is 
responsible.  In this case, we are making her a victim twice over.  The victim is often a small 
child who has gotten used to the routine of sexual abuse.  We also have cases of death threats 
and when the child confesses to her mother, the topic is undeclared for fear of  scandal.  This 
is a big problem, and it needs individual, social and psychological follow-up by a specialist. 
Rania Barghout: How can I recognize a child victim and distinguish him/her from other 
children? 
Suleiman: Some cases care easy to spot because of symptoms, such as children isolating 
themselves and being afraid of any movement by another person. 
Farah (addressing Rania Mansour): What can you do in your centre?    
Rania Mansour: One girl was abused by her father. She asked for help from her neighbour 
who advised that she go to the police and then to the courts.  In this case the family tried to 
cover up the matter for fear of scandal, because they come from a conservative Lebanese 
village.  The family accused the daughter of insanity and forced her to stay in a mental clinic.  
The girl ran away and ended up on the street, where she was exploited by pimps who often 
take advantage of girls in such circumstances.  She was only 11 years old.  She does not 
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know the meaning of a sexual relationship, but fell into prostitution.  She eventually came to 
the centre and was treated.  She is now married, has had a child and is pregnant with her 
second.  But she is still undergoing psychological treatment and has now become more 
normal.     
Rania Barghout (turning to Suleiman): If someone watching now is the victim of incest, 
what would you advise him/her?    
Suleiman:  I say to everyone watching this programme that she is not alone, and that we are 
with them.  
Rania: What if the person is afraid to talk?  
Suleiman:  This is a strictly confidential.  We do not look to defame individuals. 
Rania Mansour (immediately):  Centres are not able to deal with each and every case.  
That‘s why we encourage the victim to speak to her relatives and if she cannot reach out to 
her mother, she should seek help from an uncle, or other relative or close friend, else she will 
suffer in silence for many years to come.   
Farah: Thank you for coming and we hope things improve.   
 
The report touched on the very serious and sensitive crime of incest, but no link was made 
between the discussion in the studio and the report.  Even though the girl in the report 
explained the pain and distress she suffered in her family and how she had asked her step-
mother for help, neither the hosts nor the expert related their discussion to the girl‘s situation.  
This is yet another example of the hosts‘ inability to connect with the participant‘s suffering.  
By contrast, in her show, Oprah Winfreys not only puts relevant questions to participants, but 
also draws on her own experience of rape and sexual abuse in her family at the age of nine.  
She explains to a victim of incest in their childhood how her own experiences of incest and 
sexual abuse left her confused, humiliated and angry.  In 1992, she narrated a powerful 
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documentary on the subject that was aired on the three major commercial networks and PBS 
(Timberg, 2002, p.135).   
 
Fawzia‘s question to one of the experts not only shows her failure to connect with the 
participant‘s suffering in the report, but also her misunderstanding of the whole case.  This is 
revealed in her statement, asking if ―bringing up this matter will comfort perpetrators because 
it makes them feel that they are not the only ones who do this‖.  This might be true if the 
participant were the offender, not the victim.  In what way, can a victim confessing her 
suffering from incest justify such behaviour?  Usually, talk shows hosts reveal some of their 
own personal experiences, bestowing intimacy on the show, which is what makes the genre 
so appealing.  Talk shows locate the hosts within a framework that is conducive to their 
displaying warm and sympathetic behaviours towards participants (Verwey, 1990, p.239).  
Such characteristics are not in evidence among the hosts of Kalam Nawaim.   
 
Episode No. 293 (2009)  
This segment, about a child injured by a teacher, lasted 5 minutes.   
Farah:  There was an incident that took place in one of the Arab countries, where the teacher 
beat a girl with a broken leg, which led to paralysis.  The school decided to punish the teacher 
only by deducting five days from the teacher‘s salary, as if the matter were a minor offense 
not a crime against an innocent child.  Before we discuss this topic, the programme asked the 
views of the public on beating children at schools.   
Participant 1:  Any respectable school should not allow teachers to beat students.  If there is 
a problem, the school must send a letter to the parents so they can decide what course of 
action is needed.   
Participant 2: This is wrong.  The problem is with the teacher.   
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Participant 3: The father must go to the principal and learn what the cause of the conflict 
was; whether it is his son‘s or the teacher‘s fault.    
Participant 4:  If the teacher dared to hit my son, I would hit him back.    
Participant 5:  If someone hit my children at school, I would simply take my children to 
another school.    
Participant 6:  I would check with the teacher and ask why they were beaten.  
Participant 7:  Beating should not be allowed.  If parents do not beat their children, why 
does the school allow it?  
Farah: I cannot forget, how when I was at school, the end of the iron ruler was used by the 
teacher to jab the hand of the students.  But there are many kinds of schools.  My four-year 
old daughter‘s school asked parents not to leave their children late at school.  When we 
moved to a remote area, there were no buses provided by the school there.  My husband 
contacted the school administrator and asked them why they did not provide buses yet asked 
parents not to leave their children at school after hours.  The school principal called us and 
said buses would be available in our area.  I respect such schools; they deserve any amount of 
money you pay them.    
Rania: This school that you talk about used an iron ruler to hit students a long time ago, but 
education has changed now.  The problem with the teacher who hit the student is that there 
are no laws on violence against children in schools. When there is a law prohibiting teachers 
from hitting students then teachers will stop.    
Fawzia (confusedly questioning both Rania and Farah, raising her voice and 
gesticulating in a way that draws attention to her diamond earrings, as well as a large 
diamond and pearl ring on her right hand and smaller diamond ring on the left):  What 
do we want from the teacher?  The school has already deducted five days‘ salary.  Do you 
want to destroy the teacher‘s future?  
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Rania and Farah (responding immediately):  But the student was paralysed.   
Fawzia (surprised):  Really, paralysed?  If this is the case, that‘s different.  But some 
schools treat teachers badly, their salaries are low and the size of the student body prevents 
teachers from doing their jobs properly.    
Rania: Does that mean teachers have to avenge themselves on students?   
Fawzia: No, but we must improve conditions in the classroom, limit the number of students 
in classrooms, increase the number of better qualified teachers, and then we can introduce 
penalties for teachers‘ misdemeanours.     
Heba: I remember when I was at school there was teacher who lowered grades, punished 
students and more importantly verbally abused students, which is worse than physical abuse 
because it causes psychological damage and leaves painful memories.    
Fawzia (responding to Heba as if talking to her young daughter): Listen, Heba, there are 
girls who are badly behaved and have been brought up badly.    
Rania (assertively):  Violence is unacceptable, whether it is against children, wives or girls.   
   
Both Farah‘s and Fawzia‘s answers here offer no support to the injured girl.  Farah shows 
sympathy but her rather long anecdote about her daughter‘s school is irrelevant.  The 
disadvantaged girls of Goz Al Jaafarh felt that Farah‘s example of students‘ good treatment at 
her daughter‘s expensive private school was not relevant for those who cannot afford such 
schools (Chapter 7).  Usually, on popular talk shows we see the host discussing her own 
suffering and experience, relating it to the show‘s topic so as to demonstrate solidarity with 
the participants (Day, 1996, p. 50), but this is not the case on Kalam Nawaim.  At no point 
did she focus on her own traumatic experience as a Palestinian, who had been denied an 
education in Jordan, to show solidarity with the abused student.   
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Fawzia‘s comments are not only insensitive and irrelevant, but revealed that she was either 
not concentrating or not fully prepared.  This is demonstrated by her being surprised that the 
student was paralysed.  Vicki Abt, Professor of Sociology and American Studies at Penn 
State Ogontz, explained that talk show hosts play the roles of ―knowing therapists, but they 
may not have the professional credentials to give advice‖.  She also says that the ―therapy 
provided by talk shows ignores the need for knowing a patient‘s history‖ (Day, 1996, p.48).    
 
In addition, Fawzia‘s voice,  appearance and body language signified arrogance and luxury, 
and it showed a complete lack of sympathy and understanding for the sad case of the poor 
abused student.  In semiotics, which is the study of signs, there are denotations and 
connotations and there is an important distinction between the two.  Denotation looks at the 
visual sign and connotation is what that represents (Gripsrud, 2006, p.17).  Fawzia‘s clothes 
and jewellery connote arrogance, luxury, selfishness and a lack of sympathy for the victim.  
The disadvantaged women in my focus groups were extremely irritated by her responses; so 
much so that when they stepped out of the room they were all murmuring angrily about her 
comments (See Chapter 7).      
  
When Fawzia addressed Heba, her tone of voice and facial expression connoted that she was 
using her age as a weapon, asserting herself as a mother figure among the younger presenters, 
to push her point and idea.   
   
The same episode contained another segment that lasted for 15 minutes, about female 
students at the Royal Aviation Academy in Jordan.  In it, Heba interviewed Yasmine Al  
Memana, a student from Saudi Arabia.     
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Heba: From Jordan, Kalam Nawaim visits the Royal Aviation Academy where the rank of 
captain is no longer exclusively for men, because women have proven they are worthy of this 
title.  (Turning to Yasmine):  What made you choose this major?     
Yasmine: I have wanted to do this major since I was little, and my family encouraged me to 
go for it  
Heba: How long have you been in the Academy?   
Yasmine:  I have been there for one year.  I came here after I graduated from high school and 
then I registered with this Academy straight away, because it is the best in the Middle East. 
Heba: Which stage are you at?   
Yasmine: I can now fly an airplane, and I will graduate in five months.   
Heba: Will you pursue this as a profession, or as a hobby?   
Yasmine: Definitely as a profession.   
 
Then Heba interviewed the Head of the Royal Aviation Academy.   
 
Heba‘s introductory statement that the rank of captain is no longer exclusive to men suggests 
Saudi society is more permissive than it is.  The segment did not explain why such majors are 
not allowed to be taught to women in Saudi Arabia, or what the future of Saudi girls who 
graduate from this Academy in Jordan is when they cannot be employed in their own country.  
Since Heba interviewed a Saudi woman who will graduate from the Academy, it is more 
logical to interview a Saudi official to understand the reasons behind prohibiting such majors 
and employment in this field for women in Saudi Arabia, rather than interviewing the Head 
of the Royal Aviation Academy in Jordon.   
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Episode No.  316 (2010) 
This segment covered the story of Saeeda Zenani, a 16-year old illiterate Saudi girl who had 
been locked inside her home, where her father and step mother beat her severely, and tortured 
her by stabbing and burning her.  Her step-mother had been doing this to Saeeda since she 
was six years old.  This session interviewed Saeeda and Saud Al Shammari, a Saudi human 
rights activist and a specialist in Islamic studies, after which Rayan Abdulrhaman, a legal 
adviser and lawyer joined the show.  This segment lasted 20 minutes and was at the 
beginning of the show.  Saeeda and Rayan were interviewed via satellite and Saud was 
interviewed in the studio.        
Farah: You were in the Women‘s Protective Centre, were you treated fairly there?    
Saeeda: The treatment of women in the Centre in Jeddah is appalling.  The supervisors beat 
and threaten the girls, which makes me even more afraid.   
Saud:  Saeeda‘s case is not the only one like this.  This is a phenomenon that has spread 
throughout Saudi society due to the country‘s cultural and religious heritage.  Our society is 
extremely patriarchal and religious.  As a result, women have been marginalised and are 
viewed as obedient servants in the home.  There are no harsh penalties for violence against 
women and women‘s protection is down to the family to provide.   
Rania: How are you going to change these laws?   
Saud: I speak as a human rights activist.  I have received several phone calls from officials 
urging me not to come onto this show and speak about this subject.  Officials asked me to call 
them privately and not to go on television.  I tell them sorry I do not have one case, two or 
ten, but I have dozens of cases, and the only way to bring about change is through the media, 
to bring people together and thus force decision-makers to act.    
Fawzia: You say that Saudi society is patriarchal, but the criminal in Saeeda‘s case is the 
step-mother.   
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Saud: We all share responsibility, the families and society.  There are a lot of children who 
are tortured and killed by their step-mothers but no law has been adopted by the Saudi 
Government to deter those who have power over children, such as fathers and the family.    
Heba:  Saudi Arabia is a country of benevolence and there are many officials concerned that 
everybody does not suffer.  Who is responsible in Saeeda‘s case?   
Saud:  Saudi culture is responsible.  When a case like Saeeda‘s reaches the police, the 
guardian of the victim is asked to come, and after signing the pledge, the victim is returned to 
the family and nothing changes.  Saeeda has been to the Women‘s Protective Centre, why 
does she not have an identity card and a social security number?  The Ministry of Social 
Affairs has the largest budget in Saudi Arabia, larger than that of the Ministry of Defence, 
and it is responsible for providing housing, care and support. We have all of these rights in 
our system.  The problem lies with uncaring officials and bureaucracy. Whenever we demand 
the rights of those who are in need, we are faced with reproach and denial. 
Fawzia:  What would you like to say to your father?   
Saeeda:  If you had treated me well, as you do my siblings, and cared about me, I wouldn‘t 
be here now.  I didn‘t come onto television to defame you, but you have brought this upon 
yourself.   
Fawzia: We want you to say a few words to King Abdullah.   
Saeeda:  I say to the King that I need help, because I am a Saudi citizen.  I have a daughter 
who also needs protection.  I spent my life on the street, and I don‘t want my daughter to 
suffer as I did.   
 
In this segment, Fawzia‘s shallow questions left all the important issues, including the causes 
of Saeeda‘s hardship and suffering, such as the impact of polygamy on families, and the 
Saudi law that denies divorced mothers custody of their children after the age of 10.  By 
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asking Saeeda what she would like to say to King Abdullah, Fawzia reduced these issues 
from wider social ones to the personal situation of a single individual.  Hosts on women‘s 
talk shows tend to conceal the nature of problems endemic in society (Abt & Seesholtz, 1994, 
p.177).  Talk shows here give abused people a voice, but only a limited voice, and only 
according to certain values.   
 
Episode No.  318 (2010) 
The segment here discussed women‘s rights in Islam and false interpretations of the Qur‘an 
in verses relating to women.  The show interviewed Suhaila Zain Al Abdeen, a specialist in 
Islamic history and a member of Saudi Arabia‘s National Human Rights Society, and Sheikh 
Abdullah Al Jefn, a specialist in Islamic studies. Al Abdeen was interviewed in the studio in 
Beirut, while Al Jefn was interviewed via satellite from Jeddah.  The session lasted for 26 
minutes, and was at the beginning of the show.     
   
Farah (asking Suhaila with surprise): What is this new theory of yours about the different 
interpretations of a woman‘s status in Islam? 
Suhaila (dressed in head scarf and abaya (black cloak)):  Firstly, this is not a theory but 
rather a correction of the current Islamic discourse rooted in false interpretations of the 
Qur‘anic verses and prophetic sayings concerning women as well as fiqh provisions that have 
been based on fabricated or weak prophetic sayings.   
Farah: Can you explain a little more?  
Suhaila: There is no verse in the Qur‘an that says a wife should obey her husband.  I did a 
study and went through all the prophetic sayings relating to a wife‘s obedience to her 
husband and her going out without his permission.  These sayings proved to be weak and 
fabricated. 
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Fawzia (her hair uncovered and her sparkling blouse revealing her bare forearms):  
One verse in the Qur‘an says “Men are women‟s providers because Allah has created some 
of them to excel above others and because they pay for their shelter.”  This means that men 
are better than women, because they are paying for them.    
Suhaila: This is a misconception, unfortunately.  The meaning of ―Kawam” is the servant 
who is responsible for serving his woman and children and not the commander, as some 
scholars have interpreted.  Ibn Tabari, for example, interprets “Al Kawama” as sovereignty 
over a woman; that a man should discipline her through beating if she does not follow the 
principles of Islam.  As if they are saying women disobey God and that they need discipline, 
while men are perfect, and never commit any sins and are always obedient to God.            
Heba (asking Abdullah, apparently confused by Suhaila’s comments): We want to know 
what you think about this interpretation.  These are things that I am hearing about for the first 
time, although I have read about these matters.    
Abdullah (directing himself mainly to Suhaila, and adopting a preaching mode in the 
use of his hands and voice, while the camera lingers on Suhaila’s obviously resentful 
expression):  Suhaila must learn that woman was created from man and this is clear in the 
verse: “And one of His signs is that He created mates for you from yourselves that you may 
find rest in them, and He put between you love and compassion.”  It is women‘s destiny to be 
part of men and thus it is sin if a man does not respect a woman‘s rights.  He is considered an 
oppressor because she is part of him.  We all agree that a woman is from a different world to 
that of a man.  This is according to the verse: “The male shall have the equal of the portion of 
two females”, which means that women receive half the amount of inheritance that men do, 
and their testimony in court is worth half that of a man.  This is written in the verse:  “And 
call in to witness from among your men two witnesses; but if there are not two men, then one 
man and two women from among those whom you choose to be witnesses”.  This is not to 
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undermine women‘s rights.  Women are also not allowed to go for Jihad due to their feminine 
nature, because they need to be protected like a pearl from becoming masculine.    
Suhaila (responding with a confident smile, despite Abdullah’s shouted interruptions): 
What the Sheikh says proves that misconceptions are prevalent.  This verse: “The male shall 
have the equal of the portion of two females” should not be generalised to all cases of 
inheritance.  There are cases of women inheriting the same amount as men, and sometimes 
they inherit more, and there are also cases where they inherit, and the men do not.  For 
example, if a son dies, the mother and father inherit the same and if the son dies leaving a 
daughter, the daughter will inherit more than her grandfather.     
Suhaila:  “O you men! surely We have created you of male and a female, and made you 
tribes and families that you may know each other, surely the most honourable of you with 
Allah is the one among you most careful (of his duty)”.  (Raising her voice because of 
Abdullah’s attempts to interrupt):  What you are saying is contrary to God's sense of 
justice. You want to generalise, favouring men over women in everything, even through your 
citation of the verse, “then one man and two women from among those whom you choose to 
be witnesses”. 
Then Abdullah interrupted her again and didn‘t let her finish her sentence.  Suhaila showed 
her frustration with these interruptions by sitting right back in her chair and wrapping her 
hands over each other.   
Abdullah: I agree that society has oppressed women, but if we looked carefully at Sharia 
discourse, we find that women‘s dignity is higher than men‘s.   
Farah (asking Suhaila): You did a research study that Aisha (One of the prophet‘s wives) in 
fact did not get married at the age of nine.  This is important, because her marrying so young 
has been used by some older men to justify marrying little girls, because everyone wants to 
imitate the marriage of the Prophet.   
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Suhaila:  Most of these narratives are based on weak and incorrect accounts of the Prophet‘s 
sayings.  Is it logical that the Prophet married Aisha at nine when the Qur‘an says: “He put 
between you love and compassion”?  How can there be love and compassion between a little 
girl and an old man?  A little girl‘s organs are not fully developed when she marries an old 
man, which results in miscarriage or death during childbirth.  In addition, when a little girl 
gets married at this age and when there is such a large age gap between her and her husband, 
there might also be psychological effects that could lead to the wife‘s betrayal, or her 
murdering the husband or committing suicide.   
Rania (asking Abdullah): What is your opinion about the marriage of little girls?    
Abdullah (Suhaila listening to him with obvious resentment, revealed by her deep 
breathing, hands wrapped tightly together, and by the grinding of her teeth):  I always 
recommend early marriages.  No girl should be forced to marry.  No marriage can be without 
her consent, whether she is a little girl or an adult.  If this consent is forthcoming, there is no 
harm in getting married, even if the wife is a little girl and the husband is 100 years old.  
Abdullah said 100 years very quickly and he ended the sentence with ‘that’s it’ and by 
folding his hands to indicate there was to be no more discussion.   
Suhaila (energetically):  A little girl does not know the consequences of early marriage, so 
why should we take as valid the opinion of a child?   
Abdullah (loudly, apparently confused): I'm not talking about a child, but about those who 
are aged 15, 16, 17, 18, etc. 
Rania: Those who are 15 and 16 are still considered children.     
Then, suddenly, Fawzia ended the discussion, telling Abdullah in a very gentle and polite 
voice, with a smile that the show is grateful for his participation.  After he had left the screen, 
she turned to Suhaila angrily, firing questions at her in a loud voice, saying:    
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Fawzia: We said that “Kawamat” (Preference) of man is because of his role as a woman‘s 
protector, because he is paying for her and providing her with a house.  Will a woman enjoy 
all of these benefits and then say to her husband ―just go, I will not obey you‖? (She waved 
her hands as she said, with great disdain, ‗just go‘, illustrating that women who do that are 
disrespectful).  There is something called ethics, which means when a man is doing a favour 
for a woman, in this case covering her expenses, a woman in return must treat him well.  (As 
she said this she moved her hands, gripping all her fingers together with an admonishing and 
motherly voice, to emphasize the idea that women‘s obedience to their husbands is 
respectful).       
Suhaila (eyebrows raised in surprise): This is not a man doing a woman a favour.   
Fawzia shouted at her:  
Fawzia (shouting): Yes, he is doing her a favour.     
Suhaila (embarrassed and angry):  This is his duty, because they are fulfilling 
complementary roles.  The man obliges the woman to stay at home and raise the children.    
Fawzia (cutting in, loudly): This is not a women‘s duty.  Omar bin Al-Khattab (one of the 
most powerful and influential Muslim caliphs and a close companion of the Prophet 
Muhammad) said: ―My wife cooks my food, raises up my children, but this is not her duty‖.  
If women want to make martyrs of themselves, then they are free to do so, but they must also 
treat their husbands with care.  (She said that last sentence sarcastically and carelessly as if 
she were making fun of women who complain).    
Suhaila (clearly frustrated): Obedience will never be taken to that extent.  There are some 
fabricated prophetic sayings which state that the husband should not be challenged if he kills 
his wife because he owns her. 
Fawzia (shouting and pointing her finger to Suhaila): This is extremism.   
Suhaila:  This is what scholars say.   
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Fawzia: This is custom but not religion.  (Fawzia said this sentence as she folded her hands 
together, turning in profile to suggest the discussion was over)   
Farah: In this society, both men and women exist.  Love and obedience must be mutual 
between both of them.   
  
The debate between Al Abdeen and Sheikh Al Jefn demonstrates the struggle between the 
dominant religious power and the people, mainly women, which ultimately has implications 
for Saudi Arabia‘s development.  Al Abdeen believes that one of the most important topics 
that needs addressing is Islamic discourse, and that there should be a re-reading of this 
discourse because most of the interpretations of verses in the Qur‘an that relate to women are 
derived from tradition and cultural heritage (Al Abdeen, 2011, p.3).  Al Jefn‘s interpretation 
reflects the dominant Wahhabi power in Saudi Arabia, which emphasizes women‘s 
subordination to men.  As a result of these interpretations, men practice various forms of 
violence against women in the name of Islam, and women are deprived of their social, 
financial and educational rights (Ibid, p.3).   
 
Moreover, all the signs, including his tone of voice, gestures and commands signify a Saudi 
cleric‘s dominant power; someone who cannot bear the idea of a knowledgeable confident 
woman having the self-confidence to debate and argue with him.  Both verbal and visual 
signs are used to generate messages connoting the dominant ideology of religious power.   
 
Fawzia‘s hardline viewpoint reveals that her sympathies lie with the dominant religious 
power, especially when she said that men are doing women a favour by paying for the 
household and providing women with a roof over their heads.  Here, Fawzia completely 
ignored women‘s unpaid domestic labour.  She ignored how women‘s incomes are lower than 
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men‘s in large part because they are required to spend 40 to 50 hours a week doing unpaid 
domestic work.  Consequently, women‘s total number of working hours is much higher than 
men‘s while their monetary incomes are much lower (Koopman, 1997, p.136).       
 
The contradiction between Fawzia‘s appearance and her support for conservative religious 
views connotes hypocrisy and lack of sincerity.  Fawzia‘s dress code does not meet the rigid 
requirements of strict versions of Islam, yet she was siding with an extremely rigid, Wahhabi 
interpretation of Qur‘anic verses relating to women, against Al Abdeen‘s liberal 
interpretation, and she is a specialist in Islamic studies and appeared on TV in the apparel 
required of Saudi women in Saudi Arabia.   
  
Some sources at the channel (Anonymous source, 2013) said that when Fawzia was asked 
why she was so aggressive with Al Abdeen, she answered that since the channel is owned by 
and watched by Saudis, the presenters should be careful what was said on the show, 
otherwise they would lose their jobs.  This highlights that despite the paradigm shift in Arab 
private satellite television regarding state ownership, the Arab private market is still under 
state control.  
 
Fawzia‘s response shows her trying not only to satisfy the dominant elite power, but also the 
dominant popular culture in Saudi Arabia.  Hall (1981) argues that what we call popular 
culture involves a continuous and unequal struggle between forces of domination, points of 
resistance and everything in between.  The question is not what to allow, or not to allow, in a 
talk show just because of the elite power or producer‘s influence, but as Hebdige (1979) said, 
typically members of the subordinate class agree with the views of the powers that be. This is 
how hegemony works; otherwise popular culture would not be so popular (Grindstaff, 2002, 
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p.33).  This might explain the reason behind Saudi female presenters and guests wearing 
headscarves when they are on television, although they do not wear them in real life, in spite 
of the fact that it is not even encouraged – never mind required – by the MBC channel or the 
authorities.  After investigating the reason behind this double standard, the response was that 
the majority of the Saudi public like to watch Saudi women with head-scarves and they find it 
more acceptable that they are worn.   
  
6.2.2 Hewar Al Arab: is a talk show broadcast monthly on Al Arabiya.  It was launched in 
2007 under the auspices of the Arab Thought Foundation and is presented by Taleb Kanaan.  
The programme discusses several topics, covering cultural, intellectual, economic and social 
issues, among other areas, and is broadcast from Beirut.  It combines live press reports from 
different Arab countries, audience participation through an electronic voting process, 
questions and answers, and the participation of a studio audience from different countries 
(Arab Thought Foundation, 2010). 
 
One episode from 29
th
 October, 2009, discussed Arab women‘s empowerment.  Several other 
episodes discussed development issues, such as education and labour market requirements, 
the role of civil society, development vs. confrontation, and the needs of Arab youth, but 
these were not focused on women or on the disadvantaged, which are the key topics of this 
research.  This section will therefore analyse this one episode from, October 2009, which was 
entitled ‗The Status of Women in the Arab World.  The duration of this show‘s episodes is one 
hour.      
 
The Arab Thought Foundation was founded by Prince Khalid Al Faisal in 2000.  It began 
with a preparatory meeting in temporary headquarters in the city of Abha in Saudi Arabia, 
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before moving to its permanent headquarters in Beirut, the Arab cultural capital.  Prince 
Khalid Al Faisal had called for an initiative, demonstrating solidarity between intellectuals 
and businessmen, to be adopted by an Arabic civil foundation, with the aim of contributing to 
an Arabic renaissance (Arab Thought Foundation, 2010). 
 
Taleb Kanaan: has been a news anchor on Al Arabiya‟s TV news channel since March 2003, 
and is the presenter of its monthly talk show, Hewar Al Arab.  He started his career at 
Lebanon‘s National Broadcasting Network (NBN) news channel as an editor, after which he 
occupied several other positions at that network.  In 2002, he earned an MA in Political 
Science from the Lebanese University.  He holds a PhD from the University of Wales.  
 
Episode: The Status of Women in the Arab World (29
th
 October, 2009)  
Taleb (introducing the episode in a professional and concerned voice):  The topic of Arab 
women‘s status is painful because it starts out as marginalization, a form of inequality, but it 
might end up with murder in the name of honour – a so-called honour crime.  It is true that 
governments in the Arab world have worked to varying degrees to improve women‘s status, 
but it is also true that women‘s participation in public life has not been due to any kind of 
internal social mobility within the Arab societies, but rather is down to a desire to please the 
outside world.  Why do women in Pakistan, Turkey, Bangladesh and Indonesia reach top 
positions but women in the Arab world only attain leadership positions in exceptional cases 
and where it is permitted through quotas?  Are women ready to play such important roles and 
to be more independent, or are they passive and too accepting of the submission required of 
them?  There are several reasons for the marginalization of women; it stems from customs 
and traditions, the personal status law, religious institutions and government inaction. 
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I am happy to be hosting: Ambassador Mervat Tallawy, former Minister of Social Affairs in 
Egypt; Haifa Abu Ghazaleh, member of the Jordanian Senate; Adeeb Neama, a development 
consultant in the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA), Badria Al 
Beshr, a Saudi writer and Professor of Sociology; and Jaheda Wehbe, a Lebanese artist and 
actress.  There are also many students who are participating in this episode and will be able to 
vote on questions.      
 
The main question here is: What is needed, primarily, for Arab women to realise their rights 
and what are their responsibilities?   
Mervat:  The problem is summarized in the following points:  
 Governments have focused on stone, not on people, especially in building culture and 
education.  As a result, men continue to constrain women on the grounds of ‗tradition‘ 
and they do not elect them.   
 The ministries of social affairs and development, culture and education, have small 
budgets and are not prioritized by governments, even though they are the ones which 
develop and build human capacity. 
 Arab states do not abide by the international laws they have signed and do not apply 
them at the national level.  This is something which is inconsistent with constitutions 
and with much of national legislation.  
 Women themselves surrender to their situation and do not defend their rights. 
 The state has not confronted Salafi, ideologies which are against any kind of 
development. 
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Haifa:  
 It is essential that legislation does not discriminate between individuals in society and 
there should be no discrimination on economic, social and political grounds.  Political 
decisions should help women to take their rightful place in society. 
 Implementation mechanisms are still patchy in the Arab world.  Each institution 
believes it is protecting women‘s rights, and thus women‘s issues are lost among 
many institutions, be they formal or non-governmental organizations.   
 The existing mentality needs to be changed.  Men are looking at women in a certain 
way and women should look at themselves in terms of their capabilities, not just their 
sex. 
 The media sometimes treats women as commodities.  
Adeeb: I think there should be a renaissance project similar to the European Renaissance. 
Taleb: Aren‘t we dreaming?  
Adeeb: No we are not dreaming.  This is what is needed.  If one believes that a change in 
women‘s status will be accomplished without fundamental changes, one is mistaken.  
Discrimination against women is made up of an alliance between social heritage and neo-
liberal globalization, which is patriarchal.  This alliance is the cause of women‘s low status.  
To change the status quo there must be political reform and the eschewal of neo-liberal 
patriarchal economic policies.    
Badria:  The problem with women‘s liberation is cultural and political, so not religion itself, 
but there is a problem with religious institutions and their juridical interpretations.  Women‘s 
strongest ally is the state.  A state should not abandon its duties in the face of religious 
institutions.  It is important to emphasize that basic freedoms and acquiring knowledge from 
scientific sources not from religious ideology, are what matter.  
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Jaheda: We must create a self-perpetuating culture that educates people.  There must be new 
strategies for developing social and cultural traditions.  We must also pay more attention to a 
growing religious fundamentalism and how this inhibits women‘s development.   
 
The opening few minutes instantly send the message that there are several obstacles to Arab 
women‘s development and that each Arab country is different, yet the general challenges 
remain largely the same.  When Tallawy said that the role of governments was to focus on 
stone, not on people, especially in terms of building culture and education, this corresponds 
with the views of social experts and academics such as Al Gethame who described 
development in Saudi Arabia as “Tafra”, meaning „economic boom‟.  
 
Adeeb Neama referred to the causes of Arab women‘s discrimination as rooted in the alliance 
between traditional Arab heritage and the patriarchal system applied by development 
organizations.  Some feminist activists have suggested that what is actually taking place in 
international development organisations, and other economic and social institutions should 
not be called gender subordination, but male bias.  This male bias is embedded in 
organisations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and has 
three typical forms: sexual division of labour, unpaid domestic work and household work 
(Elson, 1991, p.24).  In the Arab world, there is an additional burden, which is tradition.  
Arab women perform domestic work that is praised by traditional Arab society.  However, 
this work is not calculated economically, nor is it factored into the calculation of the gross 
national product.  Working women therefore bear the responsibility for both domestic and 
professional work because there has been little change to Arab family structures or in the 
distribution of roles to assist women to enter the job market.  The economic participation of 
Arab women is consequently the lowest in the world.   
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Badria‘s response summarized the dilemma in women‘s development in Saudi Arabia.  The 
Saudi regime is not a theocratic regime but a hybrid structure, which is neither wholly secular 
nor wholly religious.  As such, the religious class functions under the authority of the ruling 
class (Ibid, 2007, p.58).  The fatwas issued by clerics demonstrate how desperate they are to 
control every aspect of the social sphere, especially where women are involved (Ibid, p.55).    
 
Question directed to the audience  
Taleb: Are Arab women treated justly?  
Result of electronic voting:  
Yes: 19%  
No: 81% 
Taleb (assertively): Does Arab culture reject women as equal partners to men?   
Mervat: We must change men‘s mindsets in order to improve women‘s standing in society.  
No matter how much legislation is passed and how many quotas are allocated, women are not 
elected.  Culture is left without a responsible bearer; it is left up to institutions and groups, 
whether from the West or the East, and is directed at young adults.    
Taleb (probing assuredly): Is Arab culture patriarchal?   
Mervat: Certainly, we have gone downhill.  Most of Al Azhar‘s clerics have called for better 
human rights before the United Nations (UN).  But where are these men now?  Has this 
deterioration occurred because of global materialism, which sees women as commodities?  
Or is it because of a distorted view of development?  Development can only be accomplished 
by both men and women.  Arab societies have not focused on social development.  
 
Here, even though Taleb asked closed questions that required ‗yes‘ or ‗no‘ answers, his 
assured tone of voice and gestures suggest he is asking leading questions that indicate he is 
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certain that Arab culture rejects women as equal partners and is patriarchal.  However, his 
concerned voice does not suggest to the viewer that he is dictating or forcing a particular 
answer on the interviewee; in fact, it suggests he is sympathetic and concerned about Arab 
women‘s status.    
 
There was a report from Lebanon asking people at random in the street about Arab women‘s 
status.  The report lasted 2 minutes.  The questions in the report are about women‘s status in 
general revealing diverse opinions among the public.    
  
Taleb: We know that women make up half of society and, if 50% is not participating 
effectively, there can be no development.  So, still we don‘t progress and we go backwards, 
why?  (In the last sentence, Taleb raised his voice assuredly and with frustration).      
Badria: Women in these countries are not independent persons, but are members of the 
family, and men are the intermediary between them and the state.  The state does not deal 
with women directly, so they are treated as a minority.  On top of that, women are used as 
playthings in the hands of the state whenever there are political and social problems.    
Taleb (probing): How?  
Badria:  In other words, if the state wants to conduct a public campaign abroad, it focuses on 
women‘s rights.  However, if such rights clash with traditional religious institutions, they are 
driven back.  It‘s as if the state is sharing its duties towards women as citizens with other 
institutions, and is then bidding on them.    
Taleb: Nice 
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Again, here, Taleb‘s forcefulness with the questions did not suggest that he was imposing his 
views, because the concern and frustration in his voice showed his support for women‘s 
rights, not a drive to get certain answers.    
 
Badria‘s comments illustrate the struggle between the traditional and reformist powers in 
Saudi Arabia and that women are largely the victims in this struggle.  Despite King 
Abdullah‘s promises of reform, he is just one player in a circle of powerful princes.  These 
multiple power sources have created two opposing groups: the reformists and the 
conservatives.  These contradictory forces undermine the state‘s coherence and embody an 
unprecedented antagonistic pluralism.  However, overall, power has remained concentrated in 
the hands of traditional power holders, mainly a number of princes (Al Rasheed, 2008, pp.13, 
17, 18). 
 
Saudi modernity, according to Al Gethame, is a form of a socio-cultural schizophrenia and 
cannot be fully accomplished because it is not entirely indigenous (quoted in Kraidy, 2012, 
p.238).  Al Gethame states that the main dilemma with Saudi modernity is that it is a struggle 
among the dominant religious powers, and ordinary people are excluded from the debate.  As 
a result, the debate continues without any progress (Ibid, p.248).  
 
There was a report from Jordan asking people in the street about Arab women‘s status.  The 
report lasted 2 minutes.   
 
Question to the audience  
Taleb: What are the main barriers that constrain women? 
Result of electronic voting:  
 207 
Customs and traditions: 25%   
Outdated traditions: 40%  
Religious barriers: 35% 
Taleb: You mentioned before that neo-liberalism is responsible for inequality, but the irony 
is that countries that have neo-liberalist economic policies uphold women‘s rights to a much 
greater extent than Arab countries.  Can we compare women‘s rights in Western countries 
with women‘s rights in the Arab world?  (Taleb raised his voice in the last sentence 
sympathetically, and moved his hands to indicate that there is no comparison between 
women‘s rights in the Arab world and those in Western countries).     
Adeeb: Neoliberal economies discriminate against women.  In the UN, production and 
reproduction, which are patriarchal terms, are discussed.  This neo-liberalism is interpreted in 
our society but is rooted in fundamentalism and tradition.  In our society, we suffer from 
discrimination against women as a result of both globalization and our backward heritage.  
European countries have been affected negatively by globalization, but they do not have 
traditions constraining them, because they have been liberated by modernity.  We have not 
yet modernised.  
 
Mervat: Women‘s rights in the West are much better than in Arab countries because states 
have enacted laws to protect women's rights and have not left them at the mercy of tradition 
or of Salafist interpretations of religion.    
 
There was a report from Morocco asking people at random in the street about Arab women‘s 
status.  The report lasted 2 minutes.  
 
Taleb (hesitantly):  Does the Arab intellectual prioritise women‘s issues?   
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Badria: You don‘t call someone an intellectual if he doesn‘t make women‘s issues a top 
priority.  For example, Imam Rifa'a al-Tahtawi, after he returned from France, said that the 
concept of the harem is prison and cultural unemployment, so he is an honest and real 
intellectual.  Habib Bourguiba, for example, is an intellectual leader, because he has 
promoted and supported women‘s rights.  An intellectual can be a politician, cleric or scholar 
who can play an enlightened cultural role in his homeland.    
 
Badria‘s response illustrates the notion of Gramsci who believed that intellectuals were not to 
be seen as confined to an elite class but to be grounded in everyday life.   
 
Question to the audience     
Taleb: Who is responsible for the suppression of women's rights in the Arab world? 
Result of electronic voting:  
Political systems: 15%   
Social structures: 45%  
Culture: 40% 
 
Taleb (hesitantly to Mervat): You are a member of the Arab Women's Organization.  Is 
your voice heard?  Do you work freely, or is what is applied unjustly to women also applied 
to the Arab Women's Organization, which was founded primarily to uphold women‘s rights?   
Mervat: What is missing is that the organization‘s policies and ideas need to be applied at 
the executive level of the state, otherwise they will be just words.    
Taleb (to Adeeb): You are a consultant for the ESCWA, to advance women's rights.  Is the 
voice of this organization heard in government and across Arab societies?  How can the 
ESCWA influence sectarian and tribal Arab societies? (Taleb raised his voice in frustration 
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during the last part of the question and put both hands together when he mentioned sectarian 
and tribal Arab societies).    
Adeeb:  The ESCWA provides governments with policies and supports civil society.  All of 
this is happening.  The benefit of the Arab Women‘s Organization, for example, is that they 
get leading ladies more involved in women‘s issues, but does the organization solve the 
problem? No.  Does it need another source that presents the issue more radically?  Of course.  
But I cannot ask the UN, the ESCWA and the Arab Women's Organization to adopt the most 
radical approach, to change the entire structure of society.  I think these organizations should 
play a stronger role, but change must come about as the result of integrated, participatory 
work.  The United Nations and official institutions are not necessarily the best way.  The 
most courageous acts should come from the women themselves, and the more enlightened 
corners of society; this will result in gallant movements that can be more effective than the 
UN, the Arab Women's Organization and official institutions. 
Taleb:  How can the media make a transformative contribution to women‘s rights and are the 
Arab media patriarchal?  (Taleb raised his voice anxiously when he said patriarchal) 
Badria:  The media today are a profitable enterprise that abides by the global laws of profit-
making.  Media have become a shopping market for selling goods.  They have abandoned 
their role as a tool for enlightenment and are now a vehicle for consumption and profit.  They 
have therefore played a role in making people more ignorant, rather than enlightened.       
Taleb probed:  How?   
Badria:  They have become subject to what the audience wants.    
Taleb probed:  How?  
Badria:  For example, in religious societies there are religious programmes presented by 
unknown clerics providing inaccurate information about religion.  Such clerics earn very high 
incomes from these programmes.  There are also programmes about the interpretation of 
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dreams, which are pure trivia with profit as their chief aim.  Also Arab media is patriarchal, 
as with all Arab institutions.  Statistics show that 80% of the time, women are portrayed in 
the Arab media as beautiful, sexy women, or as housewives interested in superficial things.  
This is a 100% patriarchal view.   
 
Badria‘s interpretation of women‘s portrayal on television matches the views of the focus 
group participants, who complained about the weakness of women‘s characters in dramas and 
soap operas, especially those from the Arab Gulf (See Chapter 7).  This is partly due to 
patriarchal dominance but there is also a lack of audience research in Arab media.  This 
dearth of research on women‘s media consumption in the Arab world risks baseless 
generalizations being made about the impact of television on women. 
Taleb:   To what extent is the educational system in the Arab world responsible for 
promoting injustice against women? (Taleb sounded sympathetic when he referred to 
injustice against women)   
Badria:  Educational institutions play a role in teaching women and men about the concept 
of equality and about others.  Most of the educational philosophies in our countries are 
ideological, promulgating customs and traditions that in fact reflect the state‘s philosophy.  If 
we want to create new concepts based on the principles of equality, we have to liberate not 
only the schools, but the home and outside the home, from these traditional ideologies in 
order to create a new public philosophy.  Without this public philosophy, there cannot be 
change.     
 
From the descriptions of Kalam Nawaim and Hewar Al Arab, we can deduce that discussing 
poverty, illiteracy and violence against women requires a commitment to expose other 
critically important subjects, such as social justice, a fair distribution of wealth, corruption, a 
 211 
critique of Arab traditions, and erroneous Qur‘anic interpretations, especially of verses 
relating to women.  All of this requires genuinely knowledgeable presenters on a hard-hitting 
talk show like Hewar Al Arab, something not achieved on a soft talk show like Kalam 
Nawaim.  The professionalism, solidarity, sympathy and concern of the presenter, Taleb 
Kanaan, for women‘s status in Hewar Al Arab, evident in what he said as well as in his tone 
of voice and body language, were all completely absent among the Kalam Nawaim 
presenters.           
 
6.3 Drama: Al Sakenat fee Golobena 
Al Sakenat fee Golobena is a 40 episodes Saudi drama series that ran from 2009 to 2010, and 
focused on women‘s empowerment.  Each episode presented different instances of injustice 
against women that prevented their full societal participation.  The series is produced by Al-
Sadaf for Audio and Visual Production, and its Executive Director is Hassan Assiri, an actor 
and producer.  The series‘ cast members are actors and actresses from Saudi Arabia and the 
Arab Gulf countries.  The episodes and clips analysed here are those used in the focus groups 
for this study (See Chapter 7).  These episodes are mainly chosen for their focus on issues of 
poverty, education and violence.  These episodes are: Zafaf Jotha (Wedding of a Corpse), Al 
Kheyar Al Saab (The Difficult Choice) and Burj Al Athraa (The Virgo Sign).     
  
6.3.1 Zafaf Jotha (Wedding of a Corpse):      
The edited clip lasted 10 minutes.  I selected only the scenes most relevant to this study.  It 
showed a poor family: Abu Saud, the father, Umm Saud, the mother, and four daughters, 
Zainab, Samia, Reem and Nouf.  Only one daughter, Samia, wants to complete her education, 
while the others have had to drop out of secondary school as they couldn‘t afford to go.  The 
father works as driver in a company and has a good relationship with Abu Turki, the 
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company‘s owner, who later proposed to his daughter Zainab.  Although the episode did not 
say in which part of Saudi Arabia the story took place, from the dialect we understand that it 
is set in Riyadh-Saudi Arabia, the capital.       
One day, Abu Turki calls Abu Saud into his office and started asking him questions:  
Abu Turki (eagerly):  I want to ask you how your family is, and whether your children are 
studying?   
Abu Saud:  I have one daughter who is studying and the rest are just at home.   
Abu Turki:  Have they graduated from university?   
Abu Saud (desperately):  What university, Sir?  They haven‘t completed secondary school.   
Abu Turki:  Why didn‘t you let them continue with their education?   
Abu Saud (helplessly):  Schools are expensive, Sir.  Private schools are even more 
expensive and as you can see, I struggle to feed and clothe them.  Now you are telling me to 
educate them.   
Abu Turki:  I want to visit you in your home and introduce me to them. 
Abu Saud (surprised):  You want to come to my home?!  
Abu Turki:  I want to visit you after the Esha prayer.   
Abu Saud (embarrassed):  You are more than welcome, but I am sorry that my home is not 
appropriate for your status.   
Abu Turki:  We are all equal.   
Abu Saud:  Yes, you are right.    
Later Abu Turki comes to Abu Saud‘s home.   
Abu Saud (warmly):  Welcome, and please come inside.   
Abu Turki asks the driver to take the gifts inside.   
Abu Saud:  Welcome, please have a seat.  There is no need to bring all these gifts.   
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Abu Turki:  These gifts are not for you.  They are for the girls.  Go, quickly, and call them 
for me.  Go, go.  [He says this last sentence waving his hand arrogantly and with a 
commanding tone of voice].    
Abu Saud says hesitantly:  The girls?  
Abu Tuki (demandingly):  Yes, go and call them for me.   
Abu Saud (obediently):  O.k., I will. 
Abu Saud goes to his daughters‘ room.   
Abu Saud:  Come girls, and say hi to your uncle Abu Turki.  
Samia:  Who is our uncle, Abu Turki?  
Abu Saud:  He is my boss at work, and he is like your uncle.   
Zainab:  Oh, father, how can we say hi to him in these shabby clothes?  
Abu Saud:  Why would you go out in these clothes?  You must appear decently, wearing 
your abaya (black cloak) and head scarves.   
Zainab:  O.k., father.  
Then the girls introduce themselves to Abu Turki, but he just stares at Zainab, the eldest 
daughter.  After the girls have taken their gifts, they return to their room.   
Zainab:  It seems as if Abu Turki knows our sizes.  
Reem (happily):  God bless him.  
Zainab (suspiciously):  I just wonder why he is doing all of this for us? 
Nouf:  His intentions are definitely pious.  
Zainab (uncertainly):  I hope so.  
Nouf:  Don‘t forget that he is sterile and rich, so he doesn‘t have anybody to spend his money 
on.   
Reem:  The main thing is that he brought us these gifts.  See how nice my dress is.  
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Zainab (gladly):  You look so pretty.  [Then there is a close-up shot of Zainab and 
background music is played as she appears deep in thought, with a trace of concern on her 
face].     
 
Even though Abu Turki said to Abu Saud that they were both equal when he asked him to 
visit him, during his visit he did not treat him as an equal.  The way he asked Abu Saud to 
call his daughters was extremely disrespectful, arrogant, insensitive, and this annoyed all the 
focus group participants.  In addition, the fact that Abu Saud was extremely obedient, weak 
and quickly ran to call his daughters is unrealistic and does not adhere to Islamic rules and 
Saudi tradition, which the participants related with great irritation (See Chapter 7).  Abu-
Lughod has explained how emotions are exaggerated in drama series and acting is 
overwrought, to make the point that women are more emotional than men, and that the upper 
classes are less emotional than the lower, in order to clarify the moral message (Abu-Lughod, 
2005, p.117).        
 
A semiotic analysis of television involves examining camera shots, lighting, sound and 
music.  Television images and sounds are often iconic, and although they may seem to show 
nothing more than what the camera and sound equipment have recorded, these images and 
sounds carry connotations that convey much more meaning to the viewer than simply a vision 
of an object, place or person (Bignell, 2002, p.158).  Even though the whole scene is a simple 
house visit, the soundtrack, the way Abu Turki looks at Zainab and the close-up shot of her 
accompanied by background music as she appears deep in thought and slightly troubled, 
connote that this is not an innocent visit.  The gap between rich and poor was starkly obvious, 
with the contrast between Abu Saud‘s impoverished house and his daughters‘ ragged outfits, 
and Abu Turki‘s expensive gifts and his arrogant insensitive treatment of Abu Saud when he 
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commands him to call his daughters.  Zainab‘s expression of satisfaction with her sisters‘ 
delight with their gifts shows her caring and sensitive attributes, highlighting her role as the 
episode‘s heroine.  Despite the girls‘ happiness with the gifts, the type of music played, 
coupled with Zainab‘s troubled looks suggests that something unwelcome will happen.              
   
Abu Saud goes to the hospital to visit Abu Turki. 
Abu Saud (exciting):  Salam.  
Abu Turki (tiredly):  Come in and relax.  
Abu Saud:  How are you now? 
Abu Turki (happily):  Thank God, I am much better.  How are you and the girls? 
Abu Saud:  They are very well and send their regards to you.   
Abu Turki:  Thank you, I would like to discuss with you an important matter.   
Abu Saud:  Important matter? I am at your command.   
Abu Turki:  As you see, I am getting older and I am very ill.   
Abu Saud:  You will recover soon. Don‘t worry.  
Abu Turki:  Most of my time is spent in hospital, because I have kidney failure and I need to 
go for dialysis three times a week.   
Abu Saud (sympathetically):  Oh, God! 
Abu Turki:  I need someone to take care of me and my wife is old now and she can barely 
look after herself.  As you know, I am rich and I can afford one or two servants.   
Abu Saud (supportively):  Yes, you can.  May God double your wealth. 
Abu Turki:  But I prefer to get married.  
Abu Saud (encouragingly):  That‘s good.   
Abu Turki (confidently):  That‘s why I would like to propose to your daughter, Zainab and I 
will buy her a villa.   
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Abu Saud responds (sadly, and with surprise): Zainab?  [Sad flute music is played with a 
close-up of Abu Saud].  
Zainab is discussing the matter with her sister. 
Samia:  I don‘t advise you to sell yourself like a sheep.  You life is the most valuable thing.   
Zainab:  I am so confused Samia.  
Samia:  Don‘t be confused.  The matter doesn‘t even need thinking about.   
Zainab (hopelessly):  Have you forgetten our circumstances?  
Samia:  No, I haven‘t.   
Zainab:  Dad is getting older and he is tired of the poverty we are living in. (She refers to 
poverty assertively and with pain).    
Samia:  God won‘t forget us.  
Zainab (excitedly):  Do you know he promised Dad he would buy him an apartment in one 
of his buildings and he is going to buy me a villa.  So we are going to become rich.   
Samia:  No matter how much he gives us, I don‘t advise you to sell yourself.   
Zainab:  I must sacrifice myself for my father and my mother.  My father can‘t afford to look 
after her, and I would also like to see you all happy and at ease.   
Samia:  You don‘t need to sacrifice yourself.  It is not your fault.   
Zainab:  Oh, God, what will I do?  (Sad flute music is played again, with a close-up of 
Zainab).  
Abu Saud returns to Abu Turki in hospital and is extremely sad. 
Abu Saud (reluctantly and slowly):  I am glad to tell you that the girl has agreed.  
Abu Turki (happily):  Thank you, does she have any conditions?  
Abu Saud (hesitantly):  Nothing more than what you have offered. 
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Abu Turki (excitedly):  Tomorrow, you will receive Zainab‘s dowry, which is SR 150,000 
and I will call my lawyer to complete the purchase of the apartment and the villa.  Abu Saud 
(sadly):  Thank you.  
Abu Turki:  I have one request.  
Abu Saud:  Anything. 
Abu Turki:  To keep this marriage, a secret as I don‘t want any of the staff to know.  
Abu Saud nods his head and mournful music starts to play.     
 
Zainab‘s life of poverty and lack of education are such that even if she had completed her 
education and had a job, she could never afford what Abu Turki has offered her.  Lila Abu-
Lughod has referred to the same thing in her study.  She says there is a strong emphasis in 
drama series on the importance of education, but there is no mention of the prospect of 
unemployment (Abu-Lughod, 2005, p.71).  She has also written that usually in drama series 
there is an emphasis on the importance of education for national development, and poverty 
features too, but the causes of poverty and class and gender discrimination have been 
obscured, without spelling out who is responsible for them (Ibid, p.89).  In this episode, 
friction between completing education and failing to find work was not touched on, but there 
was immediate surrender to the temptations of Abu Turki‘s offers.   
 
The dialogue between Zainab and her sister, Samia, who is the only one in the family 
pursuing her education, reveals how formal education creates a sense of pride and a feeling of 
independence in women.  Cornes (1994, p.118) highlights how women gain from literacy by 
learning to communicate confidently with other adults, to be assertive and to make decisions.  
Samia disagreed with Zainab‘s self-denial and self-sacrifice, which is associated with a 
caring role, to cultivate a ‗culture of respectable familialism‘ (Skeggs, 1997, p.63).  Literate 
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women are encouraged to come to their own conclusions about good and bad caring 
practices.  However, it might have been more convincing if the episode had shown some 
proof of Samia‘s point that her success in education would bring her some financial 
independence compared with Zainab‘s sacrifice.     
 
The episode did not show either the challenge faced by Zainab to defy her hard circumstances 
or the comparison between Zainab‘s choice of self-sacrifice and self-denial and Samia‘s 
choice of independence.  It just narrated the typical self-sacrifice and self-denial of Arab 
women who marry for financial reasons, rather than marrying for love and equality, comfort 
and happiness.  Marrying for financial security only emphasizes women‘s passivity and their 
inability to deal with problems in positive ways.  This episode failed to look at the root causes 
of why women find themselves in these difficult circumstances (Al Salem, 1997, pp.168, 169, 
194, 195).  In fact, soap operas have often been created for social and behavioural 
development, especially among women.  This opportunity for influence is missed in this 
episode and in Al Sakenat fee Golobena in general.  Story lines are weak, lack didactic and 
exciting roles, have no clear plots, climaxes or resolutions.  As a result, they bore the 
audience, regardless of how applicable the topics and circumstances are.  Most focus groups 
participants reported such boredom (See Chapter 7).    
 
Usually in television programmes, such as soap operas or drama series, camera shots change 
more rapidly than in cinema, moments of silence are rare, and the soundtrack is important for 
reaching the viewer as it enables them to engage emotionally with the scenes and characters 
(Bignell, 2002, p.160).  However, in this episode and in Al Sakenat fee Golobena in general, 
the camera shots are slow to change, moments of silence are frequent and the soundtrack is 
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sluggish, so some viewers in the focus groups felt bored and unexcited, irrespective of the 
relevance of the topics and circumstances (See Chapter 7).      
 
6.3.2 Al Kheyar Al Saab (The Difficult Choice):      
The clip lasted five minutes.  I did the same as before, looking only at the scenes most 
relevant to the research.  It is about Basma, who lives in a village in Saudi Arabia.  One day, 
she decides to visit her brother, who is studying in Riyadh, the capital.  Basma is an 
extremely ambitious and intelligent girl who wants to complete her education, and when she 
visits her brother she plans to stay and go to college, against her father‘s wishes. She agrees 
with her brother, Mohammad, that she will continue her studies, without telling their father.  
When one of the neighbours, a friend of Mohammad from the village, comes to visit him, he 
realises that Basma is studying in one of the colleges.  Upon his return to the village he tells 
their father.  Even though the episode does not say the exact location of the village in Saudi 
Arabia, from the dialect of the cast members it is likely to be set in the Eastern Province.  
Basma‘s father then asks both of them to return as soon as possible to the village.  He insults 
Mohammad and slaps Basma‘s face, locks her in her room and then forces her to marry her 
cousin, who has Down‘s syndrome.   
While Basma‘s father is beating her, Mohammed says:  Father, please listen to me.   
Father (angrily and threateningly):  Shut up.  It is all your fault and if you were not sick, I 
would have tortured you.  I don‘t have a single word to say to you or your sister.  If Saeed 
hadn‘t told me about this, I would never have known.  (The father continues beating Basma).  
You and your brother shame me.  What will I say to everybody?   
Mohammed (apologetically): Father, I am not in the wrong.  It is Basma‘s right to continue 
her education.  I was planning to let you know when we returned.   
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Father (sarcastically and angrily): Thank you for reminding me.  This is not your fault.  It 
is your mother‘s fault, who spoiled you so much and didn‘t give me the opportunity to raise 
you properly.  If I had been in charge of bringing you up, you wouldn‘t ignore me.  Look 
what‘s happened, as a result.  People are gossiping about us. 
Basma (beseechingly):  Father.  
Father (angrily):  Shut up.  I don‘t want to hear your voice, or see your face.   
Then Basma goes to her room and her brother leaves.  The mother starts to talk with the 
father. 
  
The participants in the focus group agreed that this is what fathers do  if daughters do not 
obey them.  Male relatives such as fathers, husbands, brothers and uncles, have full 
guardianship and authority over women.  The Saudi constitution is based on Islam, but there 
are several misinterpretations of verses from the Qur‘an because they are driven by tradition 
and cultural heritage.  One of these interpretations is that women are somehow incomplete, 
hence the requirement that they need to be accompanied by a male relative, who acts as a 
guardian.  This lack of a woman‘s legal rights makes her vulnerable to violence.  The 
requirement for a woman to have a guardian‘s approval in order to be educated has deprived 
women of the right to education in numerous cases (Al Abdeen, 2008, p.9).   
 
Mother (sympathetically and weakly):  Calm down, please.  
The father threatens her and says:  If I find out that you knew about this matter of her 
studying, I will divorce you immediately.  
Then the mother starts crying and goes into Basma‘s room. 
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The participants agreed that Basma‘s mother is weak and passive, and others criticized as 
unrealistic the way in which women are portrayed in these Arab Gulf and Saudi dramas, and 
that the acting is poor.  Accordingly, some participants prefer watching Egyptian drama 
series, because they are more realistic and the acting is more natural.  They do not want to see 
weak and passive women.  They want to see real personalities, with strengths and weaknesses 
who can overcome difficulties (See Chapter 7).  Egyptian melodrama, for example, adopts 
many of these characteristics.  Abu-Lughod (2002, p.300) describes it as a ―technology for 
the production of new kinds of selves.‖ 
 
Mother (blaming her daughter):  Why have you done this?  
Basma (sadly and desperately):  You know it is what I have dreamed of my entire life; to 
continue my education at university.  Why does father want to prevent me from fulfilling my 
dream?  What does he want?      
Mother (compassionately):  Oh, my daughter, you know your father and you know his way 
very well.  When you asked him previously to continue your education and he refused, you 
should have listened to him.  So tell me, do you like what has happened?  What will we tell 
people?  Your father is always so proud, and won‘t tolerate anybody gossiping about him.    
Basma (desperately):  Gossip, gossip, gossip.  For how long are we going to keep listening 
to people‘s gossip?   
Mother (surprised with a higher voice):  How can we not care about gossip?  You forgot 
where we are living.  We are living with and among people.   
Basma (desperately):  Mother, we always adhere to customs and traditions that are not 
approved by religion or Sharia law.  Until when are we going to hold onto traditions that only 
take us backwards?   
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Mother:  Please, daughter, listen to your father, and when he begins any conversation with 
you, say ‗I am at your service, father‘.  He is your father, and he knows what is good for you.   
Basma (miserably):  Why can I not dare to say anything other than ‗I am at your service 
father?‘  My existence doesn‘t matter.  No matter what I say, nobody is going to listen.   
Then she starts crying again.    
 
A patriarchal society is in fact, a traditional one, which manifests itself more strongly in rural 
and tribal communities in Arab societies.  Its attributes are that the relationship between 
father and child is like that of ruler and the ruled.  There is exaggerated ‗hyper‘ masculinity, 
coupled with a downgrading of femininity, and the father has absolute control of the family 
and oppresses women and children.  In this kind of society, communication is a means of 
control and suppression, rather than dialogue and understanding, because the primary goal is 
not enlightenment, analysis and criticism, but domination and submission.  In such societies, 
some women become passive, enslaved and accepting of the sense of their inferiority.  If 
women are continually submitting to the patriarchal family system, they are effectively 
reinforcing the patriarchy (Al Haidaree, 2003, pp.325, 326).      
 
Such a patriarchal society is also reflected in Arab dramas.  Married women usually follow 
the path laid down by their husbands and their role is to implement it without question.  Most 
married women in Arab dramas do what they are told otherwise they will be divorced or be 
punished by their husband marrying another woman (Al-Salem, 1997, p.170).  This is shown 
when Basma‘s father threatens the mother with divorce in the event that she knew about her 
daughter‘s education.       
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6.3.3 Burj Al Athraa (The Virgo Sign):    
The edited clip lasted four minutes.  It is about Nouf, who is an educated girl and a talented 
writer.  Her father and brothers want her to marry her cousin, who is also her sister‘s 
husband.  When Nouf refuses the proposal, they beat her savagely.  Nouf tries to embarrass 
her family by writing her story in a newspaper and when they read her article they become 
even angrier.  After she gives up trying to avoid this marriage, she decides to embarrass her 
family by running away on her wedding day.  Even though the episode did not say in which 
part of Saudi Arabia the whole story took place, from the dialect we understand that it was set 
in the capital, Riyadh. 
Nouf is in pain from the beating and is lying on her sister‘s lap, with her cousin trying to 
soothe her bruises.   
Nouf (painfully):  I don‘t want to marry him.  I don‘t.   
Cousin (fearfully):  Be quiet, before they kill you.  
Nouf (painfully):  They still want to kill me  
Nouf’s sister (compassionately):  Be quiet, Nouf.  Let me put these packs on you to stop the 
pain.   
Nouf (sadly):  You are caring for me, yet you know they are going to make me marry your 
husband.   
Nouf’s sister:  Just calm down.  Let me see your wound.   
Nouf:  It seems that you have agreed for me to marry your husband.   
Nouf’s sister (desperately):  If I say ‗no‘ a thousand times, what use will it be?  You are 
saying ‗no‘, and I am saying ‗no‘, and what men want is what is going to happen. 
 
Some participants in the focus group thought that such a severe beating was exaggerated and 
unrealistic.  The over-exaggerated beating, misery and the depiction of women as entirely 
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passive and depressed, gave the viewers the impression that the acting was unnatural and 
unrealistic.   
 
Then the groom, on the wedding day, goes into the garden of Nouf‘s house and talks to the 
father.  
Salman:  Salam, uncle.  
Father (discouragingly):  Salam. 
Salman:  How are you, uncle?  
Father:  I am fine. 
Salman:  Where have you been?  I have been looking for you all day.   
Father (firmly):  I have been busy.  Listen my son, Salman, your wedding day has to be 
cancelled.   
Salman (surprisingly):  What?   
Father:  You heard correctly.  
Salman (shockingly and surprisingly):  Why uncle?  What made you change your mind?  I 
hope I haven‘t done something wrong.  What I am going to do with the guests that I invited?   
Father (firmly):  Tell them that we have postponed the wedding for personal reasons.   
Salman (beseechingly):  Please, uncle, tell me.  What has happened?   
The father starts shouting at him:  This marriage is not going to happen.  
Salman (insistently):  But it is my right to know why not.  Why didn‘t you tell me at the 
outset, before I invited people and before this scandal?  Please let me know what has 
happened?  
Father (discouragingly):  Nouf, Salman. 
Salman (worried):  What‘s wrong with Nouf?  I shall go to her and she will tell me.   
Father (shouted):  Salman!  
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Salman:  Yes, uncle.  
Father:  Nouf is not here.   
Salman:  How come she‘s not here? 
Father:  Nouf has run away and we can‘t find any trace of her.   
Salman (shamefully):  Run away…What a scandal!   
 
In drama there is something called ‗disruption‘, which is a disturbance that acts as a threat – 
in this case to the patriarchal, dominant ideology.  The rebellious women who challenge 
men‘s power are both loved and hated, their actions both praised and condemned.  Even 
scenes portraying women as victims can stimulate an awareness of how men‘s power is 
responsible for the victimisation.  Excess does not necessarily lead to negative interpretation; 
it allows for an alternative understanding (Fiske, 1999, pp.181-193). 
 
6.4 Satirical Situation Comedy: Tash Ma Tash  
Tash Ma Tash is a popular Saudi situation comedy, which began in 1992 and has been 
running for 17 seasons.  It only runs during the month of Ramadan.  It was aired on Saudi 
Channel 1 for 13 seasons, but in 2005 it was acquired by MBC.  Tash Ma Tash is admired by 
most Saudis because it satirises the social, political and economic concerns of Saudis.  The 
series is also admired by hundreds of Saudi women because they think it does justice to Saudi 
women‘s issues by presenting the difficulties they face because of prejudicial customs and 
traditions.  The episode Soor Al Harem (The Wall of the Harem) was the only episode that 
discussed Saudi women‘s matters directly, such as women‘s driving and a woman‘s right to 
sell women‘s intimate items, such as lingerie and underwear.  The remaining episodes 
discussed critical issues in Saudi society, but did not focus on specific women‘s development 
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issues.  Soor Al Harem was one of the most popular episodes with Saudi women and it was in 
episode 14, broadcast in 2006.   
 
6.4.1 Soor Al Harem (The Wall of the Harem):  
The clip that will be analysed here is the one used in the focus groups for this study (See 
Chapter 7).  The clip lasted 4 minutes and basically parodied the unelected Shura 
(Consultative) Council in Saudi Arabia, calling it the Town Council.  The clip discussed 
events as if they had taken place long ago.  The clip starts with a meeting in the Town 
Council, where the most important matters are raised.  The Council is composed of a majority 
of conservative members and a minority of liberals.  Humod represents the conservatives, 
while Nasser represents the liberals.           
President of the Council:  I ask that every member raises the issues that they believe to be 
important at the end of the meeting.  The Council will choose the most important issue 
through a vote.  Now, let‘s begin with member Humod Al Chmmetah. 
Humod:  I'd say the most important issue facing this town is the issue of schools for boys 
and girls. 
One member:  I understand that you want to discuss the issue of education in the town. 
Humod:  We don‘t care about education.  The focus here is separation of boys‘ schools from 
girls‘.    
President of the Council:  But, Sir, there is already a solution to this.  There already exists a 
separation between boys and girls in school.   
Humod:  I mean separate schools for boys and girls and at the greatest distance apart 
possible; I suggest that we put the girls' schools in the south of the town and the schools for 
boys in the north of the town.  
One member:  And what is the wisdom in this?  
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Humod:  There is certainly wisdom in this.  We don‘t want boys to see our daughters.  What 
shame! 
President of the Council:  Do you think this is an issue that is sufficiently important to 
devote a session to it and to discuss it in the Council? 
Humod:  Yes, Mr. President.  This is an important issue and it affects all the parents in this 
town.  Boys‘ schools must be further away from the girls‘ [schools].  This is a big problem.  
This problem is like ―Hosgola‖ in my throat. 
One member:  What‘s the meaning of ―Hosgola‖?  
President of the Council:  ―Hosgola‖ means stone.   
 
The most recognisable feature of satire is ridicule; the target subject being illustrated as 
ridiculous.  Through satire, powers can be judged and attacked, in an entertaining fashion.  
Laughter is something satire may elicit from its audience, but what is important is what 
comes after the laughing has stopped.  Humour creates a space for critique and an opportunity 
to tackle serious issues of power and politics head-on (Gray et al, 2009, pp.11, 12).  When the 
conservative member, Humod, said that he didn‘t care about education and the focus here 
was separation of boys‘ schools from girls‘, the focus groups participants perceived him as 
shallow and silly (See Chapter 7).  Satire‘s main purpose is to scrutinize and to encourage 
audience members to do likewise (Ibid, p.11).    
 
In situation comedy, a semiotic analysis is relevant because it reveals the meaning behind the 
whole show.  Clothes and body language are loaded with meaning about each character.  In 
addition, excessive behaviour that breaks with convention is a critique of the norm and 
ridicules it (Bignell, 2002, p.s167), e.g., Humod‘s clothes (he wears a thobe, ghutra and besht 
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in the style of a Saudi cleric)
20
 and the way he carries himself, suggest a conservative testy 
character, but his extremely conservative behaviour and the fact that he wears make-up in the 
form of darkening the eye brows and beard, means he is being ridiculed to make viewers 
laugh.                    
 
Nasser:  I would like to say that the issue Humod Al Chmmetah refers to is a marginal one 
(soundtrack and close-up shot of Humod).   I propose allowing women to be more mobile by 
giving them the opportunity to ride animals and to integrate them into the labour market 
(soundtack and close-up shot of Humod).  We should at least restrict the selling of women‘s 
necessities to women only.  
Humod:  What are these deviant ideas, you ‗ugly face‘?  Every day we hear from you new 
ideas.  You have asked before that women should be allowed to ride animals and now you 
want them to work in shopping centres selling clothes.  What are these ideas?  You don‘t 
know that those are our ‗harem‘, and they are very precious to us.  Those are our honour.      
President of the Council:  Let‘s start the voting.    
Most members voted for Humod‘s proposal (soundtrack and close-up shot of Nasser).  
 
Forms of political discourse in satire are the verbal attacks and aggression cloaked in humour.  
This is played out in the dispute between Nasser and Humod.  This ability to attack power 
with sarcasm makes satire a powerful form of political communication (Gray et al, 2009, 
p.12).  Satire‘s unique ability is that it can speak the truth about power and critique the 
arrogance and hypocrisies of those in power (Ibid, p.6).  Satire becomes a means to ―shake us 
out of our sense of apathy or indifference‖, a means through which citizens can become more 
                                                 
20
 Thobe: Traditional male clothing which is a loose, long-sleeved, and ankle-length garment.  
Ghutra: A cotton or silk square scarf, worn folded across the head 
Besht: A large, black or creamy cloak, worn loose or flowing or wrapped around the body.  
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critically aware, with deft and dazzling ease (Ibid, p.15).  Discussion and debate around 
women‘s driving arose in the focus groups after they watched this scene.  Some participants 
supported the idea and others were cautious about it, but all participants supported women‘s 
integration into the labour market (See Chapter 7).   
 
In situation comedy, sounds and close-up shots of characters‘ exaggerated facial expressions 
are loaded with meaning (Bignell, 2002, p.166).  Humod‘s facial expression, when Nasser 
was speaking, was one of irritation, but the close-up shot of his exaggerated facial 
expressions and the music being played as he looks at Nasser, suggest he is ridiculous cueing 
audience laughter.  On the other hand, at the end, when most of the members voted in favour 
of Humod‘s proposal, although Nasser did not utter a single word, the close-up shot of his 
facial expression combined with the music being played, conveyed a feeling of frustration 
and the dominance of conservative powers.    
 
6.5 Conclusion  
 
Using textual analysis by combining both quantitative and qualitative methods in this chapter 
has thrown up a number of findings.  This chapter shows how a semiotic analysis was as 
important as, and, in some cases, generated more insights than critical discourse analysis.  
Visual and oral signs, such as gestures, body language, dress codes, tones of voice and facial 
expressions, can generate connotations and meanings every bit as important as language.    
 
Analysis of Kalam Nawaim, including the show‘s hosts, experts and guests, concluded that 
the show‘s style is not suited to serious topics, such as poverty, illiteracy and violence against 
women.  Neither the discourse nor the semiotic analyses of the presenters‘ contributions 
revealed solidarity or sympathy between participants.  For example, the presenters do not 
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have the credentials to give professional advice to vulnerable women, there was a lack of 
empathy between the hosts and participants, a failure to build constructive dialogue between 
participants and experts and to decide whose comments are worthwhile and what solutions 
are practicable, etc.  In addition, in some of the shows, the hosts were not fully prepared for 
the topics and, as a result, their comments were haphazard and irrelevant.  On several 
occasions, the presenters tried to avoid any kind of critical analysis, favouring instead a 
shallow discussion that seemed to be intended to please the dominant political and religious 
elites.  This, for example, was revealed when Fawzia is talking politely with the Wahhabi 
cleric, Abdullah Al Jefn, and siding with him totally, while she angrily fires questions at 
Suhaila Zain Al Abdeen.  This sense of hypocrisy is also revealed in the semiotic analysis; 
for instance, Fawzia‘s appearance does not suggest she is the type of woman who believes in 
an ultra conservative Wahhabi interpretation of Islam, which further reveals the presenter‘s 
double standards.  In another example, Fawzia sides with a teacher, who physically abused a 
student, making excuses for her.   While she was defending the teacher, she was gesticulating 
with her hands and showing off her diamond rings and earrings, which represented a 
disconnection from, and a lack of sympathy for, the victim.  Moreover, discussing poverty, 
illiteracy and violence against women requires a commitment to exposing other critically 
important subjects such as social justice, a fair distribution of wealth, corruption, critique of 
Arab traditions, and erroneous Qu‘ranic interpretations especially of verses relating to 
women.  All of this requires genuinely knowledgeable presenters on a hard-hitting talk show, 
something Kalam Nawaim is not.        
  
On the other hand, even though, between 2007 and 2010, Hewar Al Arab had only one 
episode that discussed women‘s issues in the Arab world, this one episode is worth more than 
all the relevant episodes of Kalam Nawaim put together.  The presenter asked bold questions 
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and the experts‘ answers were deep and insightful.  The professionalism, solidarity, sympathy 
and concern of Taleb Kanaan for women‘s status, evident in his discourse ands his tone of 
voice and body language, were attributes missing in all the Kalam Nawaim presenters.  The 
discussion covered several important topics, such as patriarchal systems in development 
organizations, the impact of traditions and extremists, such as the Salafis/Wahhabis on 
women‘s development and the lack of laws protecting women‘s rights agianst misguided 
religious interpretations and cultural traditions.  Furthermore, this episode discussed how the 
patriarchal Arab media portrays women as sexy, beautiful and manipulative or as weak, 
passive housewives.  It emphasizes the need for an educational system that strengthens 
women‘s active role in society, and the importance of launching social campaigns that 
enlighten people about women‘s rights.  However, the fact that Hewar Al Arab is a 
programme on a pan-Arab news channel means that the number of episodes covering 
development issues relating to women will not always be sufficient, since news channels 
usually have other priorities.   
  
In drama, especially the Arab Gulf dramas, such as Al Sakenat fee Golobena, the evidence 
here shows a clear need for more audience research, especially amongst disadvantaged 
women, so as to present scenes and characters to which viewers can relate.  Arab Gulf drama 
also needs professional writers who can write stories with better plots and characters to 
generate better elements of didacticism and excitement.  The plot diagram of the episodes 
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was mostly flat, without a clear trajectory of action, climax, slowing down and resolution.  
The camera shots are thus slow.  The moments of silence are frequent, and the soundtrack is 
sluggish, which, in conjunction with the poor plot, results in a bored audience, regardless of 
the relevance of the topics and circumstances.  Added to this, the exaggerated emotions and 
wooden acting lacks spontaneity and naturalness leaving viewers bored and they lose interest.  
Arab Gulf drama on women‘s development issues falls short in the same way that Kalam 
Nawaim does, as it covers important matters, such as poverty and the importance of 
education, but in a superficial manner.  For example, the importance of education is covered 
without mentioning the high incidence of unemployment among graduates and the low level 
of salaries, both of which discourage women from completing their education.  This also 
incentivizes women to pursue an easier route to financial security, for instance, by marrying a 
rich man, regardless of the unhappy consequences and lack of spousal compatibility.  The 
issue of poverty is covered, but without discussing its causes in an oil-rich country, e.g., 
corruption, the unequal and unfair distribution of wealth.  Besides this, women in Arab Gulf 
dramas are always portrayed as weak and passive, unable to overcome any difficulties, and 
subordinate to tribal culture and traditions.  These results in a superficial discussion of 
development issues in general and women‘s problems in particular, which may reinforce the 
prevailing notion of women‘s weakness and dependency on men, instead of competently 
dealing with their problems.  
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In situation comedy, semiotic analysis is significant, as it sheds lights on the meanings behind 
the show.  There are several examples in Tash Ma Tash where the discourse alone, without 
the semiotic signs, such as dress code, make-up, facial expressions, exaggerated behaviour, 
and the soundtrack, does not adequately convey its meaning, and this misleads the audience 
as to what or to whom the sarcasm and ridicule are aimed, e.g., even though Humod was 
angry with Nasser and verbally attacked him with abrasive language, his exaggerated facial 
expressions and the accompanying music suggest his conservative character is an object of 
ridicule rather, than fear, cueing viewers to laugh.  Even though Tash Ma Tash is a popular 
satirical situation comedy, admired by most Saudis because it satirises their social, political 
and economic concerns, one episode on women‘s development issues is insufficient.  Airing 
more episodes about women‘s development that focus on poverty, illiteracy and violence so 
as to highlight gender and class inequalities and how the Qur‘an is misinterpreted, especially 
verses relating to women, could potentially impact on society and decision-makers, given 
how popular this comedy is.  Satire‘s power lies in its ability to scrutinize critical issues and 
encourage viewers to effortlessly do likewise.        
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Chapter 7 
 
THE WOMEN OF GOZ AL JAAFARH AND THEIR REACTIONS TO 
SATELLITE TELEVISION’S TREATMENT OF: POVERTY, 
ILLITERACY AND VIOLENCE     
  
“The choice of empirical methods of investigation is only one part of a double 
venture:  it is in the dialectic between the empirical and the theoretical, between 
experience and explanation, that forms of knowledge, that is interpretations, are 
constructed” (quoted in Ang, 1994, p.105).     
 
In this study, I have used an empirical method, which is a qualitative ethnography that began 
with participant observation in a village, Goz Al Jaafarh.  Throughout the field observations, 
focus groups and interviews, I explored these women‘s differing interpretations of the 
programmes about poverty, illiteracy and violence on MBC1.  In doing so, I allowed the 
research participants to freely narrate their personal experiences of these topics.   
 
Here, I will present data from the interviews first, before the focus groups, even though the 
data were not collected in that order.  The interviews shed light on both the women‘s social 
context and their television consumption and they help to introduce the women of Goz Al 
Jaafarh to the reader before exploring their reactions that emerged from the focus groups after 
they had viewed the MBC programmes. 
 
7.1 In-Depth One-to-One Interviews 
  
The disadvantaged women I met in Goz Al Jaafarh differ from one another in terms of age 
and economic, educational and social background.  However, I was also keen to highlight the 
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similarities amongst them since they share the same ethnic backgrounds and village life.  I 
share Ann Gray‘s argument here:  
 
“...hold on to a category which enables not just differences to be revealed but also 
those profound and persistent commonalities which would seem to exist between 
women and which can form the basis of social critique.  As I hope the following 
analysis will show, gender rarely reveals itself in pure form, but does intersect with 
other determinations, even within the most apparently traditional forms of household 
unit” (Gray, 1992, p.31).   
 
This section also focuses on how these differences and similarities influenced women‘s 
television consumption including their opinions of the television programmes.  
   
7.1.1 Women’s Social Context   
One of the main things I learned from my fieldwork was to avoid terms such as ‗illiterate‘ 
when describing the women, as there are different levels and forms of literacy.  I therefore 
chose to adopt the term ‗informally educated‘ instead, and applied this term both to those 
who have not been to school at all and to those who left school at an early age (from the 2
nd
-
6
th
 grade) and still did not read or write proficiently.  In contrast, the term ‗formally educated‘ 
is applied to those who had completed high school and above.  I used the terms ―dropped out 
of school‖ or ―did not complete their education‖ to refer to those who know how to read and 
write but were not able to complete high school, mainly those who stopped going to school at 
the  4
th
 or 6
th
 grade.  Where grades are mentioned next to respondents‘ names below, this 
indicates the level at which the respondent left school.  It is important to highlight here that 
primary education in Saudi Arabia is not compulsory.     
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Since most women, whether formally or informally educated, are not part of the cash labour 
market, domestic responsibilities are held by all participants and these duties take different 
forms.  They include cleaning the house, cooking and taking care of siblings.  Some of the 
girls dropped out of school owing to excessive house-work responsibilities, because they 
could not manage both their school-work and their house-work.  Other poor families, who 
cannot afford to educate their children, hold the view that boys‘ education is more important 
than girls‘, since boys are going to be the breadwinners while girls are going to be the home-
makers.  The women of Goz Al Jaafarh hold unpaid reproductive roles, which include child 
care responsibilities and domestic tasks. ‗Reproduction of labour‘ includes child-care and 
domestic work that the society considers natural female home work (Moser, 1993, p. 29).     
  
Girls drop out of school in the village for a number of reasons.  For example, many are 
brought up to prepare for marriage rather than employment, a factor that explains the high 
unemployment rate amongst numerous women graduates in the village.  Furthermore issues 
such as a lack of transport, inadequate teaching standards and facilities at school, and 
outdated curricula discourage girls from continuing their studies.  For these reasons, village 
girls want to get married and have children for both economic and social reasons that will 
give them more power and prestige (Ibid, p.45).  Girls see that their mothers act as managers, 
administering all the practical, everyday affairs of the family and controlling the household 
budget, which is considered the female domain.  They see that this is where their power lies 
so this is what they are aiming for.  They recognise that a woman‘s role as a domestic 
manager gives her a special sense of pride and authority.  As one participants remarked: 
―Decision-making is in the hands of my father, but the budget is under the control of my 
mother.  When my father gets his monthly salary, he gives it to my mother.‖  Even though 
money is conferred by the husband, how that money is spent on the household‘s day-to-day 
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management, is in the hands of the women.  Dwyer and Bruce (1988) argued that men are 
rarely aware of their wives‘ coping strategies and that this depiction of the household as 
embodying both conflict and cooperation, gives a sense of togetherness in this gender conflict 
(quoted in Moser, 1993, p. 25). Men here are the leaders of the household while women are 
the managers.  As long as women mobilize around issues relating only to these restricted 
responsibilities and do not challenge the status quo, they become powerful and can avoid 
conflict (Ibid, p.36).   
 
In light of the above discussion, it is crucial not to overestimate the degree of additional 
power and independence which a woman could enjoy by obtaining formal education and/or 
employment.  It is also essential not to underestimate the degree of power and control a 
woman can exercise – in the household, without being formally educated or employed.  In 
fact, they are both important, but it is worth referring here to Elson‘s argument that the 
empowerment of women should focus not only on economic factors but also on various 
social factors and relationships that constrain women (Elson, 1991, p.195).   
 
Most participants live in nuclear families, except those who are recently married and still 
dependent on their family for financial support or those coming from polygamous houses 
where there is no space for them.  For example, Aya is 26 years old, has a high school degree, 
is unemployed and recently married.  Her husband cannot afford a place of their own, so they 
are living in her husband‘s family‘s house.  Hasnaa, educated to 4th grade, is also recently 
married, 24 years old and has a new born baby.  She lives with her in-laws, but when her 
husband travels she stays with her own family.  
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“The biggest thing that I am suffering from is not having a private house, for 
financial reasons.  The main conflict between my husband and me is over finances.  
Once I got extremely angry and I asked him to let me stay at my parents‟ house until 
he finds me our own house.  But my mother advised me to stay with my husband 
wherever he is.” (Hasnaa, 24, educated to 4th grade)           
  
Another participant left her father‘s house and decided to live at her sister‘s house.  There 
were too many children in her father‘s house and they were experiencing financial 
difficulties, especially after her father married his fourth wife.   
 
“I had a very enjoyable childhood, until my father got married a second time and 
especially after he married the fourth time.  His fourth wife is a young Yemeni 
woman.  He loves her a lot and she has caused this split in the family.  My father 
stopped caring about his family after he married her.  This is what has most affected 
me in my life, and I wish I could live with my mother but there is no room for me in 
the house, especially with my brothers and their children there, and with a difficult 
financial situation.” (Tamara, 18, 6th grade)  
 
Domestic violence against women occurs for several reasons.  Al Abdeen said that customs 
and traditions controlled those who set the laws, despite their being in conflict with Islamic 
law.  She also added that eradicating violence against women could not be achieved as long 
as women were deprived of legal agency, with male guardianship rules imposed upon them 
(Al Abdeen 2008, p.8).  Al Abdeen also emphasised that the power given to the male relative 
guardian gave him a sense of ownership over women.
21
  Some of the participants experience 
                                                 
21
 Suhaila Zain Al Abdeen, "Extraction of male relative guardian ..  Mechanism to combat incest" 
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abuse because of their father‘s addiction to drugs and qat, a plant which is chewed for its 
stimulating properties and which is popular in the southern region of Saudi Arabia.  Others 
experience abuse because of family interference from relatives, especially mothers- in-law, 
who encourage their sons to mistreat their wives or encourage them to take more than one 
wife.  Others suffer at the hands of their parents.  For example, Shadia was physically abused 
by her father, as were, her siblings and mother, while he was under the influence of qat.   
 
“My mother lived for 14 years under my father‟s oppression and his addiction to qat.  
He physically abused my mother, my siblings and me while under the influence of qat.  
My mother tried to defend her rights by going to court and to the police but she was 
not successful.  My father never paid us anything.  He also never responded to the 
police or the court‟s call.  The judges and the police are biased and stood beside my 
father.  They told us that since we were living with our mother, we couldn‟t obtain 
social security.  My siblings and I were deprived even of our right to social security 
and it was given to our father.  We all depend on my mother‟s social security, which 
is SR 700.” (Shadia, 18, 2nd grade)  
 
Rahma complained how her father physically abused her mother and verbally abused her.   
 
“My grandmother always created problems for my mother and tried to separate her 
from my father by using black magic.  My father got married again to a Yemeni 
woman, but after a lot of problems with her, he divorced his second wife and returned 
to my mother.  But still my grandmother interferes in my parents‟ lives and wants my 
father to marry again.  The other cause of conflict is financial and my father‟s 
                                                                                                                                                        
http://www.musanadah.com/index.php?action=show_t&id=49 
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addiction to qat.  When my father receives his social security, he gives half of it to my 
mother to spend on the house and the children and the rest he spends on qat.  He 
never thinks to pay his debts.  My mother always advises my father to stay away from 
qat but he never listens and if he doesn‟t have his qat, he gets extremely angry, bad 
tempered and starts physically and verbally abusing us.” (Rahma, 15, 6th grade)           
 
Maha is abused by both her mother and father.  She visits her father‘s family whom her 
mother dislikes, which irritates her mother, and as a result her mother encourages her father 
to beat her for no reason.  Maha left school because of depression and the heavy domestic 
workload at home.  She could not manage both her studies and the domestic duties given to 
her by her mother.  When Maha got engaged she became extremely attached to her fiancé and 
felt he was filling her emotional emptiness, and giving her much-needed security and 
compassion.   
  
“I am attached to him to the extent that I feel he is my soul mate.  I know that his 
salary is low and he does not have any income other than his salary, but I do not care.  
I consider him and his family to be my family.  My mother-in-law and my father-in- 
law are more compassionate towards me than my own parents.  My mother-in-law 
gives me more gifts than my mother.” (Maha, 21, 9th grade)        
  
Feminists agree that the family is the core site of women‘s oppression and that state policy 
towards women within the family is ambiguous because the family is seen as a private 
domain in which the state can only meddle under certain circumstances.  The concept that 
family affairs, especially in traditional societies, are a private matter, means husbands and 
fathers are free to treat their wives and daughters as they wish behind closed doors.  Women 
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may be tolerant of domestic violence and sexual abuse because of their financial dependency 
on men.  Since domestic violence occurs in the private realm of the home, it is largely 
invisible.  Even when domestic violence is made public, judges, the courts and the police are 
reluctant to interfere because such matters are considered private family issues.  In addition, 
the social and economic disadvantages of being a single woman pressures women to stay 
married regardless of the violence they experience and their unfair treatment (quoted in 
Moser, 1993, p.44).     
 
7.1.2 Women’s Television Consumption  
The percentage of Saudi families who own televisions reached 94.19% in 2007, hence the 
perceived potential of utilising television as a means of raising awareness (Kingdom of Saud 
Arabia, Ministry of Economy & Planning, Central Department of Statistics and Information 
2007, pp.46).  The results of the detailed 2004 Census of Population and Housing in the Jazan 
region showed that 87.6% of Saudi households have televisions and 32.1% have satellite 
(Ministry of Economy & Planning, Central Department of Statistics and Information, 2004, 
pp. 26).  In Sabya Province, where the village of Goz Al Jaafarh is located, 21,076 families 
own television and 7,213 families have satellite (Ibid, p.110).   
 
During my fieldwork, I saw that televisions with satellite reception were in every household I 
visited regardless of how poor the families were, proving the importance of television as a 
source of entertainment and information in everyday village life.  As Silverstone argued: 
 
“Television is a domestic medium.  It is watched at home.  Ignored at home.  
Discussed at home.  Watched in private and with members of family or friends.  But it 
is part of our domestic culture in other ways too, providing in its programming and 
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its schedules models and structures of domestic life, or at least of certain versions of 
domestic life” (Silverstone, 1994, p.24).   
 
The absence of all forms of entertainment such as going to coffee shops, social clubs, or 
going to the beach, coupled with the fact that girls are not even allowed to go out to shop 
unless they are accompanied by a mahram (male relative guardian), and are therefore limited 
to socialising only with families and close friends, explains their inflated reliance on, 
television and mainly satellite television, as their chief source of entertainment.    
 
I came across a few households where certain satellite channels were censored for religious 
reasons, so that only news channels, sport channels, religious channels and cartoons could be 
watched.  Channels deemed to pose a moral threat to the family are considered haram or 
taboo.  Even though, when growing up, those participants were obliged to accept that only 
these channels were allowed, they told me that they remain convinced that this is the right 
thing to do and they have not thought to get more channels.     
 
The participants either watch television on their own, if they have their own separate 
television set, or watch it with their family.  Those who prefer watching television with their 
family usually share the same opinions, and they discuss the programme or the drama serials 
after watching them.  Those who prefer watching television on their own usually prefer to be 
on their own anyway and do not get along with other family members.  Press (1995, p.61) 
argues that some family members may use television to inform patterns of interaction with 
other family members.  For others, watching television is considered more as an individual 
leisure activity and an opportunity to take a break from the rest of the family, which may lead 
to greater individualism.    Where families only have one television and family members are 
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obliged to choose only one channel, those who have the right to choose are the eldest and 
where women and men are concerned, men always get to choose.   
 
“We have only one television and my father rarely allows me to watch my favourite 
programmes because he watches television the whole time.  He likes to watch 
television while he is chewing qat.  That‟s why I prefer watching television at night 
after my father has gone to sleep.” (Rahma, 15, 6th grade)  
 
Moreover, girls and women lacking formal education have a tendency towards self-sacrifice 
in every aspect of life, including watching television.   
 
“In the case of a conflict over what television programme to watch, I give the choice 
to the other person.  Since I haven‟t completed my education, I don‟t feel I have the 
right to anything at home, including watching television.  My favourite time to watch 
television is at 1a.m. after everybody has gone to sleep and I have finished cleaning 
the house.” (Lateefa, 30, 3rd grade)     
 
Cornes points out that the basic needs for women‘s literacy are self-empowerment and self-
esteem (Cornes, 1994, p.118).  An absence of literacy, on top of how women are brought up 
and socialised in the village, discourages women from engaging in open confrontation and 
disputes.   
 
One of the main purposes of my one-to-one interviews was to know how participants 
perceived television programmes and their opinions on the MBC1 programmes that related to 
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poverty, illiteracy and violence.  The focus was on the programmes that were played in the 
focus groups, which were also those that were selected for textual analysis.   
  
Kalam Nawaim is a talk show for women and is popular among the girls in the village, but 
they still had some criticisms.  Most girls thought that the show did not focus on girls of their 
own class and age.  The show is unpopular among girls between 15 and 22 years of age and 
they thought that the show was more suitable for women who are 25 years old or older and 
for those who are middle class or well-off.   
 
“I don‟t like Kalam Nawaim because it doesn‟t represent my needs in anything, 
neither in age nor in class.  Kalam Nawaim presents problems for older women not of 
my own age and most of the episodes focus on issues relating to the upper and middle 
classes and rarely highlight anything to do with the poor.  It also concentrates on 
entertainment and celebritie, such as interviewing actresses and singers who have no 
place on a talk show for social issues.” (Rahma, 15, 6th grade)     
 
Nadine agreed with Rahma.   
 
“I would like to see more episodes discussing girls my age and who share my social 
circumstances.  I like the talk show Wahed Men AlNas (One of the People) on the 
Dream channel, and I like the show 99 that is presented on Saudi Channel 1 because, 
they represent the problems of our class.  I also like Seerat Hob (Love Life) presented 
by Fawzia Al Deree on Al-Rai Kuwaiti channel because it represents problems of 
girls of my own age.  I wish Kalam Nawaim presented problems more closely related 
to disadvantaged classes, like Wahed Men AlNas and 99 and presented more the 
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problems concerning young female adults and adolescents, like Seerat Hob.    I also 
like Sabaya (Young Female Adults) on Al Mehwar Channel because it presents girls‟ 
problems of all ages and classes.” (Nadine, 22, 6th grade)     
    
Fadwa has another comment on the programme.   
 
“I don‟t like Kalam Nawaim because of the presenters.  I never feel moved when they 
talk because their style does not stir me.  I like Dr. Fawzia Al Deree, the presenter of 
Seerat Hob on Al-Rai Kuwaiti Channel, because of her interaction with the girls and 
her acquaintance with the subjects.  She also covers current issues not old ones like 
the ones on Kalam Nawaim.  I also like her sincerity and seriousness more than the 
presenters of Kalam Nawaim.” (Fadwa, 19, 12th grade)  
 
Some feminist critics argue that talk shows reflect a woman‘s situation by creating ―a sense 
of community‖ between the guests and the audience, in which the presenter does not speak as 
a formal expert but as a peer (Cragin, 2010, p.157).  In this instance, the participant did not 
see the presenter either as a formal expert or peer, but rather as an individual that was not 
related to her and, accordingly, she lost interest in the show.      
 
Maha thinks that Kalam Nawaim should present more episodes about sexual education.  In 
her view, one of the causes of physical and verbal abuse against women is a lack of sexual 
understanding between couples.  She recently got engaged and would like to have such 
knowledge before she gets married.   
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“When my fiancé tried to kiss me for the first time, I didn‟t allow him, I thought only 
foreigners are allowed to kiss, not Saudis…when my fiancé tells me nice things, I get 
embarrassed and don‟t respond…I can‟t ask my mother about these things that‟s why 
I want to watch programmes about sexual education.  There was one episode on 
Kalam Nawaim about the wedding night, but I missed it.  One episode is not enough... 
I want to be educated on this subject.”(Maha, 21, 9th grade)  
    
Some feminists argue that talk shows should move from a preoccupation with gender issues 
to more pressing matters of race, class and sexuality (Cragin, 2010, p.166).  This theory is 
supported by Goz Al Jaafarh girls, who felt that Kalam Nawaim failed to reflect any of their 
concerns, whether related to class or age.  These comments correspond with Andrea Press‘s 
argument that working class women‘s resistance to models of hegemonic domination in 
television programmes is not only a result of gender-specific concerns, similar to those of 
middle class women, but also of class specific issues (Press, 1991, p.97).   Women, in 
general, like soap operas and talk shows because ―these shows enact discourse about relevant 
issues by people with whom they identify‖.  Hobson (1991) argued that women like talk 
shows because they enjoy listening to other people‘s problems, which they can then relate to 
and empathise with (quoted in Wood, 2005, p.116, 117).  However, the girls of Goz Al 
Jaafarh could barely find subjects or solutions to their problems in Kalam Nawaim with 
which they could identify or empathise.      
 
Most participants think that Al Sakenat fee Golobena is the drama serial that has best depicted 
the problems of village and disadvantaged women.  They mostly agree that the stories in the 
episodes could be true, but think the acting is poor.  Participants like Tash Ma Tash because it 
is comedy and it tackles critical issues in Saudi society.  Even those who do not like the show 
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and think it is silly agree that presenting disadvantaged women‘s issues in such a popular 
show will make society more aware of their problems so decision-makers can address them.   
 
“I prefer Al Sakenat fee Golobena to Tash Ma Tash because it better reflects reality 
and village life.  But I would like to see the stories in Sakenat fee Golobena acted out 
in Tash Ma Tash because it is a much more famous show and everybody watches it, 
so it will have a wider impact in society.  I want women‟s suffering to be watched by 
everybody not only by women.  I want solutions to this misery and change.  The 
village needs basic necessities, such as water and food.  Presenting our case in a 
show as well-known as Tash Ma Tash could make people more aware of our 
situation.” (Maram, 24, 6th grade)       
 
One of the interviewees explained her opinion of Al Sakenat fee Golobena,  
 
“I don‟t like Al Sakenat fee Golobena, not because of the stories but because of the 
artificial acting and overstated characters.  I don‟t like to watch weak and passive 
women but would rather see a more real personality, with strengths and weaknesses.  
I want to see how a woman can overcome difficulty; that‟s why I prefer watching 
Egyptian drama serials to Saudi or GCC drama, because they are more realistic and 
their acting is more natural.”(Fadwa, 19, 12th grade) 
 
Rahma gave her views on the image of village women in the Saudi and GCC dramas in 
general:  ―I do not feel the role of village women in GCC and Saudi dramas is realistic 
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because of the clothes, make up, and hair styles.  I don‘t feel that they reflect our reality 
here‖.  Another participant shared the same view about the image and acting that are 
supposed to portray village women.   
 
“For the roles of village women to be persuasive, the actresses have to live in the 
villages in order to understand the role and to act convincingly.   Most of these 
actresses do not have any experience of village life so their acting is artificial and 
unconvincing.  The representations and performances are artificial.” (Najeeba, 22, 
3
rd
 grade)    
 
Participants‘ responses correspond with Press‘s argument that working-class women are more 
critical than middle-class women about how realistic television is, through their judgment of 
characters and stories (Press, 1994, p.99).  Participants‘ responses in my study resemble those 
of the participants that Abu-Lughod discussed in Drama of Nationhood.  They criticised the 
inaccuracies of village women‘s dress and dialects and also found flaws with how much 
make-up they wore and how long their nails were (Abu-Lughod, 2005, p.73).  Even in 
situation comedy, audiences seek to identify with characters.   Identification with media 
characters increases viewers‘ enjoyment and may increase the intensity of emotional 
reactions (Lin, 2008, p.6).      
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Additional feedback from participants on MBC 1 programmes, including Al Sakenat fee 
Golobena, Tash Ma Tash and Kalam Nawaim, is covered in the focus groups section below.    
 
7.2 Focus Groups 
  
7.2.1 Al Sakenat fee Golobena 
 
Through my discussions with participants, I noted different interpretations by participants, 
depending on whether they were formally educated or, only had an informal education.  Most 
of the time, the informally-educated participants shared the same opinion as those who did 
not complete their education, but the latter had the courage to speak up and express their 
opinions more than the former.  The participants‘ educational, social and economic 
backgrounds, as well as their age, seemed to be implicated in their interpretations.    
 
7.2.1.1 Zafaf Jotha
22
 
The main subject of Zafaf Jotha was poverty.  Since the participants are disadvantaged 
women, the episode appealed to most of them, although their understanding of it varied 
according to their age, education, and social and economic status.  Even though most 
participants are disadvantaged, some were poorer than others, and this was reflected in their 
interpretations.    
 
The most obvious example of these women‘s struggle with poverty was illustrated in this 
interpretation by some of the participants:   
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 For details of the clip, see Chapter 6 
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“With all these financial temptations, I agree with Zainab and I am going to do the 
same as her.  A 150,000 SR dowry, villa and apartment, are temptations that I cannot 
resist regardless of the marriage being a secret or not.” (Iman, 30, 3rd grade)     
 
Another participant added that education is not an option in her situation because, among 
other obstacles, it is expensive.  So it is easier to accept the marriage proposal.  She said: 
 
“When Abu Saud explained that he couldn‟t afford for his children to go to school, 
this is very true to life.  Most families in the village have children who couldn‟t 
continue with their education because of money and a lack of transport.  Both are 
huge problems in the village.  70% of the girls in the village couldn‟t complete their 
education because of a lack of transport.” (Hadeel, 30, 12th grade)  
 
Skeggs (2002) points out that disadvantaged women aim to improve their economic status 
and overcome poverty through marriage.  The media allegedly perpetuate the image of 
disadvantaged women as vulgar, ignorant or passive, which compounds their feelings of 
inferiority.  This makes working-class women aspire to the respected and sophisticated 
position of middle- class women.   
 
The fact that most participants share the same circumstances as Zainab‘s family helped them 
to empathise, which was reflected in their comments.   
 
“My circumstances were extremely bad.  I was hoping to continue my education but I 
couldn‟t, because of my father‟s death and I have been through the same difficult 
experiences as Zainab.” (Amany, 22, 6th grade) 
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“With the materials given to Zainab, she will be greatly comforted.  I suffered a lot in 
my life and I would accept such a marriage proposal immediately and would be 
extremely happy.  I would agree even if he was sterile, sick and old.” (Hadeel, 30, 12th 
grade)  
 
Bausinger draws our attention to the importance of audience research in revealing how the 
mass media is integrated into everyday life (quoted in Livingstone, 1998, p.19).  When 
interpreting a programme, viewers use not only the programme, but also their past experience 
to inform their judgment.  Robert and Bachen (1981, p.21) also write that:  
 
“...different responses may derive from variations in how similar messages are 
interpreted by different people or by similar people under differing conditions” 
(quoted in Ibid, p.21).   
 
The participants‘ comment about the role of girls in helping their families could be 
considered an extension of the girls‘ traditional caring role.  Hartley (1994, p.36) describes 
this as ―the traditional female role of carer, communicator and selfless helper of others.‖    
 
Others disagreed with Zainab‘s decision to marry a rich man in order to lift herself out of 
poverty.  These views were mostly held by those with formal education and those who are 
financially better off.   Even though most of the formally-educated participants did not have 
paid jobs and were financially dependent on their families, their education afforded them 
higher self-esteem.  Cornes (1994, p. 118) points out that most women‘s desire for literacy is 
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rooted in a need for higher self-esteem and greater self-confidence.  Jameela‘s comment 
highlighted the link between education and independence.     
 
“I will never sacrifice my happiness for money.  Happiness is more important than 
money.  I would rather depend on myself and work, even if my income didn‟t bring me 
the same fortune as marrying someone like Abu Turki.” (Jameela, 16, 10th grade)     
 
Her argument was supported by another participant who had stayed longer in the education 
system than others: 
 
“The fact that Abu Turki asked to keep this marriage secret is humiliating and 
disrespectful.  I would never accept such a proposal even if he asked for it to be kept 
secret only from his family and employees. Besides, he is old, sick and sterile.” 
(Fareeda, 18, 12
th
 grade)       
 
Here we see that a women‘s pride in her class is shaped by formal education.  Cornes (Ibid, 
p.118) highlights how women gain from literacy by learning to communicate confidently 
with other adults, to be assertive and to make decisions.  These participants resist the female 
tendency to the self-denial and self-sacrifice that is associated with a caring role, to cultivate 
a ‗culture of respectable familialism‘ (Skeggs, 1997, p.63).  Literate women are encouraged 
to develop their own evaluation of good and bad caring practices.  These respondents refuse 
what Walkerdine (1984) has named female selflessness and passivity, which are typically 
produced as a result of the struggle to overcome ‗bad‘ qualities: 
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“Selflessness, even though it brings pain and suffering, brings its own rewards 
(knowledge of good deeds and righteousness).  If the heroines are displayed as 
passive victims of circumstances, all bad and difficult actions and emotions are held 
by others … selflessness becomes a virtue and doing anything for oneself is by 
implication bad and selfish” (quoted in Skeggs, 1997, p.65).   
 
All the participants completely rejected the scene where Abu Turki visits Abu Saud and asks 
him to call his daughters so he can meet them.  They explained that the scene was not 
realistic because, in their view, it does not adhere to Islamic and traditional rules.   
 
“The scene of Abu Saud‟s daughters greeting Abu Turki after Abu Turki has asked to 
see them, simply couldn‟t happen in our village.  Even if the father here needs his job, 
he would never allow his daughters to be exposed to a strange man.  The girls weren‟t 
fully covered as they were not veiled.  Wearing a headscarf and abaya aren‟t decent 
enough.  The girls could have thanked Abu Turki for his gifts and generosity behind 
the door, but to greet him directly would be impossible.” (Hadeel, 30, 12th  grade)       
 
Here, the participant‘s response corresponds with Press‘s argument that working-class 
women are more critical of television‘s realism than middle-class women.  Her study showed 
how working-class women are more concerned with how realistic characters and storylines 
are (Press, 1994, p.99).   
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7.2.1.2 Al-Kheyar Al Saab 
23
  
In the second clip, Al-Kheyar Al Saab, some participants sympathized with the way Basma 
was deprived of an education by her father, as they had suffered similarly.  Most women in 
Goz Al Jaafarh are negatively impacted by a dominant male culture in which social and 
material conditions are extremely difficult for them.   
 
The most striking example of how a man controls a woman‘s future is illustrated by one 
participants:  
 
“This can easily happen if a girl studies without her father‟s permission, especially if 
he has already forbidden her from attending school.  The beating she suffered was 
inevitable and in fact, it is likely that a girl would get more than a slap.  Basma‟s 
father‟s character is very familiar.” (Maha, 21, 9th grade)       
 
Sameera agreed with Maha, saying that ―there are cases like this where fathers prohibit their 
daughters from continuing their education.‖  Hana added that ―any father in the village, who 
discovered that his daughter had done something behind his back, would react as Basma‘s 
father did and worse.‖ 
 
All the participants agreed with Basma when she said that customs and traditions are the 
cause of underdevelopment and backwardness.  They also think such traditions are used by 
men to silence women and that education is the best way to fight such oppression.  One 
participant put it this way:   
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 For details of the clip, see Chapter 6 
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“Education has a role to play in improving the sophistication of women.  If women 
are educated, they can challenge the thinking behind customs and traditions and pay 
them less attention.  I will try to change these traditions by focusing on my education 
and talking to my family.” (Khadeeja, 30, 12th grade) 24   
 
This reveals how literacy for women is a means of self-empowerment and self-improvement.  
The respondents‘ perception is that education is a major source of power, and a site of 
struggle and resistance.  Literacy offers the promise of independence and allows younger 
women to dream of a life without fear and violence.  It also requires a change to the 
traditional system and adapting to new roles to resist men‘s control (Zubair, 2001, pp. 199-
201).         
 
Another participant added: 
 
“The first step is to challenge these traditions is through our mothers by encouraging 
them to get educated.  Then mothers can support each others.  The educated ones 
must cooperate with the uneducated ones for the sake of change.  This persistence is 
crucial for any change.  My brothers changed with persistence over time.  My 
brother‟s behaviour towards my younger sister is more moderate than his treatment 
of me.  A change to traditions depends on girls‟ determination and mothers‟ support”. 
(Hadeel, 30, 12
th
 grade)   
 
Hadeel‘s emphasis on mutual support between mothers, as well as on mothers‘ support for 
their daughters, is inspiring.  Voices such as hers are rarely heard, especially on television, 
                                                 
2424
 Khadeeja was not able to go college because her grade average was low at high school.  Now she is studying 
humanitarian science through-distance education at Sabya University 
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and can develop or inspire change in the situation of disadvantaged village women.  Without 
these women‘s voices it is difficult to see how a Saudi woman‘s movement that cuts across 
class can emerge.  According to van Zoonen, giving more voice to the voiceless is one way to 
do this and can spark the beginning of a genuine woman‘s movement (van Zoonen, 1994, 
p.128). 
 
Another participant suggested a different way of changing traditions.  She said:  
 
“We are forced to do many things in the name of tradition.  We are forced to stay at 
home and we are banned from driving, and we are not even allowed to share cars 
with other girls to get to school.  The best way to convince fathers to change such 
customs is to tempt them with money.  You need to convince them that if girls are 
educated, they will help to improve the family‟s financial circumstances.” (Fareeda, 
18, 12
th
 grade)   
 
It is sometimes said that women try to resist patriarchal power and male domination through 
―weapons‖ of slyness and stratagem.  Bourdieu realised that these ―weapons‖ are used to 
―manoeuvre‖ through manipulation, but concluded that ―the weapons of the weak are weak 
weapons‖ (quoted in Adkins & Skegg, 2006, p.52).  In the face of gender and class 
domination, disadvantaged women may resist and in some cases are powerful enough to 
effect change.   
 
All the participants opposed Basma‘s mother passive weak personality when she was trying 
to convince her to obey her father.      
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“Basma‟s mother is weak and passive and should have done more to help her 
daughter.  The roles of women in the Gulf and Saudi dramas are unrealistic.  Women 
with strong personalities are portrayed as dominant and evil and kind women are 
portrayed as weak and passive.  This is not the case in real life”.  (Sameera, 22, 
senior college)   
 
Another participant added:  
  
“Basma‟s mother is weak and should have done more.  After the fight between Basma 
and her father, the mother should have talked with the father privately and negotiated 
with him.  Afterwards, the mother, daughter and the son should have united together 
against the father.  If all three of them had challenged him, he would have finally 
agreed.  But the mother was extremely weak and passive”.  (Hadeel, 30, 12th grade)    
 
Abu-Lughod experienced the same responses from her participants and their disappointment 
with the representation of village women as being passive and ignorant.  The participants also 
objected to the artificial dialogue and flawed depiction of characters (Abu-Lughod, 1995, 
pp.73-75).   
 
The above quotation illustrates how audience members are constructive, knowledgeable and 
can bring dialogue to life through using their own personal experiences of real life situations 
to relate to a woman‘s character (Li vingstone, 1998, p.173).  Corner (1995, p.175) proposes 
a three-step approach to decoding:  
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“First, comprehension refers to the process of decoding the denotative level of textual 
meaning.  Second, the connotative level of textual meaning is decoded through 
processes of implication and association.  Lastly, the viewer‟s response to these 
decoded meanings depends on his or her own contextual and personal 
circumstances.”          
 
There is a distinction between the reader‘s comprehension and interpretation of the storyline.  
Comprehension concentrates on correct and incorrect information, which is of more interest 
to psychologists because it depends on structures of knowledge.  Interpretation concentrates 
on the reader‘s contribution and should not be judged as correct or incorrect, but rather 
should be perceived as a product of the reader‘s experience, which generates critical and 
interesting analysis (Ibid, p.176).  Fiske argues that the pleasure of television viewing is often 
oppositional, because it is driven by a resistance to dominant ideology (quoted in Seiter et al, 
1989, p.4).  In this scene, the participants reject the dominant idea that village women are 
passive and weak, and doubt the realism of the whole scene.  This is a clear example of how 
audience members can redefine and reconstruct a storyline, according to their own 
experiences and perceptions of reality.         
 
Most participants think that fathers in general do not usually prevent their daughters from 
getting an education in the way illustrated in Basma‘s story in Al Kheyar Al Saab.  When I 
asked the participants specifically about fathers prohibiting their daughters from studying 
certain degrees, such as medicine, due to co-education in colleges, or because of mixed 
workplaces in particular professions, I got very different answers.   
 
 259 
 “Fathers don‟t prevent their daughters from getting an education but they may stop 
them from studying certain degrees, such as medicine and nursing, because they 
would have to mix with men.  If I studied for a degree my father had forbidden without 
telling him, his reaction would be the same as that of Basma‟s father.” (Bedoor, 22, 
12
th
 grade)       
 
Here, we learn about what happens in the real world, based on women‘s everyday 
experiences and social knowledge.   Livingstone (1998, p. 24) points out that we should 
always ―recognise both the structuring role of the text and the constructive role of the viewer 
in negotiating meaning.‖  According to Gillespie (1995, p. 28), viewers are ―engaged in 
constructing a viable culture through negotiations around the diverse resources available to 
them both in ‗real life‘ and on screen.‖  The participant‘s response also reveals ―the creation 
of meaning through the interaction of texts and readers is a struggle, a site of negotiation 
between two semi-powerful resources‖ (Livingstone 1998, p.26).  The response also exposes 
the importance of examining the various interpretations.  As Livingstone (Ibid, p.152) stated:     
 
“…we need to investigate not only the nature of viewers‟ interpretations, but also the 
extent to which these interpretations diverge from each other.  Further, we must 
assume neither complete consensus nor complete divergence in interpretations, but 
instead investigate the areas of consensus and divergence.”                 
 
Even though all the participants didn‘t approve of the passive and weak personality of 
Basma‘s mother, I asked them whether they thought education would strengthen women‘s 
personality.  By enabling them to challenge men‘s power, the women might learn more about 
relations between men and women.  The informally-educated participants or those who had 
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dropped out of school thought that education was not necessary for creating a strong 
personality.   
 
“Education is not always the tool to face men‟s dominance but women‟s personality 
is the basis.  You see illiterate women controlling their men.  On the other hand, 
women who have been at school are under men‟s control”.  (Nadine, 22, 6th grade)          
 
Through this statement, the participant tried to explain the value of other forms of literacy, 
which can form part of a women‘s personality, as explained by Hartley (1994, p.32):    
 
“A lack of literacy skills … need not be represented as though people are suffering 
from some… handicap… Communities develop networks of exchange and 
interdependence in which literacy is just one skill amongst many being bartered …. In 
this situation, the acquisition of literacy skills is not a first order priority at the 
individual level, so long as it is available at the community level.”  
 
One the other hand, formally-educated participants believe that education is an important 
source of empowerment.    
 
“Education has a role to play in developing a women‟s personality.  Educated women 
care less about customs and traditions.  Educated girls will have more influence in 
the household in the future.” (Areej, 18, 12th grade)        
 
This participant‘s response coincides with Corne‘s argument about literacy improving self-
esteem and, thereby women‘s empowerment and independence (Cornes 1994, p.118).   
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7.2.1.3 Burj Al Athraa
25
  
On watching the third clip, most participants did not approve of the violence perpetrated 
against Nouf by her brothers and father.  Some participants were totally against the idea of 
accepting forced marriage, even under physical duress as experienced by Nouf, but others 
thought that girls have no choice but to submit.   
 
“Many girls are forced to marry in this brutal way and the only option for girls is to 
surrender.  Most girls who are forced to marry get divorced, because they end up 
miserable.‖ (Nabeela, 27, 4th grade)    
 
Women‘s surrender to men‘s power is more apparent in village communities where social 
and material conditions are extremely difficult.  However, participants‘ resistance to male 
dominance is shown in their support of Nouf running away from her family.  In drama there 
is what is called ‗disruption‘ which is a disturbance that acts as a threat – in this case to 
patriarchal dominant ideology.  The rebellious women who challenge men‘s power are both 
loved and hated, their actions both praised and condemned.  Even scenes portraying women 
as victims can stimulate an awareness of how men‘s power is responsible for the 
victimisation.  Excess does not necessarily lead to negative interpretation; it allows for 
alternative understanding (Fiske, 1999, pp.181-193).  This is revealed in Nouf‘s escape and 
the participants‘ comments on this incident:   
 
“If I had been through the same experience, I would have escaped to the National 
Society for Human Rights because they deal with cases like this and are more trust-
worthy than any governmental departments.” (Ameera, 19, 12th grade)   
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 For details of the clip, see Chapter 6 
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Similarly, another supported Nouf‘s escape, but she had more doubts than the former 
participant about how safe she would be, remaining in the country:    
 
“If I planned to escape, I would leave the country to make sure that my family would 
not make me go back.  If I were abroad, even if my family planned to bring me back, I 
could sue them.  I would not feel safe unless I was abroad, in a country that respects 
human rights.” (Manal, 15, 7th grade) 
 
Some female adolescents, who face the same problem as Nouf in Burj Al Athraa, have no 
idea what to do.  This is shown in three of the participants‘ comments.  They are 15, 16 and 
17 years old:   
 
“If we could find someone to help us escape, we could do it, but the problem is that 
we couldn‟t escape without that help.  If we couldn‟t find it, we would surrender to 
our families‟ requests.” (Reema, 15, 8th grade; Noha, 17, 12th grade, and Muneera, 15, 
9
th
 grade)     
 
Al Abdeen has said that forcing female adolescents to marry damages them physically and 
psychologically.  It also increases the rate of illiteracy and leads to a high divorce rate.  She 
argues that forced marriages can also result in psychological and sexual misdemeanours 
among young wives, because once they reach maturity, their older husbands cannot fulfil 
them sexually and emotionally.  This may lead to the husband being murdered, to suicide or 
adultery.  Since such marriages damage society, Islam does not recognise them, on the 
principle of “La darar wa la edrar” (No harm or damage).26   
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 Suhaila Zain Al Abdeen, "Human Rights: Such marriages increase the divorce rate " 
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One of the participant‘s own experiences caused her to react very emotionally when she saw 
the excessive physical abuse suffered by Nouf at the hands of her father and brother.  She 
started to weep, because she remembered her father physically abusing her, her mother and 
siblings.  She said:  
 
“The problem is with the law.  The law is unfair to women.  Women are oppressed in 
everything.  My siblings and I were deprived even of our right to obtain social 
security when it was given to our father.  We all now depend on my mother‟s social 
security, which is SR 700.  The judges and the police are biased and stood beside my 
father.  They tell us that since we live with our mother, we can‟t have his social 
security.  They are not taking into consideration how severely he physically and 
verbally abuses all the family members.” (Shadia, 18, 2nd grade)   
 
Feuer argues that ‗hyperbolic excess‘ is one of the characteristics of melodrama, which 
exaggerates the dominance of the main text and undermines the dominant ideology.  An 
excessive exaggeration of women‘s victimization can provoke awareness of male power and 
patriarchal dominance.  Excess here does not actually lead to rebellious interpretations, but it 
allows the viewer to see behind the dominant ideology (quoted in Fiske, 1999, pp.192-193).   
 
On the other hand, other participants thought that the violent scene in Burj Al Athraa was 
unrealistic and overly exaggerated.     
 
“I have heard about many girls who have been forced to marry, but I have never 
heard about them being beaten so severely.  The beating was exaggerated in the 
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episode.  It was also unrealistic that Nouf was forced to marry her brother-in-law, 
given that this is not allowed in Islam unless the sister is deceased or divorced.  The 
story might be true generally, but the exaggeration and over-dramatisation leaves you 
feeling it is unrealistic.” (Ghada, 24, sophomore)  
 
Several participants who think that Egyptian drama is more realistic and the acting is more 
natural.  Egyptian melodrama is distinguished by its emotional drama.  Feuer argued that the 
distraught acting style in American soap operas is necessary to convey emotion.  Brooks 
explained that the ‗exaggerated emotions‘ of early nineteenth-century melodramatic acting 
were ‗expressionistic‘ to elucidate the ‗moral message‘.  Egyptian acting is as melodramatic 
as those mentioned by Feuer and Brooks‘s indication of emotion and morality.  Some critics 
of Egyptian drama relate it to ‗misery‘ and to being ‗tied up with tears‘.  Ang remarks that 
melodrama is depicted with a ‗tragic structure of feeling‘ giving the impression that 
performers are ‗victims of forces that lie beyond their control‘ (quoted in Abu-Lughod, 1995, 
p.117).   
 
7.2.2 Tash Ma Tash 
The episode Soor Al Hareem discussed several issues relating to women, including women‘s 
driving.  Participants, who suffer from a lack of transport and are poor, had different 
interpretations than others not in the same situation.  Formally-educated participants had 
different interpretations than those who had only been informally-educated and those who 
dropped out of school.  This is revealed in participants‘ statements:  
 
“If you ask all the women in the village; they would like to drive.  When brothers or 
fathers refuse to give them a ride, this leaves the women feeling humiliated and 
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helpless, which is why we want to drive.  None of us can achieve our ambition 
because of our dependence on men to get around.  We want to carry out the basic 
necessities in life, like moving around, by ourselves.” (Hadeel, 30 years, 12th grade)      
 
Other participants also supported this argument and added: 
 
“Women‟s driving is more than just about getting around; it is a path to women‟s 
independence.  That‟s why I want to drive.  I don‟t want to depend on anyone to give 
me a ride and I want to drive to save myself from the humiliation I feel each time I 
have to ask for a lift.  They are preventing us from driving, but at the same time they 
do not provide us with alternative public transport.  This is unfair.” (Fareeda, 18, 12th 
grade)   
 
Even though women‘s driving is not prohibited in Islam, women are prevented from driving 
in Saudi Arabia due to the problems that allegedly might result from driving (Al-Rasheed, 
2007, p.28).     
 
All the girls agreed with the member of the Town Council named Nasser, on his views to 
integrate women into the economic process by ensuring that the trade in women's necessities 
is limited to women only.  They all agreed that this would also spare them a great deal of 
embarrassment by not having to buy such necessities from men, and would also provide 
numerous job opportunities for women.   
 
“I am embarrassed to buy women‟s necessities from a man I do not know and even 
when the item is expensive or the size is incorrect, I am shy to bargain over the price 
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or ask for another size, so I buy the item and leave quickly.  Preventing women from 
selling such items is unfair.” (Fareeda, 18, 12th grade)          
 
Since the majority of the participants were in favour of women‘s driving, this made those 
who were against the idea reluctant to openly express their real views in the focus group 
discussions because they did not want to be viewed as closed-minded or unsympathetic to 
women‘s circumstances.  They got around their embarrassment by suggesting some steps that 
needed to be taken before allowing women to drive, or by attempting to be neutral.  One 
participants, who was against women driving, was a relative of the village mayor.  She said: 
 
“I am against women driving, but if a referendum was held, I would neither support 
nor oppose it.” (Seham, 30, 12th grade)   
  
“I don‟t see the need to drive because transport is available to my sisters and me.  But 
I hope if women are allowed to drive then this process is a gradual one and that 
women are only allowed to drive when they really need to.” (Ameera, 24, sophomore)   
 
Educational background and class have impacted on the participants‘ understanding of the 
themes discussed.  Van Zoonen (1994, p. 132) showed how interpretations of mass media 
should be seen as contingent upon individuals‘ backgrounds.  The formally-educated women 
were resistant to the idea of women driving because they do not need to drive; they have 
transport available to them.    
 
A unilateral patriarchal interpretation of the Qur‘an has dominated the school religious 
curriculum. The women‘s reaction, in favour of development without challenging existing 
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structures, is somewhat reminiscent of the Women in Development (WID) approach, 
discussed in Chapter 2.  The WID movement accepted existing social structures and did not 
question the sources of women‘s subordination and oppression.  It did not question why 
women had not benefited from development strategies and instead focused exclusively on the 
productive aspects of women‘s work, as a result ignoring or minimising the reproductive side 
of women‘s lives (Beneria & Sen, 1997, p.49).  Formally-educated women are influenced by 
the dominant/political order that is imprinted on the education system; hence they may 
believe they are in favour of development, even though they wish to preserve the status quo.  
They also seek to defend the power that they have as a result of their connections with 
religious scholars, who are considered members of the ruling class in Saudi Arabia.   
 
I asked the participants whether the conservative member of the Town Council, Humod, 
should be focusing on educational development, instead of on locating girls‘ schools and 
boys‘ schools on opposite sides of town to protect the girls.  One participant gave the 
following opinion:  
 
“They always focus on silly things and leave aside the important issues.  We all 
support a segregated society and such a discussion is not important.  What should be 
discussed is the quality of education, especially in villages, including the curriculum 
and the aggressive teachers who beat students and don‟t even teach well.  They 
should discuss the bad services in schools.  There is no air conditioning, no cafeteria, 
and there are no computer labs.  There are only a few classes and they are very 
crowded.” (Nadine, 22, 6th grade)          
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This participant may live in a village but her comment corresponds with criticisms made by 
some prominent Muslim thinkers and leaders.  The Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir 
Mohamad, for example, declared that one of the reasons for the decline of Muslims is their 
focus on trivialities and superficial issues.  He complained that Muslims are pre-occupied 
with Islamic testimonials, such as Islamic dress, and neglect important issues surrounding 
development.  As a result, Muslims have become dependant on other nations even for the 
most basic things (Mohamad 2000, p.22).  Most Islamists always focus on gender 
segregation, but rarely discuss social issues such as poverty, unemployment and the role of 
women in the country‘s development (Aksikas, 2009, p.108). 
 
I asked the participants if they thought that Council laws would be much fairer if there were 
women on the Council.  The participants who are the most disadvantaged, who have 
experienced the most injustice and who have dropped out of school supported this idea and 
thought that hiring female candidates would strengthen women‘s rights and balance laws 
relating to women.      
 
“I wish that women had the same voice as men.  The extremist hardliners in the 
Council are the majority and more influential than the liberals who are supportive of 
women‟s rights.  That‟s why someone like Nasser is frustrated, because his voice is 
not heard.” (Hadeel, 30, 12th grade)   
   
There are those extremists who want to deny women‘s access to the Shura Council and 
women‘s participation in decision-making and in elections.  They claim that such rights for 
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women are being brought over by the West as a result of the foreign colonisation of the Arab 
and Muslim world.
27
  
 
Participants who had not experienced hardships, and those who were formally-educated, 
veered towards the latter view.  They were unsure about women working in the Council.   
 
“I prefer decision-makers to be men because women are emotional.  Women who are 
selected to be decision-makers must be qualified and go through several qualification 
exams before acquiring such positions in order to make sure that their decisions can 
be relied upon.” (Nesreen, 30, diploma from teaching institute after the 9th grade)       
 
The Saudi constitution is based on a specific school of Islam.  Women‘s education and 
careers are perceived as of secondary importance, a view promulgated by clerics.  For 
example, Sheikh bin Baz of Saudi Arabia demands that women stay at home and limit 
themselves to undertaking housework. 
 
“He who wants to know the countless evils that mixing has wrought need only look at 
the plagues that have afflicted the nations that have made such choices … He will find 
concern on a personal and collective level over the escape of women from the home 
and the disintegration of the family” (quoted in Haddad, 1998, p.9).      
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7.2.3 Kalam Nawaim  
7.2.3 .1 Episode No. 293 (2009) 
The first clip discusses a particular act of violence at Saudi Arabian school.  The teacher 
brutally beat a female student, causing paralysis in one of her legs.  The school decided to 
punish the teacher by deducting five days of her salary.   All the participants agreed that 
corporal punishment should be prohibited in schools and the teacher‘s punishment was 
inadequate; she should have been dismissed.  All the girls had experienced physical and 
verbal abuse from teachers, which was one of the main reasons they left school.  They all 
agreed with the three presenters, Farah, Rania and Heba that physical violence should not be 
allowed at school, and they agreed with Heba that verbal abuse can be more painful than 
physical violence.   
 
“The punishment given to the teacher, a deduction of five days‟ worth of salary is 
inadequate because her actions paralysed the student.  My cousin had a similar 
experience where her teacher beat her so severely that she lost her voice and was 
unable to speak.  My cousin couldn‟t speak for years and the teacher was only 
transferred to another school.  The penalty is unfair.” (Samia, 22, senior college)   
  
Another participant narrated her own experience of being verbally abused by teachers, using 
a word like ‗shoes,‘ which is so impolite in Arabic that any spoken reference to shoes, even 
as an item of clothing, has to be followed by an apology: 
 
“Verbal abuse from teachers can be very disrespectful, using terms such as, you 
shoes, and the word, stupid, is used to describe students whether they are studious or 
not.  If the student complains to the Principal, nothing happens.  Afterwards, the 
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teacher takes revenge on the student by failing her.  Sometimes teachers threaten 
students by saying:  You will never pass your subjects.” (Maha, 21, 9th grade)      
 
Participants also discussed the different facilities in schools and the quality of the teaching 
across the regions in Saudi Arabia and between cities and villages.  Most of the participants 
who had lived in other regions and in cities recognised the differences.   
 
“There is a big difference between studying in Jazan and studying in Jeddah.  The 
facilities and teaching are much better there.  On the contrary, here, students are 
beaten for any minor reason such as being a little late and laughing with other 
students.  I will not go back to school until I return to Jeddah.” (Nadine, 22, 6th grade)    
 
Even though the wealth and the oil revenues of Saudi Arabia have helped to build a large 
number of schools and colleges, such wealth has not been distributed equally across all 
regions and villages (Findlay, 1994, p.90).  There is a tremendous difference between the 
facilities in Riyadh the capital, for example and Jazan.  In addition, there is a huge difference 
between services in cities and villages.  Disadvantaged women struggle for recognition, more 
than anything else.  Other participants think that the education system in the village enforces 
a culture of violence, immorality, and fails to reward students since most of those who 
graduate remain unemployed.    
 
“One of the main reasons girls leave school is the teaching style and teachers‟ 
physical abuse.  Physical abuse must be forbidden, as is the case in the Gulf 
countries.  When a student misbehaves, her parents must be called; corporal 
punishment will only encourage violent behaviour among girls as they seek to defend 
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themselves.  There must be laws that prohibit physical abuse, but the problem is not 
with a lack of laws but with the implementation.”  (Hadeel, 30, 12th grade)      
 
Other participants added that: 
 
“Relationships and connections play a big role in schools.  Students who have 
relatives at the same school, such as a mother or a sister, are untouchable both 
physically and verbally.  But for most students without these connections, they 
wouldn‟t even dare defend themselves.” (Fareeda, 19, 12th grade)       
 
One participants explained the corrupt education system and its impact on the few loyal 
teachers and on the students.   
 
“When a student complains to the education department in Sabya province, the 
complaint file never gets transferred to the education department in Jazan.   When 
one of our teachers helped us to relay our complaint about one of the teachers to the 
education department in Sabya, this teacher encountered some difficulties afterwards.  
The teacher was singled out by the principal and other teachers, because she had 
sided with the students.  In the end, the complaint never reached Jazan and the 
teacher who had helped the students was punished with an increased workload and 
salary deductions for minor mistakes.” (Ameera, 24, sophomore)    
 
Usually, girls are enticed by the promise of literacy and with how education can change and 
improve their lives (Horsman 1994, p.169).  For these girls, however, there is only a small 
chance that this dream can be realised given their circumstances.  Guthrie explained that 
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frustrations occur when a person‘s literacy level is more advanced than their educational 
setting, distancing her/him from others (quoted in Cornes, 1994, p.107).  Participants‘ 
interpretations are not only influenced by their personal experiences, but also by their 
perception that literacy can fulfil their needs.  This idea that literacy is the answer to their 
problem is not realistic given their experiences of the education system.    
 
None of the participants supported the television presenter, Fawzia‘s, argument that the 
physical abuse perpetrated by the teacher was justified.  Fawzia said that some teachers are 
treated badly in schools, are given bad salaries, and that large classes overwhelm teachers.   
 
“It is unfair to beat the student and to paralyse her.  If the teacher is unsatisfied with 
the salary or the management, she can take that up with the relevant officials, not take 
it out on a student.  The students are her responsibility.” (Bushra, 20, freshman)  
 
Even though participants appreciate Farah‘s sympathy for the student, and that she was 
against corporal punishment in schools, they did not agree with the example that she gave.  
Farah compared schools that allow students to be beaten with her daughter‘s private school 
where students and their families are treated politely and considerately.  
 
“Farah in her argument and solution, concentrated on upper and middle class 
schools but didn‟t offer a resolution for schools for lower classes and in village areas 
– they can‟t afford expensive private expensive schools like her daughter‟s.  Most of 
the episodes of Kalam Nawaim concentrate on the rich and the middle classes, rather 
than the poor.” (Safaa, 17, 12th grade)    
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These underprivileged women could not relate to the presenters, who clearly represented the 
middle classes.  The problem is that middle-class women are unable to identify with the 
sufferings of disadvantaged women.  Feminism has to take into account economic, social, and 
cultural factors.  Feminism has to be transformed from individual responses to injustice, to 
providing frameworks that can accommodate everybody‘s experience of injustice.  It has to 
be sensitive to serious differences and inequalities that exist between women in different 
classes (Skeggs, 2002, pp.157-158).   
 
The comments of those disadvantaged women correspond with the findings of a study by 
Nahr, Image of Women in the Arab Media- An analytical study to address the image of 
women on MBC, 2008, who conducted a content analysis of MBC programmes, one of which 
was Kalam Nawaim.  The results of the analysis revealed that the show focuses mostly on the 
middle-class, (64.5% of the time), much less on the rich (13.9%), and even less on the poor 
(11.8%).  The show is mostly about urban women (75.2% of the time) while only 3.2% of the 
show‘s time is about village women.  It also spends 69.8% of the time focusing on college 
women and women with less education only feature 5.3% of the time (Nahr 2008, p. 53, 54).  
In the in-depth one-to-one interviews, the participants explained to me in greater detail the 
kind of topics they like to watch on a talk show, which are not featured on Kalam Nawaim.  
Here is where the importance of triangulation comes in; one research technique (in-depth 
one-to-one interviews or focus groups) is strengthened by the other.   
  
7.2.3.2 Episode No. 201 (2007)  
The second clip played from Kalam Nawaim discussed the issue of incest.  Participants who 
had already heard such stories narrated what they know about it.   
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“I heard about a girl in the village who was raped by her brother and she was afraid 
to speak to her parents.  When she got pregnant, her brother escaped.  When her 
father realized she was pregnant, she told him what her brother had done.  Her father 
didn‟t believe her and killed her.  The father went to prison.” (Hala, 24, 4th grade)   
 
Discussing sexual matters in front of adolescents is unacceptable in a conservative traditional 
society like Saudi Arabia, especially in village communities.  One of the participants 
complained that such topics should not be raised among girls between the ages of 15 and 17.  
I explained to her that most of the victims of incest are girls in that age group, because they 
are afraid to speak up and cannot defend themselves.  She became convinced once she heard 
the views of 16 year old Sawsan and 15 year old Amal.    
 
“We wouldn‟t know what to do if we had had the same experience and we would be 
very scared.  Most girls our age wouldn‟t speak up because they would be afraid too.  
Mothers offer some advice to their daughters, but never explain how to act under such 
circumstances.  Neither school nor television helps us to understand this issue.” 
(Sawsan, 16, 10
th
 grade, and Amal, 15, 9
th
 grade)  
  
Another participant highlighted the difficulties that girls face if they have experienced incest.   
 
“Most girls are afraid to confess to their parents if they have experienced incest.  
Sometimes even the mother is helpless if the father is dominant and threatening.  It is 
hard for the girls to go to the police, the National Society for Human Rights or the 
Protection Centre because all of these services are located in the city of Jazan.  There 
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is nothing in the village, and girls can ‟t get to Jazan because they don‟t have access 
to transport.” (Hadeel, 30, 12th grade)   
 
Al Abdeen explained that the power given to the male relative guardian gave him more than 
he deserves so that he considered the woman to be his property, including her money, body 
and life.
28
 
 
7.2.3.3 Episode No. 182 (2006)   
The third clip discussed a centre called Madenat Al-Amal (Hope City).  After an introduction 
to Sharla‘s centre, a report was presented about an abused woman who was severely beaten 
by her husband.  The husband refused to divorce her, even though he married for a second 
time.  The abused woman said that she went to the police several times, as well as to the 
courts, but they were extremely slow to progress her case and, in the end, it was the centre 
that helped her obtain her right to a divorce.   
 
All the participants said they would like to have the same centre in their village to teach 
women about their rights and to speed up the process when divorce is sought and in cases 
involving violence against women.    
 
“One of my friends, as well as her children, is suffering at the hands of her violent 
husband.  She tried to get a divorce, but couldn‟t.  A centre like that one is vital – 
most women put up with men‟s oppression for the sake of the children.  Women need 
to be enlightened.” (Khadeeja, 30, 12th grade)  
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Similarly, another participant supported this argument by saying:  
“Women need such a centre to educate them about their rights.  The law and courts 
are slow in giving women their rights, especially in matters of divorce and cases of 
violence and a centre like that would speed up the process.  Also, it is difficult to get 
to court, or the Protection Care Centre or the National Society of Human Rights 
because they are all located in the city of Jazan and transport is an issue.  A centre in 
the village like Hope City would help a lot.” (Hadeel, 30, 12th grade)    
 
Another participant highlighted the importance of television programmes. 
 
“There is a shortage of television programmes that educate women about their rights, 
and offer solutions.  Women need hotline numbers in cases of violence.” (Faten, 18, 
12
th
 grade)     
 
Lila Abu-Lughod had the same experience with village women in her fieldwork.  She realised 
that women accepted television scripts when they ―increase awareness‖, whether about the 
importance of education, rights or values.  Furthermore, viewers are looking not only for 
advice but also for assistance (Abu-Lughod, 2005, pp.71, 97).    
 
7.3 Conclusion  
 
In this chapter, I have attempted to situate the women of Goz Al Jaafarh, as an active 
television audience, within a broad socio-cultural context, which highlights both the 
similarities and differences amongst these women.  I argue that through understanding a 
woman‘s social context, we can understand their television consumption in relation to the 
dominant ideology in the televised message.  
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The discussion in this chapter highlights a numbers of findings.  It shows that gender rarely 
reveals itself in pure form, but rather that it intersects with other determinations such as class, 
age and social backgrounds (Gray, 1992, p.31).  The participants‘ educational, social and 
economic backgrounds, as well as their age, seemed to inform their interpretations – those 
who had spent longer in formal education were more sympathetic to some dominant 
conservative views, such as those against the visibility of women and women‘s agency in 
society.   
 
The television programmes showed unrealistic solutions, unsympathetic feedback, or no 
solution at all to village women problems.  The women themselves had practical solutions, 
such as solidarity amongst mothers and daughters, which were not portrayed in the clips.  The 
women were more in tune with the fundamental structural changes needed to improve their 
lives than were the programme makers were and, as such, rejected the idea of village women 
as passive and weak – as was implied in some of the clips.    
 
One of the television programmes‘ unrealistic solutions was the idea of literacy as a means of 
empowerment.  The girls, however, are faced with the reality that literacy does not reward 
since they are witnesses to high unemployment rates amongst college graduates and bad 
treatment of the faculty, thereby clashing with the ideal educational system in their minds.  
They are also faced with the fact that they may have to be already empowered before they 
can gain access to the empowerment of literacy.   
   
In addition, girls between the ages of 15-25 thought that talk shows like Kalam Nawaim did 
not represent either their age or class based needs because, most of the issues presented were 
more pertinent to women aged 25 years or older.  They therefore highlighted the need for 
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more programmes for female adolescents.  Some girls added that there were programmes and 
shows on other satellite channels that they would like to see on MBC1 such as Wahed Men 
AlNas (One of the People), on the Dream Channel, which presented problems relating to 
disadvantaged classes.  Seerat Hob (Love Life), on the Al-Rai Kuwaiti Channel, and Sabaya 
(Young Female Adults), on the Al Mehwar Channel, also presented the problems of girls from 
all ages and classes.    
 
The participants also thought that presenters played a big role in the success of talk shows, 
and that Kalam Nawaim‟s presenters did not have the deep analytical skills needed to present 
the women‘s problems and could not feel their sincerity and seriousness; accordingly, they 
could not identify with the show and lost interest.           
 
The women of the village thought that their issues of poverty, illiteracy and violence would 
be more recognised in mixed shows and dramas, rather than in ‗women only‘ shows.  They 
thought that ‗women only‘ programmes were only watched by women and accordingly there 
would not be any change or awareness, whilst, on the other hand, when issues were presented 
in popular mixed shows more solutions were provided as well as more awareness in society 
about the problems that affected the women.  Other participants thought that the acting in the 
Gulf and Saudi dramas were artificial and that, even if they had good messages, they will not 
have an impact on society.  Participants thought that the image of village women in the Saudi 
and GCC dramas in general were unrealistic due to the clothes, makeup and hair styles used.  
Some participants suggested that, in order to act more convincingly, actresses should live and 
explore the villages that they were supposed to be representing.          
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Most participants pointed out the unjust patriarchal system that is revealed in the biased laws 
against women practiced by judges and the police in Saudi Arabia.  It is also presented in 
prohibiting women from driving, without providing them with alternative public 
transportations.  One of the problems in Saudi society is that families give absolute power to 
the brothers over their sisters, therefore, some of these men think that they can do anything in 
regards to women, such as adultery or sexual harassment.   
 
All participants agree that there is a shortage of television programmes that educate 
disadvantaged women about their rights and offer solutions to the women, especially in the 
cases of divorce, crime or violence.  They also agreed that the media alone will not solve 
their problems without actual centers opening to support women, as well as civil society 
institutions that work in collaboration with the media.     
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Chapter 8 
CONCLUSION  
      
This study set out to investigate whether or not MBC 1 and Al Arabiya have successfully 
applied media initiatives in their programming to improve the prospects of disadvantaged 
women, mainly in terms of poverty, illiteracy and violence.  Evidence in the previous 
chapters has shown that in order to answer this question, these media initiatives need to be 
analysed in the context, of other factors, namely the power dynamics and resourcing issues 
that decision-makers of these satellite channels are up against.  The preceding chapters have 
analysed programmes relating to advancing gender equality on MBC 1 and Al Arabiya and 
also how disadvantaged Saudi village women perceive television programmes that cover 
developmental issues.  Due to a lack of existing research, I used a variety of methods to 
answer my research questions.  By using more than one research tool, I was able to minimize 
the occurrence of errors, which can result from relying on only one research method.  I began 
my study by conducting ethnographic research in the form of participant-observation, in a 
village called Goz Al Jaafarh.  Then I conducted focus groups, interviews with disadvantaged 
Saudi women in the village, interviews with key players and decision-makers, and, finally, a 
textual analysis.  I started by conducting my ethnographic fieldwork, in order to use a 
participatory, bottom-up approach in my study.  This meant that when I interviewed the elites 
I was in a better position to explore and question any top-down thinking, be it in terms of 
how programmes were devised to improve women‘s status on MBC 1 and Al Arabiya, or on 
what basis media initiatives were put together to address women‘s empowerment or on any 
other top-down endeavour to address gender inequality.  This chapter will provide a summary 
of the findings from the different chapters of this study and will answer the research question 
about whether or not MBC 1 and Al Arabiya have applied successful media initiatives to 
improve women‘s status, mainly in terms of poverty, illiteracy and violence,  and how 
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disadvantaged Saudi village women perceive television programmes that cover 
developmental issues.     
 
8.1 Problems of the Initiatives and the Importance of Research Centres   
As has been discussed in Chapter 4, media initiatives such as that of Queen Rania and 
Sheikha Fatima are lacking several things.  These initiatives represent a dominant top-down 
approach that lacks participatory ethics because it does not involve lower class women and 
has no impact on women‘s empowerment.  The fact that each first lady wants to prove herself 
by starting a new initiative that she can put her name on, instead of continuing and building 
upon any previous endeavours, suggests that the first ladies‘ primary intention is to promote 
themselves rather than to contribute to women‘s advancement.    Accordingly, the problem 
with Queen Rania‘s Media Initiative, and others, is that they lack continuity because they fail 
to work cooperatively and build on each other‘s successes, and the initiatives do not run for a 
sufficient amount of time.   
 
Those who launch such initiatives must bear in mind that what the Arab media needs are 
research centres that can translate information into programming.  These centres would 
combine audience research and television scriptwriting, like the work of the Norman Lear 
Center and Population Communications International (PCI) in the United States, to produce 
and write entertainment programmes, like soap operas, for behavioural change, based on 
scientific studies.  In addition, establishing media monitoring institutions to establish how 
women are portrayed in different programmes is vital.  These centres can coordinate with 
media and other institutions to share expertise to produce better outcomes.   
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Officials from the MBC Group  confirm there is a need to establish media research centres 
and institutions for television scriptwriting.  These would gather and organise information 
and turn out skilled professionals, who, in turn, could produce developmental programmes 
combining accurate scientific information and technical reports written by international 
development organisations, in the form of entertainment shows, to make them 
comprehensible to, and enjoyable for, the average viewers.  The Arab uprisings were caused 
by reasons quite similar to the topics of this study; namely, issues driven by low development 
indicators, such as poverty, unemployment and inequality, which means the production of 
developmental programmes targeting ordinary citizens and disadvantaged women in 
particular, is much needed.  This is because programmes focused on development are one 
way to progress the development agenda and show the people that their voices are being 
heard.     
 
These demands of the people and the change in the political arena in the Arab world might 
give more of a basis for producing developmental programmes on news channels, such as Al 
Arabiya, that have more scope for incorporating the development agenda.  Afaneh explained 
that there is no comparison between Al Arabiya‟s cooperation with those in Queen Rania‘s 
Media Initiative and Al Jazeera‘s political agenda, which is more important to them than 
development.  However, although Hewar Al Arab, a hard-hitting talk show on Al Arabiya, 
only aired one episode between 2007 and 2010 that covered developmental issues relating to 
women, this one episode is worth more than all the development related episodes of Kalam 
Nawaim, a soft talk show, put together.   
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8.2 Disconnection between Programme Makers and Viewers       
Sheikh Waleed‘s declaration, ―I want my networks to make a difference in the Arab world‖, 
suggests his channels have goals that could potentially contribute, through news and 
entertainment, towards development.  However, after discussing the possibility of 
programmes that would help advance women in society with Sheikh Waleed, it became 
evident that, even though he may be interested in such programmes, he has fallen into the 
same trap of making sweeping generalisations to which van Zoonen has drawn attention, 
where women are lumped together as a homogenous unit, regardless of class, education and 
age (van Zoonen, 1994, pp.119, 123).  For example, he thinks highly of Kalam Nawaim, due 
to its high ratings over the past few years, but this rating is not broken down by class; so it is 
not known who most benefits from viewing it.  This was reflected in the responses of the 
participants in the focus group, especially the girls between the ages of 15 and 20, who 
thought that Kalam Nawaim does not represent their needs either in terms of age or class.     
 
In terms of numbers, there are few programmes that cover poverty, illiteracy and violence 
against disadvantaged women.  On Kalam Nawaim, between 2006 and 2010, discussion of 
poverty accounted for only (4.6%) of the total time for all the episodes combined, violence 
accounted for (8.13%) and education for only (1.21%).  The episode Soor Al Harem (The 
Wall of the Harem) was the only episode of Tash Ma Tash that discussed Saudi women‘s 
matters directly and it was episode 14, broadcast as far back as 2006.  Al Sakenat fee 
Golobena ran from 2009-2010, and focuses on issues around women‘s empowerment.  There 
was only one episode that discussed poverty and one education, all the episodes tackled the 
subject of violence, whether physical emotional or psychological.      
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The analysis of Kalam Nawaim, as discussed in Chapter 6, including the show‘s hosts, 
experts and guests, concluded that the show‘s style is not suited to serious topics, such as 
poverty, illiteracy and violence against women.  Neither the discourse nor the semiotic 
analyses of the presenters revealed any expression of solidarity with, or sympathy for, the 
participants.  For example, the presenters do not have the credentials to give professional 
advice to vulnerable women; there was a lack of empathy between the hosts and the 
participants, a failure to build constructive dialogue between participants and experts and 
decide whose comments were worthwhile and what solutions were practicable, and the list 
goes on.  In addition, in some of the show‘s sessions, the hosts were not fully prepared for the 
topics and, as a result, their comments were haphazard and irrelevant.    
 
Discussing poverty, illiteracy and violence against women requires a commitment to 
exposing other critically important subjects, such as social justice, a fair distribution of 
wealth, corruption, a critique of Arab traditions, and erroneous Qur‘anic interpretations, 
especially of verses relating to women.  This was illustrated in one of the episodes of Kalam 
Nawaim (See Chapter 6), when one of the presenters sided completely with a hard line 
Wahhabi cleric against Al Abdeen.  Even though Al Abeen‘s ―liberal Islam‖ approach, which 
seeks to challenge the patriarchal and tribal interpretation of verses in the Qur‘an related to 
women, is considered more conservative than other Islamic feminist scholars, she is still 
harshly critiqued by Wahhabi clerics and her approach was not even welcomed on a women‘s 
show.  Such controversial debates require genuinely knowledgeable presenters on a hard-
hitting talk show, like Al Thamina (8 O‟clock), which is something Kalam Nawaim has failed 
to achieve.  Al Thamina has been on air since the start of the Arab revolutions and was 
launched on MBC1 in 2012 to address everyday political, social and economic problems, 
including underprivileged women‘s concerns.  It enjoys a large degree of freedom and covers 
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ground-breaking discussions (MBC.net, 2012).  The difference in coverage between hard-
hitting talk and soft shows was shown in the coverage of developmental issues relating to 
women on Hewar Al Arab and Kalam Nawaim.  The presenter on Hewar Al Arab asked bold, 
pertinent questions and the experts‘ answers were thoughtful and insightful.  The 
professionalism, solidarity, sympathy and concern of the presenter, Taleb Kanaan, for 
women‘s status, evident in what he said as well as in his tone of voice and body language, 
were all completely absent in the presenters on Kalam Nawaim.  It could have had a 
tremendous impact on the decision-makers who watch this channel had there been more 
episodes on poverty, illiteracy and violence.             
    
In the focus groups as discussed in Chapter 7, the disadvantaged women had similar opinions 
about the presenters on Kalam Nawaim and thought they did not have the deep analytical 
skills needed to talk about women‘s problems, and they did not consider them sincere or 
serious about the issues involved.  As a result, they did not identify with the show and were 
not interested in watching it.  They also thought that presenters on other satellite channels 
who discuss social problems relating to the underprivileged, do so with greater sincerity and 
empathy.  In addition, girls between the ages of 15 and 25 thought that talk shows like Kalam 
Nawaim did not appeal either to their age group or their class, because most of the issues 
discussed were more relevant to women aged 25 years or older.  They therefore highlighted a 
need for more programmes targeted at female adolescents.  Some girls added that there were 
programmes on other satellite channels that they would like to see on MBC1, such as Wahed 
Men AlNas on the Dream Channel, which tackled problems relating to the disadvantaged.  
Fawzia Al Deree, who hosts Seerat Hob on the Al-Rai Kuwaiti Channel, was complemented 
by the village girls due to her empathy with the audience and knowledge about the subjects, 
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as was Sabaya, on the Al Mehwar Channel, which was also deemed to expertly discuss 
problems relevant to girls of all ages and classes.   
 
According to the women in the focus groups, television programmes, be they talk shows or 
dramas, showed unrealistic outcomes in situations, were unsympathetic in their feedback, or 
offered no solutions at all to the problems of village women.  The women themselves 
suggested practical solutions, such as demonstrating solidarity between mothers and 
daughters, which were not played out in the clips.  These women were more in tune with the 
fundamental structural changes required to improve their lives than the programme makers 
and, as such, rejected the idea of village women being passive and weak, which is how some 
of the clips portrayed them.   
 
In dramas, especially Arab Gulf dramas like Al Sakenat fee Golobena, there is a clear need 
for more audience research, especially amongst disadvantaged women, in order to devise 
scenes and characters to which viewers can relate.  Arab Gulf drama also needs professional 
writers who can write stories with much better plots and more robust characters to generate 
greater didacticism and excitement.  In general, the episodes‘ plots were flat and without a 
clear trajectory of action, climax, period of calm and then resolution.  The camera shots are 
slow and drawn out, drawn-out silences are common and the soundtrack sluggish, which, in 
conjunction with the weak plot, leaves audiences extremely bored, regardless of the relevance 
of the topics and scenarios.  Moreover, exaggerated emotions and wooden acting that lacks 
spontaneity and naturalness may also leave viewers unmoved, resulting in their losing 
interest.   
 
 288 
The focus group participants thought that the acting in the Gulf and Saudi dramas was 
artificial and that, even if they had embedded good messages in their plots, it would not have 
an impact on society.  Participants thought that the portrayal of village women in Saudi 
dramas, in particular, and Arab Gulf dramas in general, was unrealistic on account of the 
clothes, makeup and hair styles.  Some participants suggested that, in order to act more 
convincingly, actresses should live in and explore the villages that they were supposed to be 
representing, a kind of immersion.  However, most women in the village thought that 
poverty, illiteracy and violence would receive greater recognition in mainstream shows and 
dramas, rather than in women‘s shows.  Even though the participants liked watching Al 
Sakenat fee Golobena, some preferred the stories of Al Sakenat fee Golobena to be acted out 
in Tash Ma Tash.  They thought that women‘s programmes were only watched by women 
and accordingly there would be no change or increase in levels of awareness, whilst on the 
other hand when issues were presented in popular mainstream shows, better outcomes were 
crafted and a broader range of problems that affect these women covered.  Here, the views of 
the disadvantaged women match those of Suzanne Afaneh, who made the same point that 
―Instead of producing women-only programmes, women should be integrated into the 
mainstream, because we do not want to watch programmes only for women.  We would like 
to have women‘s empowerment issues addressed as public issues‖.    
 
8.3 Obstacles to the Production of Women’s Empowerment Programmes 
The main obstacle facing development in general, and the production of developmental 
programmes addressing women‘s status, particularly in a country like Saudi Arabia, is the 
fact that religious institutes control all the Ideological State Apparatus (ISA), including 
educational institutions, radio, television, press and family structure.  This makes Saudi 
society pre-capitalist and not progressive.  The influence of this unilateral form of Islam in 
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Saudi Arabia, Wahhabism, reflected throughout most of Saudi society, including among 
disadvantaged women, has turned some women against themselves by renouncing their rights 
in the name of religious belief.  According to Sen,  the dilemma in some societies is that 
gender inequality is perceived as natural and is accepted by women themselves.  Abu-Lughod 
critiqued the Arab Human Development Report 2005: Towards the Rise of Women in the 
Arab World, saying that the Arab intellectuals and activists, who were involved in writing 
this report, think that the cause of illiteracy and backwardness is a lack of education, but in 
fact it is more likely that poor quality public education for girls is to blame.  This was 
revealed in Chapter 7, where formally-educated women in the focus groups were more 
willing to defend some conservative religious patriarchal views, such as keeping women 
invisible in society, not allowing women on the Shura Council and a ban on women driving.    
 
The challenges facing media officials and practitioners are that this religious control can 
extend to death threats and fatwas that legitimise murder.  A fatwa was issued against Sheikh 
Waleed Al Ibrahim, and death threats have been made against Nasser Al Qasabi and his 
family, as was discussed in Chapter 5.  Due to this clerical control, these satellite channels 
owned by Saudi businessmen or members of the Royal Family are located outside of Saudi 
Arabia, either in neighbouring Arab countries or in Europe.  However, even at this distance, 
media officials and practitioners are not safe from fatwas and death threats.  What is more, 
Saudi Arabia is losing skilled professionals because they prefer to work for channels based 
abroad that have better working environments and are free from religious dominance.    
  
The main obstacle is when Qur‘anic interpretations, especially the ones related to women and 
professions, such as the media, are affected by political events.  For example, women‘s 
position in society and the media both changed tremendously after the Juhaiman siege and the 
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Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979.  Because both the Al-Otaibi assault and Iran‘s Khomeini 
Revolution criticized and embarrassed Saudi Arabia – the country that includes the two 
holiest mosques, at Mecca and Medina – as not correctly representing Islam, the foundational 
Wahhabism of the Kingdom was aggressively reinforced.  As a result, all plays, fashion 
shows, international events and cinemas were banned in Saudi Arabia.  Female broadcasters 
were prevented from reading the news, all female singers and other women vanished 
completely from television screens, women without their ID cards could not even walk 
around in public, even with their husbands, and sometimes even ID cards were not enough 
for the "religious police."  After the shock of September 11, 2001, when 15 of the 19 
hijackers were from Saudi Arabia, the Kingdom was under pressure to reform, and this 
included its media.   
 
Due to the fact that several issues in Saudi Arabia are used for a political agenda, especially 
where women‘s empowerment is concerned, Saudis are divided into reformists and 
conservatives.  Despite King Abdullah‘s promises of reform, he is just one player in a circle 
of powerful princes.  These multiple sources of powers have created two opposing groups: 
the reformists and the conservatives.  There is no set of rules that protects the development of 
women‘s status and most progressions have more or less come in the form of a concession by 
one of the powerful players in this circle.  Due to this tug-of-war between two opposing 
powers, the role of the media will always be limited, especially in terms of devising women‘s 
empowerment programmes, evidenced by Saudi satellite channels being located outside 
Saudi Arabia to be free of clerical control.  Accordingly, it will be difficult for MBC 1 and Al 
Arabiya to critically discuss sensitive topics like poverty, illiteracy and violence against 
women if death threats and fatwas like that against Sheikh Waleed Al Ibrahim remain 
unchallenged owing to a serious lack of governmental or constitutional control over clerics.  
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These contradictory powers in Saudi Arabia were represented by sophisticated high-tech 
Saudi owned satellite television like MBC Group and a pre-capitalist traditional society 
controlled by a unilateral religious institute illustrates Al Gethame‘s description of 
development in Saudi Arabia as “Tafra, “economic boom,” which suggests building the 
place was achieved much faster than building the person.  Modernity has thus only arrived in 
a physical sense, while, according to Al Gethame, backwardness of the mind remained.  Sen 
also highlights the importance of social freedom and factors such as, gender equality, for 
development.  Even though a rich country like Saudi Arabia is dominated by a capitalist 
system, what is crucial is that its society is essentially still pre-capitalist because traditions are 
forced upon citizens by religious leaders who unilaterally reject modernity. 
   
8.4 The Response to the Main Research Questions 
To what extent have MBC1 and Al Arabiya applied pan-Arab media initiatives in their 
programming on the development of Arab women‘s status?  How and why have they been 
implemented? How do disadvantaged Saudi village women perceive television programmes 
that cover developmental issues? 
    
MBC1 and Al Arabiya have not adequately addressed issues surrounding women‘s status in 
programming on poverty, illiteracy and violence.  Numbers-wise, there are pitifully few 
programmes covering poverty, illiteracy and violence against disadvantaged women.  There 
is also a dearth of programmes targeting young women between the ages of 15 and 25, and 
young disadvantaged women in particular.  My analysis shows that disadvantaged women 
preferred mainstream programmes, such as Tash Ma Tash more than women‘s programmes 
like Kalam Nawaim.  They think that the issues of poverty, illiteracy and violence would 
reach a far wider audience in mainstream shows and dramas, than in shows targeted at 
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women.  However, one-off episodes covering women‘s empowerment issues in Tash Ma 
Tash will not suffice.  Discussing poverty, illiteracy and violence against women are better 
covered by hard-hitting talk shows like, Hewar Al Arab, than by a soft talk show, such as 
Kalam Nawaim.  Such topics require a commitment to expose other critically important 
subjects such as social justice, a fair distribution of wealth, corruption, a critique of Arab 
traditions, and erroneous Qur‘anic interpretations, especially of verses relating to women, 
something that will not be on a ‗soft‘ talk show.  Arab Gulf drama that covers women‘s 
empowerment issues falls short in the same way that Kalam Nawaim does, since while it 
covers important matters, such as poverty and the value of education, it only does so in a 
superficial manner.               
 
Media initiatives tackling women‘s status could not be applied on MBC1 and Al Arabiya 
because they themselves need to be modified and developed.  These initiatives lack 
participatory ethics because they do not involve lower class women and have no impact on 
women‘s empowerment.  They also lack continuity, because they fail to work cooperatively 
and build on each other‘s successes, and the initiatives do not run for a sufficient amount of 
time.  Those who launch such initiatives must bear in mind that what the Arab media needs 
are research centres that can translate information into programming.         
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APPENDIX  
List of Interviews 
 
 
Focus groups and one to one interviews with disadvantaged women in Jazan-Saudi Arabia, 
February 2011   
 
Sheikh Waleed Al Ibrahim, the MBC Group‘s Chairman and Chief Executive Officer (CEO),  
Dubai, 22
nd
 March, 2011 
 
Abdulrahman Al Rashed, Director of Al Arabiya, Dubai, 13
th
 March, 2011  
    
Nakhle El Hage, Director of News at Al Arabiya, Dubai, 13
th
 March, 2011  
     
Ali Jaber, the MBC Group‘s TV Director, Dubai, 23rd March, 2011, London, 29th October 
2011  
 
Suzanne Afaneh, former Minister of Tourism in Jordan and former Head of Queen Rania‘s 
Media Initiative for Women‘s Development and now President of the Board of Directors of 
the Dead Sea Area and Ajloun for Development, Amman, 2
nd
 March, 2011 
 
Ethar Khawasnah, the Chairman of Queen Rania‘s Media Office, Amman, 2nd March, 2011 
 
Mazen Hayek, Director of PR & Commercial of the MBC Group, via phone call, 2
nd
 March, 
2013   
  
Anonymous source, interviews in person in London and by phone call to Dubai, 2013 
(precised date withheld to protect anonymity) 
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